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Abstract
In Western society we encounter contrasting prescriptions for how to live a happy life. Some
argue the key to life satisfaction is living in the moment (e.g., seize the day), while others herald
the importance of focusing on the future (e.g., pursuing goals, following one’s dreams). We
suspect, however, that these prescriptions do not work the same for everyone. The goal of the
present research is to examine whether the relation between temporal focus (focusing on a
present versus future goal) and life satisfaction (LS) might be moderated by participants’ implicit
theories of change and stability (Dweck, 1999). Incremental theorists believe that they can
change with time and effort, whereas entity theorists believe their core attributes are relatively
stable over time. We hypothesized that, because incremental theorists may feel more control over
personal change and future outcomes, they may derive more immediate satisfaction from
prioritizing future goals over present ones. In contrast, entity theorists may feel less certain about
‘what may be’ in the future and are likely to feel more satisfied with life when pursuing more
assured present rewards instead of striving for the unknown proceeds of the future. In Study 1,
we examined these concepts correlationally. We measured willingness to sacrifice the present for
the future, implicit theories and life satisfaction. We found that, as predicted, incremental
theorists felt more LS when they endorsed a willingness to sacrifice the present for the future,
whereas entity theorists felt more LS when they were less willing to sacrifice present goals for
future ones. In Studies 2 and 3 we experimentally manipulated the tension between present and
future focus. We asked participants to describe a recent decision where they either chose to
pursue a future goal (over a present one) or they chose a present goal (over a future one) and then
they indicated their overall satisfaction with life (e.g., Diener et al., 1984). Study 3 used a more
controlled set of goals (spending and saving goals) and demonstrates that incremental theorists

Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction

3

were more satisfied when they chose to pursue the future goal over the present one whereas
entity theorists showed the reverse pattern; but this effect only occurred among those with lower
initial life satisfaction. In Study 4, we directly examined the relationship between implicit
theories and feelings of personal control over future goals, a likely process variable. We found a
significant relation between implicit theories and feelings of certainty of future goal attainment:
incremental theorists were more certain about future goal attainment. Moreover, certainty about
future goal attainment mediated the relationship between implicit theories and life satisfaction. In
Study 5 we sought to manipulate this process variable (goal certainty) as part of establishing a
causal link between feelings of future goal controllability and life satisfaction. We elicited
feelings of perceived control (or lack of control) of a future goal outcome and found that
participants were generally more satisfied when the future was made to feel controllable than
when it was made to feel uncontrollable. Additional exploration of the data suggested that lowLS entity theorists might still have difficulty deriving satisfaction even from controllable future
goals. Overall, the findings suggest that implicit theories of change and stability importantly
moderate the satisfaction in life that people may feel when deciding whether to live for today or
sacrifice immediate gains to pursue their future.

Keywords: implicit theories, life satisfaction, well-being, happiness, time perspective, selfconcordance, locus of control
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Overview
In Aesop’s tale of moral virtue, The Ant and the Grasshopper, the ant worked all day
socking away food for the winter whereas the grasshopper sang and danced all day long. When
winter came, the ant had food and the grasshopper did not. The moral of the story is that success
is achieved by planning for the future and should not be spent squandering time in frivolous
pursuits, like singing and dancing and having a good time. Although humans are interested in
achieving success, they also want to be satisfied with their life. The fable of The Ant and the
Grasshopper suggests that success is achieved by focusing on the future, however, it does not
tell us anything directly about ways to be satisfied with life. Although the story suggests that the
grasshopper enjoyed his present-oriented hedonic activities, one cannot overlook the possibility
that the ant was just as satisfied by working toward the future. Indeed, two people may differ
dramatically in the types of activities that provide the basis for their evaluations of life
satisfaction (Schimmack, Diener,& Oishi, 2002).This thesis examines how people’s implicit
theories about personal change and stability may inform different routes to life satisfaction.
What is Life Satisfaction?
We begin with a definition of life satisfaction (LS) as this construct is referred to in the
literature. Diener and colleagues have found that life satisfaction is generally based on a person’s
global assessment of their own of life ‘as a whole’ where people choose their own criteria of
what is important (Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin, 1985). Subjective well-being is a
conceptually different construct in that it includes people’s overall life satisfaction evaluations
plus an affective component (positive emotions, such as joy and happiness, minus negative
emotions, such as fear and sadness); (Diener, 1984). Without the affective component, life
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satisfaction evaluations are thus referred to as cognitive, judgmental processes (Diener, Oishi, &
Lucas, 2003).
Researchers have found that present mood can sometimes affect people’s reports of life
satisfaction, however these effects are generally small and inconsistent (Eid & Diener, 2004).
Overall, reports of life satisfaction can be relatively stable over time because if people rely on
important life domains (which are often stable and chronic) when assessing their life satisfaction
(Schimmack, Diener, & Oishi, 2002). However, people can also use temporarily accessible
information such as a situation that is made salient when people are making their assessment
(e.g., when the tragic fate of others is present). Typically, temporarily accessible information is
only used when it is relevant to the person. For example, when the benefits of marriage are
highlighted, this information may be pertinent to a married person when assessing their life
satisfaction, but not to someone who is single (Schimmack et al., 2002).
In the literature on life satisfaction and well-being, there can be a great deal of overlap in
the definitions of constructs such as happiness, well-being, and life satisfaction (Myers & Diener,
1995). Additionally, there is cultural and historical variation on how these constructs have been
and are thought about by lay people (Oishi, Graham, Kesebir, & Galinha, 2013). In the present
research, we are primarily interested in capturing people’s global assessment of their life
satisfaction, rather than changes in positive or negative affect. Thus, in the present thesis, we
focus only on people’s evaluations of their overall satisfaction with life.
Temporal Focus – Living in the Moment vs. Planning for the Future
Advice about whether to live one’s life with a present or future focus did not end with the
story of The Ant and the Grasshopper. There are a number of popular, but contrasting adages in
modern culture about the best way to achieve life satisfaction. For example, some might say that
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the best way to achieve a satisfied life is to live in the moment and seize every day. For example,
Bill Watterson, the witty cartoonist of the Calvin and Hobbes series, stated “We’re so busy
watching out for what’s just ahead of us that we don’t take time to enjoy where we are.” Albert
Einstein’s quote “Past is dead; Future is uncertain; Present is all you have, so eat, drink and live
merry,” is highly circulated on the internet as is a quote by the great American poet Walt
Whitman, who said “Happiness is, not in another place but this place...not for another hour, but
this hour.”
On the other hand, there is camp suggesting the complete opposite: that the best way to
achieve a satisfied life is to work for a better future and to never stop believing in your dreams.
For example, Stephen Covey, acclaimed author and leadership trainer stated in his book, The 7
Habits of Highly Effective People, “Happiness (is) - in part at least - the fruit of the desire and
ability to sacrifice what we want now for what we want eventually.” Ezra Taft Benson, religious
leader and political figure during the 20th century has popularized the quote “Years of happiness
can be lost in the foolish gratification of a momentary desire for pleasure.” And popular
sportscaster, Erin Andrews, is known for her inspirational quotes including “Success doesn't
happen overnight. Keep your eye on the prize and don't look back.”
Because it is often hard to satisfy both present and future goals at the same time, there
can be a struggle in determining which prescription to follow. Two people can differ in the types
of activities that provide the basis for their evaluations of life satisfaction (Schimmack et al.,
2002). First, we examine each of these prescriptions individually, and then consider the kind of
person who might thrive in each context.
Live in the moment. One person may value and find pleasure in everyday activities such
as savoring good meals, spending time with loved ones, or working on a creative endeavor (e.g.,
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painting and sculpture). These examples suggest a type of “living in the moment.” Research has
found that living in the moment is an orientation toward present pleasure (Sobol-Kwapinska,
2013) which is sometimes referred to as hedonism (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Although some
cultural representations of hedonism depict people engaging in activities such as sex, drugs and
rock-and-roll, present-oriented activities need not be so lavish - or risky. Indeed, general presentoriented activities, such as stopping to smell the roses, often result in positive emotions (Brown
& Ryan, 2003; Sobol-Kwapinska, 2013) which can often lead to feelings of higher life
satisfaction in general (Lyubomirsky & Layous, 2013). Additionally, research has found that
people enjoy themselves more when they are absorbed in mindful challenge (e.g., immersed in a
project), or engaged in meaningful work (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Thus it seems as if a presentfocus can be very fulfilling and that some people might feel great life satisfaction with this
temporal focus. The downside to present orientation is that with less regard for the future, people
may have less defined future goals and may not plan appropriately for important future situations
such as academic testing and career goals (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Overall though, present
orientation can have many positive benefits (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Sobol-Kwapinska, 2013).
Zimbardo & Boyd (1999) found that present-oriented participants were highly energetic and
savored personal relationships.
Plan for the future. Another person may find little satisfaction in moment to moment
situations, but rather instead, find pleasure and deep satisfaction in working toward some future
goal; like planning a vacation or working toward a job promotion. These examples suggest a type
of “future orientation.” Thinking about ‘what may be’ in the future can be very fulfilling because
people tend to focus on only the positive aspects of the future and overlook any potential
negative aspects (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003). This type of positivity
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bias towards the future has been shown to increase people’s perceptions of their overall life
satisfaction, particularly when they are engaged in striving toward a future goal (Diener, 1984;
Schmuck & Sheldon, 2001). The downside to future-orientation is that working toward future
goals often means forgoing pleasure in the moment. For example, future-oriented students
indicated that having high ambitions for their careers meant that they had no time to “waste”
hanging out with friends; they were quite happily willing to sacrifice present enjoyment to
achieve their career objectives (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Overall, though, future orientation has
been found to be related to many positive consequences for individuals in Western society such
as higher socioeconomic status and superior academic achievement (Teahan, 1958; Zimbardo &
Boyd, 1999). Thus it seems as if a future orientation can also be very fulfilling and that some
people might feel great life satisfaction with this temporal focus.
You can’t have your cake and eat it too – the tension between present and future
goals. It can be very difficult to satisfy both a future goal and a present goal at the same time.
Thus, there is often a natural tension between the two choices where one type of goal may need
to be sacrificed over the other (Emmons, 1986). As noted above, students with high career
ambitions may end up sacrificing social friendships in the present in order to devote the time it
takes to achieve the successful outcomes they desire in the future. In contrast, people who prefer
to relish the time they spend with friends may end up sacrificing work projects and other careerfocused goals.
Where a balanced time perspective is most likely the best strategy for psychological wellbeing (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999), chronic time perspectives don’t preclude the fact that everyone
encounters situations where they are faced with making a choice between a present desire and a
future desire (Emmons, 1986). Although virtually everyone pursues both goal types at one time
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or another (Harber, Zimbardo, & Boyd, 2003), we thought that some people might derive more
pleasure from one type of goal pursuit over the other.
Temporal Focus and Life Satisfaction: Implicit theories of Change and Stability may
Moderate the Relationship.
People generally have both present goals and future goals (Harber et al., 2003). However,
this does not mean that everyone derives similar satisfaction from pursuing these goals. Let us
imagine, for example, a person working toward an ultimate future goal of owning a successful
business. In the service of this future goal, she must sacrifice many current pleasures. One might
wonder if such a state of affairs is satisfying or joyless to the pursuer. It may have to do with her
belief in her ability to achieve the future goal. If this business-owner is confident that the
business will succeed, then it may be possible that sacrificing present rewards may not seem very
challenging given the future success that she anticipates. However, if the future success of her
businesses does not seem likely or guaranteed, then every present reward that she sacrifices
might feel like a possible wasted pleasure in the service of something that might not even come
to pass.
So, who might derive pleasure from sacrificing the present for the future? We suspect
that incremental theorists, who tend to feel more control over future outcomes (Dweck, Chiu, &
Hong, 1995a), may feel more satisfied with life when they put their eggs into their future basket,
particularly if they feel like success is likely. A future focus is culturally valued (Spears, Lin, &
Mowen, 2001), and, when a person feels optimistic that such a future may actually come to pass,
they may feel greater life satisfaction in the present in anticipation of these future rewards
(Carver, Lawerence, & Scheier, 1996). In contrast, we suspect that entity theorists, who may feel
less control over future outcomes (Dweck et al., 1995a) may prefer to concentrate on present
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(more certain) outcomes rather than future outcomes that may never come to fruition. We
elaborate on this further below.
Implicit Theories of Personal Malleability
Implicit theories constitute influential top-down belief systems that are often found to be
stable individual differences among people and strong predictors of behavior (Dweck et al.,
1995a). Individual differences in perspective play a pivotal role in how people approach and
interpret the world (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999; Plaks, Levy, & Dweck, 2009), and
accordingly, may have major implications for life satisfaction.
Research on implicit theories of stability and change suggests that people differ in their
assumptions about the nature and malleability of human qualities and that these theories function
like knowledge structures (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995b; Plaks et
al., 2009) such that people regularly lean toward using one theory over the other as a lens
through which they interpret themselves and the world around them. Entity theorists believe that
personality characteristics are fixed and stable (e.g., a leopard never changes its spots), whereas
incremental theorists believe that personality characteristics are malleable and can be developed
with time and effort (e.g., turn over a new leaf). Implicit theories have been extensively studied
as a cognitive construct for their effects on motivation (Dweck, 1999), learning (Dweck &
Leggett, 1988), and person perception (Plaks et al., 2009), but relatively little is known about
their contribution to well-being and life satisfaction.
Intelligence Domain. The first work in implicit theories research began in the
intelligence domain with a substantial focus on school aged children. Dweck and colleagues
found consistent evidence that when children believed their traits were fixed and stable they
responded with helpless reactions to achievement setbacks, blaming internal stable dispositions
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for failure. In contrast, children who believed their traits were malleable responded to difficulties
and setbacks with learning goals and mastery oriented behavior citing reasons for failure as a
lack of effort (Dweck, 1999). Thus, implicit theories are argued to be a basis for the attributions
people make (Dweck et al., 1995a, Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999).
Considerable evidence has been found that incremental theorists pursue learning goals
(Burnette, O’Boyle, VanEpps, Pollack & Finkel, 2013; Dweck & Leggett, 1988); they feel
intelligent when they can master difficult problems, and believe that most of what contributes to
intelligence is effort (rather than sheer ability). In earlier work, Dweck et al, (1995a) found a
modest, but significant association between internal locus of control (Levenson, 1974) and
implicit theories of intelligence (β = .15) suggesting that incremental theorists feel more
confident than entity theorists in making their plans work and actively determining what will
happen in their life. After failure, incremental theorists tend to focus on increased effort and
remedial strategies to increase their chances of success (Dweck, 1999). Corroborating these
earlier findings, recent work in the self-regulation literature has found that in the domain of
dieting and weight management, incremental theorists felt less doubt and more confidence about
attaining their dieting goals which then led them to exert more effortful regulation in pursuit of
the goal (Burnette, 2010). Furthermore, a meta-analysis covering an age range from age 5 – 42,
primarily focused on the learning, performance and achievement domains, found that
incremental theorists have higher expectations of goal success than entity theorists and tend to
develop more self-control because they engage in learning opportunities (even though these
opportunities require extra effort) which in turn strengthens self-regulation abilities (Burnette et
al., 2013). Although less is known about these relationships outside of the academic, learning
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and achievement domains, it is possible that incremental theorists may feel a stronger sense of
personal control over future outcomes more generally – more so than entity theorists.
Because entity theorists tend to think in terms of dispositional traits and ‘how much’ of a
trait they or someone might possess (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997) they tend to seek out
performance goals – situations where they can show off their traits and validate themselves
(Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Entity theorists feel intelligent when the work seems
easy, and believe that most of what contributes to intelligence is an innate ability that one is born
with (Dweck, 1999). In the intelligence domain, entity theorists tend to believe that if they have
to work hard at something it is evidence that they don’t have a high ability (Dweck & Leggett,
1988). Additionally, when faced with failures, entity theorists have been shown to give up and
not seek remedial action – a helpless response (Burnette et al., 2013; Hong et al., 1999).
Furthermore, because an ability such as intelligence is a vague construct it is hard to know for
certain if one ever has enough of it; entity theorists tend to constantly seek reflections of their
abilities in their performance (to reassure themselves they have a sufficient amount). In general,
entity theorists tend to experience more negative emotions (than incremental theorists) during
goal pursuit and have less optimistic expectations about their ability to achieve their goals.
Results from a meta-analysis conducted by Burnette et al. (2013) found significant correlations
between implicit theories and negative emotions (r = -.32) and implicit theories and optimistic
expectations of success (r = .41) during goal monitoring.
Because entity theorists tend to feel less internal control over future outcomes (Dweck,
1995a), experience negative emotions during goal pursuit and are less optimistic about goal
outcomes, the entity theory system tends to breed uncertainty (Dweck et al., 1995b) and leads to
fewer and less successful self-regulation strategies (Burnette et al., 2013).
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General Person Domain. Additional research has shown that implicit theories affect
people’s social information processing; entity theorists tend to make dispositional attributions
about others’ behavior whereas incremental theorists tend to consider more dynamic elements of
the person within situation (Dweck et al., 1995a; McConnell, 2001; Molden, Plaks, & Dweck,
2006). Furthermore, implicit theories have also been found to have powerful effects on
motivation and self-regulation strategies (Ommundsen, 2003; Dweck, 1999; Burnette et al.,
2013), relationship communication strategies (Kammrath & Dweck, 2006), and other outcomes
such as stereotype formation (Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998) and punitive judgments of
criminal offenders (Tam, Shu, Ng, & Tong, 2013).
Who is more satisfied with their life?
Despite the large literature on the effects of implicit theories of change and stability on
social cognition, surprisingly little research has been done in the domain of implicit theories and
the “self-concept” beyond the domain of intelligence. For instance, not much is known about the
relationship between implicit theories and life satisfaction. For example, are there any
differences in life satisfaction between incremental and entity theorists? Is one group happier
than the other?
A substantial amount of research has consistently found a strong link between self-esteem
and life satisfaction (Myers & Diener, 1995). As Myers and Diener (1995) say, “Happy people
like themselves.” Research to date, however, has not found a relationship between implicit
theories and self-esteem (Dweck et al., 1995a; Hong et al., 1999), or perhaps a weak relationship
with incremental theory (Diseth, Meland, & Breidablik, 2014). In their seminal paper, Dweck
and Leggett (1988) suggested that entity and incremental theorists differ in the processes by
which they maintain self-esteem, where entity theorists feed off of performance outcomes and
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incremental theorists relish learning and mastery – both of which can lead to high self-esteem.
Thus, based on the literature to date, there is no clear reason to believe that entity theorists would
differ from incremental theorists, on average, on their life satisfaction.
Although we do not have any theoretical reasons to believe that incremental theorists are
more satisfied with their lives than entity theorists or vice versa, people with these theories
approach the world differently and possibly use differing strategies to achieve similar ends (e.g.,
self-esteem, positive self-regard). For example, differences can be seen in the self-enhancement
strategies that are used. Whereas incremental theorists tend to downplay past selves as a means
for seeing improvement in the present (e.g., “that was the old me, whereas the new me has
improved”), entity theorists tend to enhance past selves for the same purpose (i.e., as a means for
creating positive regard in the present) (Ward & Wilson, 2015). Thus, we speculate that because
of these differences in perspective, incremental and entity theorists might derive life satisfaction
from different contexts. For the purposes of the present research, we were interested in how
entity and incremental theorists might respond to alternative goal pursuit strategies: specifically,
focusing on the future (while sacrificing the present) versus focusing on the present (while
sacrificing the future).
Overview of the Present Studies
The goal of the present research is to examine whether the relation between temporal
focus (focusing on a present versus future goal) and life satisfaction (LS) might be moderated by
participants’ implicit theories of change and stability (Dweck, 1999). Incremental theorists
believe that they can change with time and effort, whereas entity theorists believe their core
attributes are relatively stable over time. We hypothesize that, because incremental theorists may
feel more control over personal change and future outcomes, they may derive more immediate
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satisfaction from prioritizing future goals over present ones. In contrast, entity theorists may feel
less certain about ‘what may be’ in the future and are likely to feel more satisfied with life when
pursuing more assured present rewards instead of striving for the proceeds of an unknown future.
In Study 1, we examine these concepts correlationally. In Studies 2 and 3 we experimentally
manipulate the tension between present and future focus. We ask participants to describe a recent
decision where they either chose to pursue a future goal (over a present one) or they chose a
present goal (over a future one) and then indicate their overall satisfaction with life (e.g., Diener,
1984). We hypothesize that incremental theorists will be more satisfied when they choose to
pursue a future goal over a present one whereas entity theorists are likely to be more satisfied
when they pursue a present goal over a future one. In Study 4, we examine a likely process
variable: feelings of personal control over the future. We test the hypothesis that incremental
theorists might feel more control/certainty over their future outcomes than entity theorists.
Finally, in Study 5, we explicitly manipulate felt controllability with respect to future goals as
part of establishing a link between implicit theories, feelings of future goal certainty and life
satisfaction as suggested by Spencer, Zanna, and Fong (2005). We hypothesize that when
controllability of future outcomes is emphasized, participants will indicate higher satisfaction
with life than when uncontrollability of future outcomes is emphasized.
Study 1
The goal of Study 1 was to examine if the relationship between one’s willingness to
sacrifice the present for the future and life satisfaction might be moderated by participants’
implicit theories of personality.
Evidence suggests that incremental theorists are optimistic about changing in desired
ways (Dweck & Leggett, 1988) and feel a locus of control over personal outcomes (Dweck et al.,
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1995a). Thus, we expected that incremental theorists might be most satisfied with life when
focused on, or generally oriented toward, future-planning. In contrast, entity theorists tend to
endorse a stable conception of ability and are not particularly optimistic about improving their
ability and skill level even if they try harder (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Thus, it was expected
that entity theorists might be most satisfied with life when they place importance on (more
certain) present enjoyment over future goals that they may be less confident they can attain.
The first study explores these questions correlationally. We hypothesized that
incremental theorists would not differ substantially from entity theorists on overall life
satisfaction. However, we suspected that incremental theorists would report the greatest amount
of life satisfaction when they endorsed a future-focus (i.e., sacrificing present rewards for future
goals) and that entity theorists would report the greatest amount of life satisfaction when they
endorsed a present-focus (i.e., focused on enjoying life in the present rather than planning for the
future). Finally, we measured additional variables for analysis to ensure that that the effects we
find are not explained by other plausible constructs (e.g., regulatory focus, Higgins, 1997; time
perspective, Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999).
Method
Participants
Two hundred and twelve participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
Nine participants failed one or both attention checks and were eliminated from all analyses
leaving 203 participants (Mage = 35.74, SD = 12.68; 111 female, 89 male, 3 undisclosed).
Because no gender effects were found in any study, gender is not included in the analyses
reported.
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Measures
Life Satisfaction. Participants rated their overall satisfaction with life using a
standardized one-item measure commonly used in national polls throughout OECD nations (i.e.,
member nations of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) (Helliwell,
Layard, & Sachs, 2012). On a scale ranging from 0(extremely dissatisfied) to 10(extremely
satisfied) participants rated their level of agreement with the following statement: “All things
considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?” Higher numbers indicate
more favourable evaluations. The means and standard deviations of all measures are reported in
Table 1.
Implicit theories. Implicit theories are described as the naive personal beliefs people
hold about the nature and malleability of human attributes (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck et
al., 1995a). Researchers typically use the terms incremental theorists and entity theorists to refer
to groups of people with different dominant lay theories. Incremental theorists endorse beliefs
about personal change (i.e., believe people can change their basic attributes and personalities),
whereas entity theorists typically endorse personal stability (i.e., believe that people’s attributes
and personalities are fixed and stable). We adapted the general measure of implicit theories
Dweck (1999) to measure participants’ implicit theory of personality (see Appendix A). On a
Likert scale with end-points anchored at 1(strongly disagree) and 7(strongly agree), participants
indicated their agreement with two statements: “People can’t change the kind of person they are;
no matter what they do, their fundamental attributes stay the same,” and “A person’s basic
characteristics and traits can’t be changed very much, no matter how hard they try.” Higher
numbers indicate a general endorsement of the entity theory of personality (i.e., the belief that
characteristics and personality traits are fixed and not likely to change). Both items are then
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reverse scored which provides an overall score where high numbers indicate the incremental
theory perspective and low numbers indicate the entity theory perspective. A composite score
was then calculated for participants’ implicit theory of personality (Cronbach’s α = .83). It is
worth mentioning that although the items did not offer participants the opportunity to endorse the
incremental theory directly Dweck and colleagues have substantial evidence indicating that those
who disagree with the entity theory also directly endorse the incremental theory (Dweck et al.,
1995a; Dweck, et al., 1995b).
Willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. We used a 4-item measure
developed by Hayes, Ward, and McGregor (2015) designed to capture the degree to which
participants are willing to sacrifice pleasure in the present in order to reap future rewards (α =
.79). On a Likert scale ranging from 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree), participants rated
the extent to which they agreed with four statements: “It is more important for me to enjoy life
now than plan for the future;” [reverse scored], “I am willing to sacrifice pleasure in the present
because I know that it will bring me more rewards in the future,” “I am afraid that if I sacrifice
pleasure now, I will never experience many of the great things that life has to offer;” [R], and “I
want to have a good time now, even if my future might suffer as a result;” [R]. Higher composite
scores on this scale indicate a greater importance placed on reaping future goals over attaining
present rewards. Lower composite scores represent the reverse: A greater importance placed on
attaining present rewards over reaping future benefits.
Regulatory focus. Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) describes two distinct types
of achievement motivation toward a desired outcome. Promotion focus describes a motivational
style focused on hopes and accomplishments resulting in eager approach motivation. In contrast,
prevention focus describes a motivational style focused on safety and responsibilities resulting in
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vigilant approach motivation. Regulatory focus is not part of our a priori hypothesis however, it
seemed prudent to examine it in relation to the variables of interest for the following reasons.
First, promotion orientation is often found to be positively correlated with subjective well-being,
particularly in Western nations (Fulmer et al., 2010). Additionally, regulatory focus (promotion
orientation) is linked to a general openness to change as part of an advancement and growth
process (Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999). Finally, the concept of promotion focus orienting toward future goals - may also be deemed as conceptually similar to sacrificing present
rewards for the future. Thus, we measured regulatory focus to allow us to examine whether
prevention and promotion orientations were alternate explanations for the effects of our
hypothesized variables. Regulatory focus was measured using the 11-item regulatory focus
questionnaire (RFQ: Higgins et al., 2001). On a Likert scale ranging from 1(never or seldom) to
5(very often), the questions ask how frequently certain events have occurred in a person’s life.
Six items capture promotion focus (e.g., Do you often do well at different things that you try?
Cronbach’s α = .64), and five items capture prevention focus (e.g., How often did you obey rules
and regulations that were established by your parents? Cronbach’s α = .87).
Time Perspective. The Zimbardo time perspective inventory (ZTPI; Zimbardo & Boyd,
1999) was used to assess individual differences in temporal orientation. This orientation (or bias)
is also described as a learned and habitual pattern of using temporal categories or time frames to
process personal and social experiences. While some people might have a balanced or flexible
time orientation with the ability to switch temporal frames among the past, present, and future,
Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) suggest that time perspectives are typically stable individual
differences: Some people are chronically more future-oriented, others more present or past
oriented, etc. Because one’s willingness to sacrifice the present for the future naturally involves
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the tension between two temporal perspectives (present and future), Zimbardo and Boyd’s time
perspective scale was used in the present study to help us to further assess and explain the
predicted effects related to willingness to sacrifice. The 56 item ZTPI comprise five subscales1
(as ranged from .77 to .87). Items (e.g., ‘‘I’ve made mistakes in the past that I wish I could
undo;’’[past negative], ‘‘I get nostalgic about my childhood;’’ [past positive], “I complete
projects on time by making steady progress;’’ [future],‘‘Since whatever will be will be, it doesn’t
really matter what I do;’’ [present-fatalistic], and, ‘‘I take risks to put excitement in my life;’’
[present hedonistic], were rated on a Likert scale from 1(very uncharacteristic of me) to 5(very
characteristic of me). Of primary interest are future orientation and present hedonistic
orientation, as these orientations each represent one component of willingness to sacrifice (a
future orientation, at the expense of present hedonism and vice versa). In addition, a present
fatalistic orientation might zero in on some of the hypothesized differences in how entity and
incremental theorists think about their ability to control and influence the future.
Procedure
Participants completed the questionnaire package online in one 30 minute session. After
the demographics section, participants were first asked to indicate their level of life satisfaction.
Then participants completed the adapted measure of personality implicit theories (Dweck, 1999).
Next, participants completed a number of tasks unrelated to the present study: the degree to
which participants’ needs are met (e.g., Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, 1943) and the degree to
which participants obtain information about happiness from a variety of sources (e.g., friends,
social media, television, and the internet). Finally, participants completed the dependent

1

A principal components varimax rotation factor analysis was conducted on the ZTIP. The fixed five-factor solution
that was extracted replicated Zimbardo and Boyd’s (1999) findings.
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measures. Means and standard deviations of all of the variables in the study are presented in
Table 1; Intercorrelations are presented in Table 2.
Results and Discussion
According to our hypothesis, the question of interest was whether the relationship
between one’s willingness to sacrifice the present for the future and life satisfaction might be
moderated by participants’ implicit theories of personality.
Central Analyses
Do Implicit Theories Moderate the Relationship between Willingness to Sacrifice the
Present for the Future and Life Satisfaction?
Because our research design included two continuous variables (implicit theories and
willingness to sacrifice), we conducted multiple regression analyses allowing us to assess the
implicit theory x willingness to sacrifice interaction term as a predictor of life satisfaction. We
entered life satisfaction as the criterion variable. Then, we centered both continuous independent
variables (IVs), whereby the mean is subtracted from each score to yield a mean score of zero, as
recommended by Aiken and West (1991); and entered both IVs in Step 2. In Step 3, we entered
the interaction term: Implicit theory x willingness to sacrifice.
As predicted, we found a significant interaction (see Figure 1); b = .211, β = .201, p =
.004, 95% CI = [.07, .36] that suggests that implicit theories of personality moderates the
relationship between willingness to sacrifice the present for the future and life satisfaction (see
Table 3 for β and t values for all predictor variables). No main effects for either willingness to
sacrifice (β = -.01, p = .87) or implicit theories (β = -.02, p = .74) emerged.
Next, we examined the interaction pattern in regression analysis by examining the simple
slopes at one standard deviation (SD) above and below the mean for the implicit theories
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variable. We expected that incremental theorists might report higher life satisfaction when they
also prioritize future over present goals (i.e., as reflected in a high willingness to sacrifice present
rewards in pursuit of future goals), whereas entity theorists might report higher life satisfaction
when they are less willing to sacrifice present rewards (i.e., focused on enjoying life in the
present rather than sacrificing now for the future). As expected, incremental theorists, defined at
1 SD above the mean, were marginally more satisfied with life when they were more willing (vs.
less willing) to sacrifice the present for the future; b = .28, β = .16, p = .088, 95% CI = [-.04,
.61]. In contrast, entity theorists, defined at one SD below the mean, were significantly more
satisfied with life when they were less willing (vs. more willing) to sacrifice the present for the
future; b = -.37, β = -.20, p = .04, 95% CI = [-.72, -.02]. Additionally, examination of the simple
slopes at one standard deviation (SD) above and below the mean for the willingness to sacrifice
variable revealed that incremental theorists are marginally more satisfied with their life than
entity theorists when high on willingness to sacrifice for the future; b = .25, β = .17, p = .09, 95%
CI = [-.04, .54], whereas entity theorists are significantly more satisfied with their life than their
incremental counterparts when they are low on willingness to sacrifice for the future; b = -.29, β
= -.19, p = .036, 95% CI = [-.55, -.02].
Supplemental Analyses
Is Regulatory Focus an Alternative Explanation for the Effects on Life Satisfaction?
To rule out the possibility that regulatory focus may be the true construct of interest in
these interactions, two analysis strategies were employed. Using the same regression analysis
approach as above, we first examined regulatory focus as a potential proxy for implicit theories
(that is, we replaced implicit theories with promotion focus in the model), and then we examined
regulatory focus as a potential proxy for willingness to sacrifice the present for the future.
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Promotion focus, an eager approach style, and prevention focus, a vigilant approach style, were
both tested. For the first two steps we ran four regressions allowing us to test the interaction
terms as predictors of subjective life satisfaction: promotion x willingness to sacrifice, prevention
x willingness to sacrifice, promotion x implicit theories, and, prevention x implicit theories.
Regulatory focus as a potential proxy for implicit theories. When the two sub-scales
of regulatory focus were substituted for implicit theories of personality in the main regression
analysis, neither the interaction of willingness to sacrifice with promotion nor the interaction of
willingness to sacrifice with prevention emerged significant (t’s < 1.16, p’s > .25). β and t values
for all predictor variables across each of the four analyses can be found in Tables 4 through 7.
Consistent with past research, promotion orientation was significantly correlated with life
satisfaction; r(203) = .54, p < .001, and thus emerged as a significant main effect throughout the
regression analyses in Study 1. Prevention orientation was not correlated with life satisfaction;
r(203) = .07, p = .32.
Regulatory focus as a potential proxy for willingness to sacrifice the present for the
future. When the two sub-scales of regulatory focus were substituted for the willingness to
sacrifice variable in the main regression analysis, the interaction with prevention orientation was
non-significant; b = .074, β = .05, p = .45, 95% CI = [-.12, .27]. Upon examination of the
implicit theories x promotion orientation analysis, both a main effect of promotion and a main
effect of implicit theories were significant. However, these main effects were qualified by a
marginal interaction; b = .22, β = .11, p = .067, 95% CI = [-.02, .46] (see Figure 2). In line with
our exploratory approach to conceptually related constructs, we took a closer look at this
interaction pattern and examined simple effects at -1SD and +1SD for both of these continuous
variables. Both incremental and entity theorists were more satisfied with life when high (versus
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low) in promotion orientation; β’s > .47, p’s < .001. Of particular note, entity theorists were just
as satisfied with life as incremental theorists when high in promotion orientation (1 SD above the
mean); p = .61, whereas, low promotion orientation (1 SD below the mean) seemed to be linked
to lower satisfaction for incremental theorists. Incremental theorists were significantly less
satisfied with life than entity theorists when low in promotion orientation; b = -.35, β = -.24, p =
.004, 95% CI = [-.59, -.11]. Overall, it appears as if entity theorists are just as satisfied with life
as incremental theorists when they are high in eager approach motivation (i.e., promotion). In
contrast, low promotion orientation (i.e., low in eager approach motivation) was generally
associated with lower life satisfaction, but in particular, incremental theorists were significantly
less satisfied in this state.
Lastly, in order to rule out regulatory focus accounting for our predicted interaction
between implicit theories and willingness to sacrifice the present for the future, we re-ran our
initial regression analysis with implicit theories and willingness to sacrifice the present for the
future as well as prevention, promotion and all higher order interaction terms. As expected, the
predicted interaction between implicit theories and willingness to sacrifice remained significant;
b = .25, β = .24, p < .001, 95% CI = [.13, .37]; (see Table 8 for β and t values for all predictor
variables).
Do Implicit Theories Moderate the Relationship between Time Perspective and Life
Satisfaction?
Zimbardo and Boyd’s (1999) time perspective scale was used in the present study to
provide additional explanatory power for disentangling the dual temporal nature of sacrificing
the present for the future for entity and incremental theorists. For example, we found that
incremental theorists are most satisfied with life when they sacrifice the present for potential

Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction

33

future rewards and that entity theorists are most satisfied with life when they do not. So, does
this mean that incremental theorists do not enjoy the present, or that entity theorists take no
pleasure in planning for the future? We speculate that it is the tension between having to
prioritize a future goal by sacrificing present enjoyment that truly captures the psychological
struggle experienced by incremental and entity theorists. However, by examining the present
hedonic and future time perspective subscales we are able to tease apart the built-in tension
between present and future in the willingness to sacrifice variable and answer some of these
important questions.
Because the willingness to sacrifice has both a present and future component, we looked
at these two components separately by examining the two most closely corresponding temporal
orientations – present hedonism and future orientation. We suspect that the effect of willingness
to sacrifice has to do with the tension between a present and future goal – but it could be that all
of the action really centers around people’s responses to a present focus, or to a future focus.
Perhaps incremental theorists are unhappy about present hedonism, for instance, or perhaps
entity theorists dislike a future focus state. Examining these separate scales allows us to
disentangle these two possibilities and compare findings to those for willingness to sacrifice,
which (unlike either time orientation) directly pits present goals against future goals.
In addition, present fatalism could be of some relevance to examine because it is tied to
our theorized explanation. Specifically, we expect that entity theorists might feel less control
over future outcomes, hence having a higher fatalistic perspective (what will be, will be).
However we also thought it plausible that entity theorists would not find present fatalism to be
unpleasant, whereas incremental theorists might find it more dissatisfying to have that viewpoint.
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Present hedonic time perspective. Present hedonism is moderately correlated with life
satisfaction; r(203) = .21, p = .002. It is possible that implicit theories might moderate this
relationship. To test this, we conducted multiple regression analyses allowing us to assess the
implicit theory x present hedonic interaction term as a predictor of life satisfaction. Again, we
entered life satisfaction as the criterion variable and entered both centered IVs in Step 2. In Step
3, we entered the interaction term: Implicit theory x present hedonism. In Step 1, we controlled
for the other four time perspectives: past positive, past negative, present fatalistic, and present
hedonic as all five time perspectives are intercorrelated (see Table 2).
We found a significant interaction (see Figure 3); b = -.24, β = -.12, p = .028, 95% CI = [.46, -.03] that suggests that implicit theories moderates the relationship between present
hedonism and life satisfaction (see Table 9 for β and t values for all predictor variables). Next,
we examined the interaction pattern in regression analysis by examining the simple effects at 1SD and +1SD for both the implicit theories variable and the present hedonism variable. Life
Satisfaction did not differ between incremental and entity when low in present hedonism; p =
.92. Although incremental theorists were less satisfied with life than entity theorists when highly
hedonistic; b = -.36, β = -.24, p = .002, 95% CI = [-.28, -.13], both entity theorists (b = 1.39, β =
.43, p < .001, 95% CI = [.88, 1.91]) and incremental theorists (b = .65, β = .20, p = .016, 95% CI
= [.12, 1.17]) were significantly more satisfied when high in present hedonism than when low in
present hedonism. Thus, it seems as if both entity theorists and incremental theorists may benefit
from a present hedonic temporal perspective; and entity theorists to a somewhat greater degree.
Future time perspective. Future orientation is moderately correlated with life
satisfaction; r(203) = .22, p = .001. It is possible that implicit theories might moderate this
relationship. To test this, we conducted the same multiple regression analyses as above,
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controlling for the other four time perspectives, to investigate implicit theories x future
orientation. The interaction did not emerge as significant; b = .12, β = .05, p = .36 (see Figure 4
and Table 10 for β and t values for all predictor variables). However, given that we are interested
in exploring future orientation as a variable that may provide explanatory information for entity
and incremental theorists, we went ahead and broke down the interaction by examining the
simple effects at one standard deviation (SD) above and below the mean for both the implicit
theories variable and future orientation variable. As anticipated, both entity (b = .63, β = .17, p =
.05, 95% CI = [.00, 1.26]) and incremental theorists (b = .99, β = .27, p = .001, 95% CI = [.41,
1.58]) were more satisfied with life when they were higher (versus lower) in future orientation. It
is possible that incremental theorists may be more satisfied (than entity theorists) when high in
future orientation, however, results find that, in fact, both theory groups were equally as satisfied
with life when they had a high future focus; b = -.12, β = -.08, p = .31, 95% CI = [-.35, .11].
Present fatalistic time perspective. Present fatalism, a tendency to believe the future is
pre-destined, was negatively correlated with both life satisfaction; r(203) = -.19, p = .008, and, as
we anticipated, with implicit theories; r(203) = -.32, p < .001; indicating that entity theorists are
more present fatalistic. In other words, it seems as if entity theorists are more likely to believe
that there is not much that can be done about the future – e.g., “que sera sera.” We examined
present fatalism as an exploratory variable with no specific hypotheses a priori.
We conducted the same multiple regression analyses as above, controlling for the other
four time perspectives, to investigate implicit theories x present fatalism on life satisfaction as
the dependent variable. We found a significant interaction (see Figure 5); b = -.36, β = -.18, p =
.002, 95% CI = [-.59, -.14] suggesting that implicit theories moderates the relationship between
present fatalism and life satisfaction (see Table 11 for β and t values for all predictor variables).
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Next, we examined the interaction pattern in regression analysis by examining the simple effects
at one standard deviation (SD) above and below the mean for both the implicit theories variable
and present fatalism. While life satisfaction was similarly high for both entity and incremental
theorists when present fatalism was low; b = .07, β = .05, p = .54, 95% CI = [-.16, .31],
incremental theorists were significantly less satisfied than entity theorists when high in present
fatalism; b = -.43, β = -.29, p < .001, 95% CI = [-1.51, -.36]. Entity theorists did not seem to be
bothered by high fatalism and did not differ in life satisfaction between high and low present
fatalism; b = .18, β = .05, p = .53, 95% CI = [-.38, .73]. In contrast, incremental theorists were
significantly less satisfied with life when they were high (versus low) in present fatalism; b = .94, β = -.28, p = .002, 95% CI = [-1.51, -.36].
Discussion
As expected, we found that incremental theorists are most satisfied with life when they
sacrifice present benefits in order to work toward future goals whereas entity theorists are most
satisfied when they are not willing to sacrifice present rewards in order to achieve future goals.
The willingness to sacrifice measure captures a particular tension between temporal goals – the
psychological state in which one temporal goal is achieved at the cost of the other. We speculate
that it is this tension that causes incremental and entity theorists to react differently. However,
because the willingness to sacrifice has both a present and future component, it could be that
most of the “action” is driven by one temporal component or the other. We looked at these two
components separately by examining the two most closely corresponding temporal orientations –
present hedonism and future orientation. It was possible that entity theorists find no satisfaction
when striving toward future goals and that incremental theorists find no satisfaction with presentoriented pursuits. However, analyses indicate that this was not the case. The evidence from
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Study 1 finds that both entity and incremental theorists report higher life satisfaction with a high
(vs. low) future oriented perspective and high (vs. low) promotion orientation. Additionally, both
types of theorists report higher life satisfaction when they are high in present hedonism as
opposed to low in present hedonism (though entity theorists are more satisfied than incremental
theorists in this state). Thus, the story seems to best captured when the present is pitted against
the future; when natural tensions from choosing one over the other surface.
We hypothesized at the onset of the present study that incremental theorists might be
more satisfied with life when they are future focused whereas entity theorists might be more
satisfied with life when they focus on present enjoyment over future goals. Results of the present
study support this view, but in particular when temporal goals are at odds with one another.
Because everybody has both present goals and future goals and sometimes must choose one goal
over another, it emerged that this element of “sacrificing” present goals for future goals (and vice
versa) appeared to show the predicted effect more clearly than either temporal focus alone. We
found that incremental theorists are most satisfied with life when they sacrifice present benefits
in order to work toward future goals whereas entity theorists are more satisfied when they are not
willing to sacrifice present rewards in order to achieve future goals.
Study 2
As Study 1 was correlational where causation cannot be inferred, the goal of Study 2 was
to examine the causal role of temporal focus (i.e., sacrificing one temporal goal for another) on
life satisfaction and the moderating role of implicit theories. Thus, in Study 2 we hoped to
conceptually replicate the findings of Study 1 using an experimental design whereby we
manipulated the tension between present and future focus highlighting one temporal priority in
contrast to the other. Similar to Study 1, we predicted that entity theorists would report the
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highest life satisfaction when the tension between present and future favoured the present. In
contrast, we expected that incremental theorists would report the highest life satisfaction when
present vs. future tension favoured the future.
In Study 2, we used Diener’s five-item measure of life satisfaction (Diener, Emmons,
Larsen & Griffin, 1985) as the main dependent variable (as opposed to the 1-item OECD
measure of LS) and pre-measured mood as a potential control variable in addition to initial life
satisfaction as captured by the 1-item OECD measure of LS.
Transparency Report: Failure of Random Assignment
Before explaining the method and results of Study 2, it is important to note that a failure
of random assignment was discovered very late in the writing of this dissertation. Specifically,
although initial levels of life satisfaction did not differ by condition (which had been checked in
preliminary analyses) it was later discovered that there was a condition x implicit theories
interaction on initial life satisfaction which makes it impossible to draw clear conclusions from
the pattern of results in this study. The results (and implications) will be explained in greater
detail below. The present narrative is included to clarify the timing of discovering this problem
(after subsequent studies had been conducted and the draft dissertation was written) and the
subsequent decision making process. One option would be to drop Study 2 from the package
because its results are so inconclusive. However, following discussion with the members of the
dissertation committee, we decided it would be appropriate to introduce the methodology and
briefly report the results of Study 2. Although this study leaves us with no conclusions regarding
our main hypotheses, the methodology became the jumping-off point for Studies 3 through 5.
Methodological decisions made later in the research process are better understood when Study
2’s method is first described. Also keep in mind that the problems of interpretation for this study
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do not pertain to a problem of methodology, only a problem of (fluke) failure of random
assignment.
In Study 2 we initially set out to manipulate present vs. future focus and also to test some
possible third variables/alternative explanations. Unfortunately, the results of two additional
potential third variables that were explored in Study 2 are also impossible to interpret due to the
failure of random assignment. These were: consideration of future consequences (Strathman,
Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994) and approach/avoidance (Elliot & Thrash, 2010).
Coverage of these items has been removed from the method and results section, however, the full
set of measures is still available for review in Appendix B.
Method
Participants
Two hundred and eight participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
Eight participants failed one or both attention checks, five participants did not complete the
dependent measures and nine participants spent either less than 30 seconds or more than 1000
seconds generating their present versus future focused event.2 In total, twenty-two participants
were eliminated from all analyses leaving 186 participants (Mage = 36.58, SD = 11.66; 111
female, 75 male).

2

Inattentive and careless responses can affect data quality leading to lower reliability (Mead & Bartholomew, 2012).
Careless responding in internet survey research is a growing concern. Mead and Bartholomew (2012) identified
approximately 10-12% of their student respondents as careless responders and suggested that an important index for
identifying careless responses is by examining response time. Thus, it was determined a priori that a minimum of
thirty seconds would be required to thoughtfully generate a present versus future focused event. Eliminating
participants who spent less than 30 seconds generating an event served as an additional attention check.
Additionally, we eliminated three participants who spent more than 1000 seconds generating their event as this these
participants may have been distracted during the process resulting in reduced attention toward the subtle
psychological manipulation.
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Measures
Life satisfaction pre-measure. As in Study 1, all participants rated their overall life
satisfaction using the OECD 1-item measure of life satisfaction (Helliwell et al., 2012): “All
things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?”
Mood. A one-item measure was used to capture present mood. On a Likert scale
anchored at endpoints 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree) participants rated their level of
agreement to the statement, “Right now, I don't feel very happy.”
Implicit theories. Similar to Study 1, implicit theories were measured using the Dweck
(1999) implicit theory of personality measure (see Appendix B). Whereas Study 1 used a twoitem abridged measure, the present study employed the full 10-items as recommended by Dweck
(Dweck, 1999). Five of the items were reverse scored which provides an overall score where
higher numbers indicate the incremental theory perspective and lower numbers indicate the
entity theory perspective. A composite score where higher numbers indicate a stronger
incremental theory was then calculated for participants’ implicit theory of personality
(Cronbach’s α = .95).
Manipulation: The tension between present desires and future rewards. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of two tension conditions: Sacrificing a present benefit in order
to prioritize a future benefit (future induction) or sacrificing a future benefit in order to prioritize
a present benefit (present induction). Across both conditions, participants were first provided
with a preamble describing the tension between [future/present]. It was stated:
“Sometimes in life, there is a tension between our happiness now (in the present) and
what we hope to achieve in the future. Sometimes we might feel that it is important to sacrifice

Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction

41

or set aside [an immediate (or present) goal/a future goal] or desire in order to [work toward a
long-term goal/satisfy an immediate (or present) goal or desire].”
Specific examples were then provided in each condition. In the present induction
condition it was stated that “people sometimes choose to enjoy a night out with friends now even
though it may hinder work on a project that might benefit a future career. Or, perhaps the
benefits of an enjoyable vacation now may be prioritized over a desire to save money for the
future.”
In the future induction condition the example given was that “people may choose to
sacrifice enjoying a night out with friends now in order to work on a project that might benefit a
future career. Or, perhaps a desire to save money for the future may be prioritized over the
benefits of an enjoyable vacation now.” See Appendix B for the entire script.
Goal elicitation. In both the present and future conditions, participants were then asked
to think of a decision that they are working on these days - or worked on recently - where they
are sacrificing some [present/future] benefit in order to prioritize a [future/present] benefit.
Participants were then asked to briefly describe what that decision was. The open-ended goals
(both present and future) were examined and coded for the general domain of the goals. For
example, 47% referred to financial goals (e.g., “I am sticking with my crappy old car so that I
can save up for a new house.”); 18% referred to family or relationship goals (e.g., “I decided I
would rather save up a little money first in order to get an apartment so that my daughter could
be with me.”); 15% referred to career goals (e.g., “I spend the greatest majority of my free time
working on building my businesses.”); 18% referred to leisure goals, 12 % referred to education
goals, and 8% referred to health goals. A number of present vs. future goals crossed two domains
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(e.g., “I decided to spend more time raising my kids and less time on my hobbies,” and, “The
decision to sacrifice free time with family to work overtime for financial goals.”)
Goal importance. Following the dependent variable measure of life satisfaction
participants were asked to rate the importance of both the present goal and the future goal (i.e.,
the present vs. future goal pitted against each other during the tension manipulation) generated
during goal elicitation. On a 7-point Likert scale anchored at endpoints 1(not at all important) to
7(extremely important), participants were asked, “How important was the future goal at the
time?” and “How important was the present goal at the time?”
Mood DV – Happiness right now. Because present mood can occasionally affect
people’s reports of life satisfaction (Eid & Diener, 2004) we were interested in capturing
participants’ mood prior to assessing life satisfaction in order to examine if mood moved around
by manipulated condition and implicit theories. We had no specific hypotheses for mood as Eid
and Diener (2004) report that mood effects are generally small and inconsistent. If we find only
effects of our manipulation and implicit theories on the life satisfaction DV and not on the mood
DV, we can proceed with more confidence that life satisfaction, as measured below, reflects
participants’ cognitive, judgmental evaluations of their life – a more accurate definition of life
satisfaction – as described by Diener et al. (2003).
Mood was captured with a 4-item measure. On a Likert scale anchored at endpoints
1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree), participants rated their disagreement/agreement with
four statements such as “Right now, I don’t feel very happy” [R] and “I feel very happy.” A
composite score where higher numbers indicate a more positive mood was calculated
(Cronbach’s α = .91).
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Life satisfaction DV. Life satisfaction (LS) was captured by Diener’s measure of global
life satisfaction (Diener et al., 1985). This measure captures a global evaluation of life as a
whole. The five-item scale has been used in a great deal of research and has shown consistent
internal reliability and strong predictive power (Pavot & Diener, 1993). On a Likert scale
anchored at endpoints 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree), participants rated their
disagreement/agreement with five statements such as “I am satisfied with my life,” and “If I
could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.” A composite score where higher
numbers indicate higher overall life satisfaction was calculated (Cronbach’s α = .94).
Willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. Willingness to sacrifice the present
for the future was the same measure used in Study 1 and in the present study was used to assess
the effectiveness of our present versus future tension manipulation; α = .77.
Procedure
Participants completed the questionnaire package online in one 20 minute session. After
the demographics section, participants answered the 1-item life satisfaction question and the 1item mood question. Then participants completed the implicit theories of personality measure
(Dweck, 1999). Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of two tension manipulation
conditions: Sacrificing a present benefit in order to prioritize a future benefit (future induction)
or sacrificing a future benefit in order to prioritize a present benefit (present induction).
Participants were asked to think of a goal they are working on, or recently worked on, congruent
with the assigned condition and briefly describe the decision. Following the manipulation, all
participants completed the life satisfaction (LS) dependent measure. Finally, they completed the
willingness to sacrifice the present for the future scale (Hayes et al., 2015) which served as a
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check of our manipulation. Intercorrelations between all of the variables in the study are
presented in Table 12.
Results and Discussion
Central Analyses
According to our hypothesis, the question of interest was determining how entity versus
incremental theorists differed in their life satisfaction after bringing to mind a present-oriented
goal versus a future-oriented goal.
Preliminary Analyses
As a test of random assignment, we first wanted to make sure that implicit theories of
personality, present mood and initial life satisfaction did not differ by tension condition (i.e.,
present focus vs. future focus). Therefore, we conducted one-way ANOVAs and found that lay
theories of personality did not differ by tension condition; F(1,184) = .12, p = .73; Neither did
participants’ mood at the onset of the study; F(1,184) = .28, p = .60, or initial life satisfaction;
F(1,184) = .73, p = .40. The means and standard deviations of all measures across the two
conditions (present focus vs. future focus) are reported in Table 13.
Manipulation Checks
Willingness to sacrifice present for future. In order to determine if the present focus
versus future focus tension manipulation had its desired effect we examined participants’
willingness to sacrifice the present for the future by condition (present focus vs. future focus).
Results from the one-way ANOVA indicate that the manipulation seemed to have its desired
effect. In the future focus condition, participants were more willing to sacrifice the present for
the future (M = 5.00, SD = 1.14) than in the present focus condition (M = 4.52, SD = 1.08); F(1,
184) = 8.09, p = .005, η2 = .04. Our manipulation check was also tested in regression analyses.
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Condition (present vs. future focus, with present condition coded -1 reflecting the reference
group), as recommended by Aiken and West (1991), and implicit theories, along with the
interaction term were regressed on willingness to sacrifice the present for the future as the
dependent measure. Similar to the results of the ANOVA, a main effect of condition emerged as
significant; b = .24, β = .21, p = .004, 95% CI = [.08, .40]. A main effect of implicit theories
emerged as marginal; b = .13, β = .13, p = .07, 95% CI = [-.01, .27], indicating that incremental
theorists, overall, were slightly more willing to sacrifice the present for the future; however the
interaction was not significant: b = .05, β = .05, p = .49, 95% CI = [-.09, .19].3
Goal importance. Additionally, we compared the goal importance ratings for present
goals and future goals by manipulated focus condition in a repeated measures multivariate
analysis. Recall that within each focus condition, participants were asked to recall a time when a
present goal was contrasted to a future goal. In other words, both a present goal and a future goal
were elicited however it was the tension between the two goals that was manipulated. As
anticipated, we found that in the present focus condition, present goals were rated more
important (M = 5.94, SD = 1.01) than future goals (M = 5.57, SD = 1.38); Pillai’s F(1, 183) =
4.56, p = .03, η2 = .02; and in the future focus condition, future goals (M = 6.14, SD = .73) were
rated more important than present goals (M = 5.05, SD = 1.60); Pillai’s F(1, 183) = 36.96, p <
.001, η2 = .17.4
We also examined importance ratings separately with implicit theories as a possible
moderator. Looking only at importance ratings of present goals, we regressed both implicit
theories and condition (present focus vs. future focus; effect coded, where -1 reflects the present

3

Results remained the same controlling for initial life satisfaction in the regression analysis. Furthermore there was
no main effect of initial life satisfaction on willingness to sacrifice the present for the future; β = .02, p = .83.
4
Results remained the same controlling for initial life satisfaction in the repeated measures multivariate analysis.
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condition) onto present importance as the criterion variable. As anticipated, a main effect of
condition emerged as significant; b = -.44, β = -.31, p < .001, 95% CI = [-.61, -.24] indicating
that present goals were rated more important in the present focus condition. Neither the main
effect of implicit theories (b = .08, β = .07, p = .33) nor the interaction (b = .01, β = .01, p = .95)
was significant.5
Looking at importance ratings of future goals, we performed the same regression analysis
as above with future importance as the criterion variable. As anticipated, a main effect of
condition emerged significant; b = .30, β = .25, p < .001, 95% CI = [.14, .46] indicating that
future goals were rated more important in the future focus condition. A main effect of implicit
theories emerged as marginally significant (b = .12, β = .12, p = .10, 95% CI = [-.02, .26])
indicating that, overall, incremental theorists rated future goals as more important than entity
theorists. Additionally, an interaction between condition and implicit theories emerged as
significant; b = -.15, β = -.15, p = .034, 95% CI = [-.29, -.01].6 We examined the interaction
pattern in regression analysis by examining the simple effects at one standard deviation (SD)
above and below the mean for the implicit theories variable. Entity theorists, defined at 1 SD
below the mean, rated future goals as less important in the present focus condition than when in
the future focus condition; b = .94, β = .41, p < .001, 95% CI = [.49, 1.40], whereas there was no
difference in future goal importance ratings between conditions for incremental theorists
(defined at one SD above the mean); b = .24, β = .10, p = .31. In the present focus condition,
incremental theorists rated future goals as more important than entity theorists did; b = .27, β =

5

Results remained the same controlling for initial life satisfaction in the regression analysis. Furthermore there was
no main effect of initial life satisfaction on present goal importance ratings; β = .01, p = .99.
6
Results remained the same controlling for initial life satisfaction in the regression analysis. Furthermore there was
no main effect of initial life satisfaction on future goal importance ratings; β = .01, p = .94.
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.27, p = .005, 95% CI = [.08, .45], whereas there was no difference between implicit theories in
the future focus condition; b = -.03, β = -.03, p = .75.
Do Implicit Theories Moderate the Relationship Between Temporal Focus and Life
Satisfaction?
In the present study, we had one continuous variable and one categorical variable. As in
Study 1, we conducted multiple regression analyses allowing us to assess the implicit theory x
temporal focus condition (present focus vs. future focus) interaction term as a predictor of life
satisfaction. We entered life satisfaction as the criterion variable. As in Study 1, we centred our
implicit theories IV. In addition, we adjusted our categorical condition variable to reflect effect
coding (with present condition coded -1 reflecting the reference group), as recommended by
Aiken and West (1991). Both IVs were entered in Step 1, and, in Step 2 we entered the
interaction term: Implicit theory x condition (present focus vs. future focus).
As expected, an implicit theories x temporal focus condition interaction emerged,
although marginally significant: (see Figure 6); b = .20, β = .14, p = .057, 95% CI = [-.01, .40].
When present mood (measured at the beginning of the study) was entered as a control variable in
the first step of the regression, the interaction reached traditional levels of significance; b = .16, β
= .12, p = .048, 95% CI = [.01, .32].7 The interaction suggests that implicit theories moderates
the relationship between temporal focus and life satisfaction (see Table 14 for β and t values for
all predictor variables). No main effects for either condition (b = -.21, β = -.15, p = .13) or
implicit theories emerged (b = -.19, β = -.06, p = .44).

When mood (measured just prior to Diener’s life satisfaction) was tested as the DV, there was no interaction
between manipulated condition and implicit theories (β = .14, p = .17) nor were there any main effects of condition
or implicit theories (p’s > .72).
7
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Subsequent Analyses: Discovery of Failed Random Assignment
As noted in the introduction to Study 2, condition differences were not found on initial
life satisfaction, therefore covariates were not included when initially testing our main
hypothesis. On the advice of a committee member, and late in the process, we conducted
analyses with the covariate of initial life satisfaction and found, quite unexpectedly, that this
wiped out the effects. For this analysis, the 1-item OECD measure of life satisfaction was
standardized and entered in Step 1 of the regression. Both IVs were entered in Step 2, and the
interaction term was entered in Step 3. With initial LS as a control variable in the analysis, the
implicit theories x temporal focus condition interaction was no longer significant; b = .03, β =
.02, p = .58 (see Table 15 for β and t values for all predictor variables).
Upon further investigation, we determined that the pre-measure of life satisfaction sowed
a marginal interaction; b = .30, β = .14, p = .068, 95% CI = [-.02, .61]; see Table 16 for β and t
values for all predictor variables. No main effects for either condition (b = -.15, β = -.06, p = .43)
or implicit theories emerged (b = -.06, β = -.03, p = .72). The interaction pattern on initial LS,
measured at the start of the study (shown in Figure 7) is remarkably similar to the pattern found
with our main dependent variable assessed at the end of the study (shown in Figure 6). Thus, the
overall results on our DV of lay theories and manipulated condition become impossible to
interpret and raise the question as to whether or not the effects (without co-varying initial life
satisfaction) are real.
Discussion
In Study 2 we used an experimental design whereby we manipulated the tension between
present and future. However, a failure of random assignment was discovered very late in the
writing of this dissertation.
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To be clear, it should be noted that Studies 3 through 5 were conducted and written up
prior to discovering the error in Study 2, however the following studies have been edited in terms
of any references made to Study 2’s results. We proceed now to Study 3 whereby we, once
again, manipulate the tension between present focus and future focus. In addition, Study 3 used a
more controlled set of goals (spending and saving goals). We go forward recognizing the need
for further research and replication prior to drawing clear conclusions about the effect and its
boundary conditions.
Study 3
In Study 2, participants were allowed to generate self-relevant idiosyncratic decisions
involving tension between present and future goals. We found that almost half of the participants
(47%) included decisions involving financial tensions. For example, in Study 2, one participant
wrote, “I made the decision to not go on a ski trip in the spring so I could pay my rent.”
Thus, Study 3 examined the finance domain more directly: spending now versus saving
for the future. Additionally, we elicited both a present goal (spend now) and future goal (save for
the future) prior to pitting the two goals against each other (i.e., the tension manipulation)
whereby one goal is sacrificed in order to satisfy the other. We anticipated that incremental
theorists will indicate higher life satisfaction after they describe saving for the future (rather than
spending in the present) whereas entity theorists will indicate higher life satisfaction after they
describe spending in the present (versus saving for the future).
Study 3 is different in two other important ways. First, in Study 2, participants were
asked to generate a recent decision where the present benefit/goal and future benefit/goal are
already paired and producing tension. Where this methodological structure may have captured
meaningful tension over which goal was sacrificed (e.g., present over future and vice versa), the
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simultaneous recall of both a present and a future goal may also have elicited present/future
tension decisions already favoring the condition (present focus or future focus) that the
participant was assigned to. Indeed, we found in Study 2 that participants assigned to the present
focus condition rated their present goals as more important than future goals, and in the future
focus condition, future goals were rated more important than present goals. To address this
possibility methodologically, in Study 3 we asked participants to first generate a potential present
goal (i.e., spend in the present) and then generate a potential future goal (i.e., save for the future)
prior to asking the participants to imagine only carrying through with one of the goals – either
spending in the present or saving for the future (the tension manipulation). Second, whereas in
Study 2, participants were asked to generate tension decisions that they made recently (or are
presently working on), participants in Study 3 were asked to think of a financial decision they
could make now or very soon the future. In other words, we focused them on yet-to-be made
decisions that is, by its nature, somewhat hypothetical in nature. They imagined how they would
feel if they pursued one goal at the expense of the other; we of course cannot push them to
actually follow through and have no information on which if any goals they actually chose to
pursue.
In sum, although we are producing a cleaner methodological structure for the
manipulation in Study 3 by eliciting present and future goals separately before introducing the
tension, it is possible that this improvement will come at a cost. Assigning people to imagine
selecting one of two financial goals could somewhat undermine the natural meaning found in
self-relevant decision-making between present rewards and potential future outcomes, because
the choice is more hypothetical and the domain is constrained to money.
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Finally, in the present study, we sought to directly examine the relationship between
implicit theories and feelings of certainty about attaining present (spend) and future (save) goals;
a likely process variable between implicit theories and life satisfaction. Previous research has
found that incremental theorists tend to feel an internal locus of control over future outcomes
(Dweck, 1995a) and have higher expectations of goal success than entity theorists (Burnette et
al., 2013), however, these relationships are less well-known outside of academic, learning and
achievement contexts.
Method
Participants
Three hundred and fifteen participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk and Crowdflower which are both crowd-sourcing forums. Forty-three participants failed
one or both attention checks, one participant did not complete the manipulated IV, twenty-one
participants indicated they had completed the study for a second time and eleven participants
spent less than 30 seconds generating their present versus future focused event.8 In total, seventysix participants were eliminated from all analyses leaving 239 participants (Mage = 37.15, SD =
12.95; 122 female, 115 male, 2 undisclosed).
Measures
Life Satisfaction and mood pre-measures. Life satisfaction and mood were premeasured as in Study 2.
Implicit theories. As in Study 2, implicit theories were measured using the Dweck
(1999) implicit theory of personality measure (α = .95).

8

As in Study 2, it was determined a priori that participants who spent less than thirty seconds generating a present
versus future focused event would be deemed careless responders. Thus, eliminating participants who spent less than
30 seconds generating an event served as an additional attention check. There were no participants who spent more
than 1000 seconds generating their event.
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Present and future goal elicitation. Participants were asked to generate two goals
independently: a present goal (spend now) and a future goal (save for later). First all participants
were asked to think about and describe a decision they could make now to spend money on
something that they will enjoy immediately and in the short-term future. Then, all participants
were asked to think about and describe a decision they could make now to save money in order
to achieve some longer-term goal or make a distant future purchase. See Appendix C for the
entire script.
Goal importance and achievement certainty. Following each goal elicitation (and prior
to the goal focus manipulation), participants were asked to indicate the degree to which each goal
was important: from 1(not at all important) to 7(extremely important). For the present (spend
now) goal, participants were asked, “How personally important is to you to act on the decision to
spend now for the short term?” For the future (save now) goal, participants were asked, “How
personally important is it to act on the decision to save now for a long-term future goal?
Additionally, participants were asked about goal achievement certainty for each goal.
From 1(not certain at all) to 7(extremely certain), participants were asked, “How certain are you
that if you acted on this short term [long term] goal, you would ultimately achieve the desired
outcome?” Participants rated their certainty for both the present-focused (spend) goal and the
future-focused (save) goal.
Manipulation: The tension between present desires and future rewards. All
participants read an introductory paragraph where it was stated that “tension exists between
spending money on things we want to have or do now and on things we hope to have or do in the
long-term future.” Participants were randomly assigned to one of two tension conditions:
Sacrificing a present benefit in order to prioritize a future benefit (future focus – save money for
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the future) or sacrificing a future benefit in order to prioritize a present benefit (present focus –
spend now). In both conditions, participants were then asked to imagine that “only one of the
goals can be fulfilled.” In the present focus condition participants were asked to “focus on
fulfilling only the current desire (spend now) – at the expense of the longer-term desire.” In the
future focus condition, participants were asked to “focus on fulfilling only the future desire (save
for the future) – at the expense of the short-term desire.”
Mood DV – happiness right now. Mood was captured with the same four-item measure
as in Study 2. A composite score where higher numbers indicate a more positive mood was
calculated (Cronbach’s α = .95).
Life satisfaction DV. As in Study 2, life satisfaction (LS) was captured by Diener’s
measure of global life satisfaction (Diener et al., 1985). A composite score where higher
numbers indicate higher overall life satisfaction was calculated (Cronbach’s α = .92).
Willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. Willingness to sacrifice the present
for the future was the same measure used in Study 1 and in the present study was used to assess
the effectiveness of our present versus future tension manipulation; Cronbach’s α = .77.
Procedure
Participants completed the questionnaire package online in one 20 minute session in the
same order as listed above (see also Appendix C). Intercorrelations between all of the variables
in the study are presented in Table 17.
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Results and Discussion
Central Analyses
Preliminary Analyses
To check the success of random assignment, we first wanted to make sure that implicit
theories of personality, present mood and the LS pre-measure did not differ by tension condition
(i.e., present focus vs. future focus). Therefore, we conducted one-way ANOVAs and found that
lay theories of personality did not differ by tension condition; F(1, 237) = .23, p = .63; neither
did participants’ mood at the onset of the study; F(1, 237) = 2.04, p = .16. However, we did find
a marginal difference in participants’ pre-measure of life satisfaction by condition; F(1, 237) =
3.72, p = .055, η2 = .015 such that participants in the present focus (spend now) condition
reported lower life satisfaction at the onset of the study; Mpres = 7.04, SD = 2.28, than those in the
future focus (save) condition; Mfut= 7.55, SD = 2.09.9 We investigate the differences between
those initially low and high in life satisfaction further on. The means and standard deviations of
all measures across the two conditions (present focus vs. future focus) are reported in Table 18.
Manipulation Checks
Willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. In order to determine if the present
focus versus future focus tension manipulation had its desired effect we examined participants’
willingness to sacrifice the present for the future by condition (present focus vs. future focus).
We regressed condition (present vs. future focus using effect codes) and implicit theories, along
with the interaction term, onto the willingness to sacrifice composite score as the dependent
measure. Although we might have expected a main effect of condition, this did not emerge as

9

Similar to Study 2, after writing the dissertation in its entirety, a precautionary check of random assignment was
performed on initial life satisfaction and mood by regressing both condition and implicit theories on to these premeasures. In the present study, an interaction did not emerge for initial life satisfaction (β = .002, p = .97) nor did an
interaction emerge for initial mood (β = -.05, p = .43).
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significant: β = .01, p = .83. The main effect of implicit theories was also not significant; β = .09,
p = .15, nor was the interaction; β = .001, p = .99.10
It is possible that measuring willingness to sacrifice the present for the future was not the
most suitable manipulation check in the present study for a couple of reasons. First, this variable
was measured at the end of the study, and any potential effects of the manipulation may have
dissipated by the time participants got to this questionnaire. A more likely explanation is that the
manipulation itself was importantly different than the manipulation of Study 2 where differences
were seen in the willingness to sacrifice manipulation check measure. In Study 2 participants
were asked to think of a time they decided (or are currently deciding) to sacrifice the present for
the future for a personally chosen goal that they actually worked on or were planning to. The
manipulation of the present study, on the other hand, asked participants to imagine fulfilling only
one of their financial goals; a process that is more hypothetical in nature and thus, not as likely to
convince participants of their underlying willingness to sacrifice one way or the other.
Goal importance. Similar to Study 2, we compared the goal importance ratings for
present goals and future goals by manipulated focus condition in a repeated measures
multivariate analysis. In Study 2, participants seemed to choose goals whose relative importance
was also congruent with the condition they were assigned to (e.g., present goals were rated more
important than future goals in the present focus condition, and vice versa in the future focus
condition). In the financial domain of the present study, recall that importance was measured
prior to the goal focus manipulation so it should be unaffected by condition. We found that
future-oriented (saving goals) were rated more important overall (M = 5.87, SD = 1.32) than
present-oriented (spending goals) (M = 4.42, SD = 1.62); Pillai’s F(1, 234) = 143.30, p < .001, η2

10

Results were the same when we controlled for initial life satisfaction.
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= .38; and this was consistent across conditions. There was no within-subject (present/future
ratings) interaction with condition; Pillai’s F(1, 234) = .96, p = .33, or with implicit theories;
Pillai’s F(1, 234) = 1.20, p = .27; nor was there a 3-way interaction; Pillai’s F(1, 234) = .83, p =
.37.11
We also examined importance ratings separately with implicit theories as a possible
moderator. Looking first at importance ratings of present (spend) goals, we regressed both
implicit theories and condition (present vs. future; effect coded) onto present importance as the
criterion variable. Neither the main effect of condition (β = -.01, p = .86), nor the interaction (β =
-.04, p = .64) emerged as significant. A main effect of implicit theories emerged as marginal; b =
.15, β = .11, p = .09, 95% CI = [-.03, .32], suggesting that incremental theorists rated the present
(spend) goal as somewhat more important than entity theorists overall.12
Looking at importance ratings of future (save) goals, we performed the same regression
analysis as above with future importance as the criterion variable. Neither the main effect of
condition (β = .08, p = .25) or the main effect of implicit theories (β = -.06, p = .37) emerged as
significant. An interaction, however, emerged as marginal; b = -.12, β = -.11, p = .08, 95% CI =
[-.27, .02].13 A review of simple effects found that entity theorists rated future (save) goals as
marginally more important than incremental theorists in the future-focus condition; b = -.19, β =
-.17, p = .06, 05% CI = [-.38, .01], whereas they did not differ in the present-focus condition; β =
.06, p = .56. Entity theorists also rated future (save) goals as more important in the future-focus
condition than they did in the present-focus condition; b = .48, β = .18, p = .05, 95% CI = [.00,
.95], whereas incremental theorists did not differ between conditions; β = -.03, p = .72. The

11

Results were the same when we controlled for initial life satisfaction.
Results were the same when we controlled for initial life satisfaction, however, the initial marginal effect of
implicit theories became less significant (β = .10, p = .11).
13
The same results were obtained when we controlled for initial life satisfaction.
12
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interaction for future goal importance should be interpreted with caution as these ratings were
captured before participants were randomly assignment to condition. We will control for this
variable when testing our main hypothesis.
Goal achievement certainty. As with goal importance ratings, goal achievement
certainty was measured immediately after each goal elicitation and prior to random assignment
of condition, thus, goal achievement certainty should not differ by condition. One-way ANOVAs
were conducted and, indeed, we found that participants felt just as certain about achieving the
present (spend) goal in the present-focused condition (M = 5.73, SD = 1.30) as they did in the
future-focused condition (M = 5.84, SD = 1.34); F(1, 237) = .54, p = .54. Participants also felt
just as certain about achieving the future (save) goal in the present-focused condition (M = 5.29,
SD = 1.50) as they did in the future-focused condition (M = 5.43, SD = 1.48); F(1, 237) = .46, p
= .46. Notably, participants felt more certain overall of achieving the present outcome (M = 5.78,
SD = 1.32) than the future outcome (M = 5.36, SD = 1.49); F(1, 237) = 16.98, p < .001, η2 = .07.
We also examined certainty ratings separately with implicit theories included as a
predictor. Looking first at certainty ratings of present (spend) goals, we regressed both implicit
theories and condition (present vs. future; effect coded) onto present goal certainty as the
criterion variable. Previous research has found that incremental theorists tend to feel more
internal control over one’s outcomes (vs. entity theorists; Dweck et al., 1995a) and tend to report
higher expectations of goal success (Burnette et al., 2013). However, it was possible that both
entity and incremental theorists might feel certain about achieving imminent (i.e., present) goals.
Despite this possibility, a main effect of implicit theories emerged as significant; b = .17, β = .15,
p = .02, 95% CI = [.03, .31], suggesting that incremental theorists did, indeed, feel more certain
about achieving present (spend) goals overall. As expected, there was no effect of condition; β =
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.03, p =.67, however, an unexpected interaction emerged as significant; b = .14, β = .13, p = .05,
95% CI = [.00, .28].14 A review of simple effects found that entity and incremental theorists did
not differ on certainty about achieving present (spend) goals in the present-focused condition; β
= .03, p = .75, whereas, in the future-focused condition, incremental theorists were more certain
about achieving the spending goals than entity theorists; b = .31, β = .28, p = .002, 95% CI =
[.12, .50]. Also, entity theorists did not differ in certainty about spending in the present between
the present-focused and future-focused conditions; β = -.09, p = .32, whereas incremental
theorists felt marginally more certain about achieving present (spend) goals in the future-focused
condition than they did in the present-focused condition; b = .38, β = .15, p = .09, 95% CI = [.06, .82]. As with the future goal importance ratings above, the interaction for present goal
achievement certainty should be interpreted with caution as these ratings were garnered prior to
random assignment to the two conditions. We will control for this variable in tests of our main
hypothesis.
Looking at certainty ratings of future (save) goals, we ran the same regression for futuregoal certainty as the criterion variable. Based on Burnette et al.’s findings (2013) noted above
(i.e., incremental theorists hold higher expectations of goal success), we anticipated that
incremental theorists might feel more certain about achieving more distant/future goals. As
expected, a main effect of implicit theories emerged as significant; b = .18, β = .15, p = .02, 95%
CI = [.03, .34], suggesting that, similar to present (spend) goal certainty, incremental theorists
felt more certain about achieving future (save) goals as well. There was no effect of condition; β
= .03, p =.67 nor an interaction between condition and implicit theories; β = -.07, p = .27.15

14
15

Results were the same when we controlled for initial life satisfaction.
The same results were obtained when we controlled for initial life satisfaction.
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Do Implicit Theories Moderate the Relationship Between Temporal Perspective and Life
Satisfaction?
As in Study 2, we conducted multiple regression analyses allowing us to assess the
implicit theory x temporal focus condition (present focus vs. future focus) interaction term as a
predictor of life satisfaction. We entered the centred implicit theories IV and our effect coded
condition variable in Step 1. In Step 2 we entered the interaction term: Implicit theory x
condition (present focus vs. future focus, effect coded). Inconsistent with predictions, the
predicted two-way interaction did not emerge as significant: β = .04, p = .52. 16,17 Neither the
main effect of condition (β = .08, p = .20) nor implicit theories was significant (β = .05, p = .45).
Does income play a moderating role? We wondered if it was possible that income (as
measured during the demographic intake at the beginning of the study) might play a moderating
role. Considering that the domain of focus for the present study was the financial domain, it is
entirely possible that people with more money/higher incomes might not experience the same
tension between spending now and saving for later. For example, buying concert tickets now
might not really interfere with saving for a house. For someone with higher income, this type of
decision-making might not create tension between present goals and future goals.
Thus, we ran the same regression analysis as above with income as an additional
moderator. However, before proceeding with this analysis, we confirmed that income did not
vary between the manipulated conditions; F(1, 223) = .17, p = .70. Results of the 3-way
regression analysis on life satisfaction found that the three-way interaction between condition,

16

The same results were obtained when we controlled for initial life satisfaction as well as when controlling for
future goal importance and present goal achievement certainty.
17
When mood was tested as the DV, there was no interaction between manipulated condition and implicit theories
(β = -.02, p = .74). Only an effect of implicit theories emerged for mood; b = .32, β = .23, p < .001, 95% CI = [.15,
.50], suggesting that incremental theorists had a more positive mood than entity theorists. This finding is consistent
with the initial mood measure at the start of the study. There was no main effect of condition (b = .09, p = .18).
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implicit theories and income did not emerge as significant: b = -.02, β = -.04, p = .60, 95% CI =
[-.07, .40].18
In the present study, income and initial life satisfaction are correlated; r(225) = .18, p =
.009. To illustrate this, when we examined income differences between those low and high (via
median split) in initial life satisfaction using a one-way ANOVA we found that participants
initially high in life satisfaction earned significantly more money (MHighSat = $58,996, SD =
$33,375) than those initially low in life satisfaction (MLowSat = $48,532, SD = $33,132); F(1, 223)
= 5.36, p = .022, η2 = .02. However, we surmised, that although income can often be a rough
indicator of life satisfaction (Meyers & Diener, 1995), it is not always a perfect indicator of life
satisfaction as some people might find great life satisfaction even when they are living on very
little (Meyers & Diener, 1995).
To this point, we found that physical resources (i.e., income) did not play a moderating
role with implicit theories and temporal focus (present vs. future), however, there may be
something about psychological resources that may play an important role. Myers and Diener
(1995) found that satisfaction with income can be a better predictor of life satisfaction than
actual income. Based on this reasoning, we decided to examine initial life satisfaction (measured
at the beginning of the study) as an additional independent variable/moderator in the original
regression.
Does Initial life satisfaction play a moderating role? We conducted a multiple
regression analysis allowing us to assess the initial life satisfaction x implicit theory x temporal
focus condition (present focus vs. future focus) interaction term as a predictor of life satisfaction.
As anticipated, a significant main effect of initial life satisfaction revealed that initial LS

18

The same results were obtained when we controlled for initial life satisfaction as well as when controlling for
future goal importance and present goal achievement certainty.
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predicted later LS; b = .54, β = .82, p < .001, 95% CI = [.49, .59]. More importantly, a three-way
interaction between implicit theory, condition, and initial life satisfaction also emerged
significant; b = -.09, β = -.11, p = .03, 95% CI = [-.16, -.01]. None of the other main effects or
two-way interactions were significant (p’s > .12). See Table 19 for β and t values for all predictor
variables.19, 20
Next, we broke down the three-way interaction by examining the initial low and high
satisfaction groups separately. An implicit theories x temporal focus condition interaction did not
emerge for those initially high in life satisfaction (see Figure 8); b = -.02, β = -.03, p = .76,
whereas, as anticipated, the interaction did emerge as significant for those initially low in life
satisfaction (see Figure 9); b = .24, β = .22, p = .031, 95% CI = [.02, .45].21, 22 No main effect for
either condition (b = -.02, β = -.02, p = .87) or implicit theory (b = .14, β = .13, p = .21) emerged
among those low in initial life satisfaction; see Table 20 for β and t values.
Next, we examined the interaction pattern for those low in initial life satisfaction in
regression analysis by examining the simple effects at one standard deviation (SD) above and
below the mean for the implicit theories variable. Similar to the pattern we saw in Study 2, entity
theorists (defined at 1 SD below the mean) were somewhat but not significantly more satisfied
with life than incremental theorists (defined at 1 SD above the mean) when temporal tension

19

The same results were obtained when controlling for future goal importance and present goal achievement
certainty.
20
When mood was tested as the DV, there was no 3-way interaction between initial life satisfaction, manipulated
condition and implicit theories (β = -.06, p = .28). Furthermore, when mood (DV) was entered as a control variable
in the initial regression, the 3-way interaction on Diener LS remained close to significant; b = -.04, β = -.07, p =
.058, 95% CI = [ -.07, .00].
21
When mood was tested as the DV, there was no interaction between manipulated condition and implicit theories
(β = .00, p = .99) for those initially low in life satisfaction – nor was there an interaction for those initially high in
life satisfaction (β = -.02, p = .83). Furthermore, when mood (DV) was entered as a control variable in the initial
regression for those initially low in life satisfaction, the interaction on Diener LS strengthened; b = .24, β = .22, p =
.008, 95% CI = [.07, .41].
22
The same results were obtained when controlling for future goal importance and present goal achievement
certainty.
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favoured a present focus; b = -.57, β = -.23, p = .11, 95% CI = [-1.28, .13]. Incremental theorists
were much more satisfied than entity theorists in the future focus condition; b = .38, β = .34, p =
.024, 95% CI = [.05, .70], but not significantly more than in the present focus condition; b = .49,
β = .20, p = .15, 95% CI = [-.18, 1.17]. Entity and incremental theorists did not differ in LS in the
present focus condition; b = -.10, β = -.09, p = .48, 95% CI = [-.39, .18].23
Discussion
In Study 3 we targeted participants’ attention to decisions that they make in the financial
domain (e.g., present – spend now vs. future – save for later). We anticipated that, overall,
incremental theorists would be more satisfied with life (than entity theorists) when they
sacrificed spending in the present to focus on saving for the future and entity theorists would be
more satisfied (than incremental theorists) when they sacrificed saving for the future and focused
on present (saving) goals.
We found that when we examined the group initially high in life satisfaction, there were
no differences after the sacrifice (present/spend vs. future/save) manipulation on Diener’s life
satisfaction between entity and incremental theorists. Entity theorists reported the same
satisfaction as incremental theorists when sacrificing the present (i.e., saving) and incremental
theorists reported the same satisfaction as entity theorists when sacrificing the future (i.e.,
saving). However, our hypotheses were confirmed when we examined the group that was
initially low in initial life satisfaction. Entity theorists were more satisfied when they focused on
spending in the present (over saving for the future) and incremental theorists were more satisfied
than entity theorists when they contemplated saving for the future.

23

Simple effects tests were conducted without any covariates, however, when mood (DV) was controlled for, simple
effects remained the same (and in some cases strengthened).

Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction

63

Although we attempted to produce a cleaner methodological structure for the
manipulation in Study 3 by eliciting present and future goals separately before introducing the
tension, it is possible that we lost some natural meaning found in self-relevant decision-making
tensions that come with deciding between present rewards and potential future outcomes by
constraining the focus to the financial domain.
An additional finding in the present study was that incremental theorists felt more certain
than entity theorists in attaining both present (spend) and future (save) goals. This finding
corroborates earlier evidence from a meta-analysis conducted by Burnette et al. (2013) who
found that incremental theorists generally have higher expectations of goal success. The goal
certainty ratings were elicited prior to the condition manipulation, however, so it is unknown if
people may shift certainty once they think of actually pursing the goal at the expense of another.
Additionally, it is unknown if certainty ratings might vary if experimentally induced to feel low
or high control over goal outcomes.
Study 4
Thus far, we have suspected that incremental theorists might feel greater life satisfaction
than entity theorists when sacrificing present goals for future goals, due, in part to the felt
certainty that future outcomes will come to fruition. On the other hand, if an entity theorist feels
less certain about future outcomes, they might feel less satisfied when they are future-focused
because they may believe that the present sacrifices they must endure will not guarantee the
future rewards that they are hoping for. Thus, in Study 4 we sought to explicitly manipulate felt
certainty/controllability with respect to future goals as part of establishing a link between
implicit theories, feelings of future goal certainty (one anticipated mechanism) and life
satisfaction as suggested by Spencer et al. (2005). Whereas in Study 3 we found a relationship

Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction

64

between implicit theories and felt certainty of future goal achievement, in Study 4 we pilot test a
manipulation of future controllability/certainty with the goal of examining these effects on life
satisfaction for entity and incremental theorists.
Similar to Study 2, we asked all participants to generate a decision that they are working
on these days where they are sacrificing some present goal/benefit in order to achieve some
future goal/benefit. This instruction again captures the tension involved in prioritizing one goal at
the expense of another. Notably we only include the future goal condition in this study
(sacrificing the present for the future) and not the converse condition (sacrificing the future for
the present). We reasoned that, despite the finding that incremental theorists in Study 3 felt more
certain than entity theorists even for present-oriented goals, all participants in Study 3 felt
significantly less certain about future goals than present goal. Thus, immediate decisions may
show less variability on certainty, whereas uncertainty is a hallmark of delayed outcomes (Green
& Myerson, 2004). Therefore, certainty/controllability is likely to be an important mechanism
for explaining people’s varying reactions to future goals to a greater extent than for present
goals.
All participants were asked to think of a goal that they are still working on and have
decided to pursue despite the sacrifices they must make in the present. Then one third of the
participants were asked to describe a goal that feels within their personal control and which they
are certain it will work out. Another third of the participants were asked to describe a goal that
feels outside of their personal control and which they feel uncertain if it will work out. The final
third were not provided with any further instructions about controllability/uncontrollability but to
simply describe the goal (the baseline condition).
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Because our primary interest centers on the variable that we hypothesize may underlie the
differences we see between entity theorists (less willingness to sacrifice for the future) and
incremental theorists (more willingness to sacrifice for the future) and the effects this has on
overall life satisfaction, our main prediction for this study will focus on the main effects of our
controllability manipulation on overall life satisfaction.
If we find that our experimental manipulation of controllability/certainty versus lack of
control/uncertainty of future outcomes affects life satisfaction then this would provide some
evidence for why incremental theorists might favor sacrificing present rewards for what they
believe to be more certain outcomes and entity theorists might be less willing to do so. Thus, for
Study 4, we hypothesize that when controllability of future outcomes is emphasized (the
controllable condition), participants will indicate higher satisfaction with life than when
uncontrollability of future outcomes is emphasized (the lack of control condition). In Study 4, we
do not compare a present and future condition, but examine only a future goal. Thus, we have no
specific hypotheses for the effect of the baseline condition on participants’ overall life
satisfaction.
Having explained the rationale for the present study, it is important to note that this study
was designed as an initial pilot study attempting to manipulate future controllability. The
manipulation, however, did not successfully affect participants’ certainty perceptions; as a result,
we altered several elements to test the same hypothesis in Study 5. This pilot study, though, also
measured beliefs about certainty and controllability over achieving future goals (measured in this
case – unlike Study 3 - after participants spent time thinking about pursuing a future goal at the
expense of a present one) and willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. Because these
dependent variables did not differ by condition, we were able to assess some
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correlational/descriptive questions in Study 4 and examine meditational models that test whether
felt certainty/controllability of future goals accounts for the link between implicit theories and
life satisfaction and willingness to sacrifice the present for the future.
Method
Participants
Two hundred and eighty-seven participants were recruited through Crowdflower. Thirtythree participants failed one, both, or all three attention checks and thirteen participants spent less
than 30 seconds generating an event in which they expect to sacrifice some present goal/benefit
for some future goal/benefit.24 In total, forty-six participants were eliminated from all analyses
leaving 241 participants (Mage = 37.93, SD = 12.42; 145 female, 96 male).
Procedure
Participants completed the questionnaire package online in one 20 minute session in the
same order as listed above (see also Appendix D).
Measures
Note. The full set of measures in the original study are presented in Appendix D. Only
the measures highlighted in our analyses are described below. The means and standard
deviations of all measures by original condition (future controllability, future – lack of control,
and future baseline) are reported in Table 21 and the zero-order correlations among all measures
are reported in Table 22.
Implicit theories. As in Studies 2 and 3, implicit theories were measured using the
Dweck (1999) implicit theory of personality measure. A composite score where higher numbers

24

To remain consistent with Studies 2 and 3, thirty seconds was deemed the cut-off for generating a future focused
event. There were no participants who spent more than 1000 seconds generating their event.
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indicate a stronger incremental theory was then calculated for participants’ implicit theory of
personality (Cronbach’s α = .96).
Goal elicitation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three goal elicitation
conditions: control, no control and a baseline condition. All participants were asked to think of a
decision they are working on these days where they are sacrificing some present benefit/goal in
order to prioritize a future benefit/goal. Within the same instructions, participants were also
asked to choose a goal they are still working on and have decided to pursue despite the sacrifices
that they must make in the present. In the controllable condition participants were asked to
generate a goal that feels within their control and that they are certain will work out. In the lack
of control condition, participants were asked to generate a goal that feels outside of their personal
control and they are uncertain if it will work out. In the baseline condition, these last instructions
were omitted. See Appendix D for the full script.
Mood DV – happiness right now. Mood was captured with the same four-item measure
as in Study 2. A composite score where higher numbers indicate a more positive mood was
calculated (Cronbach’s α = .90).
Life satisfaction. As in Studies 2 and 3, life satisfaction (LS) was captured by Diener’s
measure of global life satisfaction (Diener et al., 1985). A composite score where higher
numbers indicate higher overall life satisfaction was calculated (Cronbach’s α = .91).
Specific certainty/controllability of future goal. On a Likert scale from 1(very
uncertain that I will attain future goal/benefit) to 7(very certain that I will attain future
goal/benefit) participants were asked “From ‘very uncertain’ to ‘very certain’ – How ‘certain’
are you that you will be able to attain this future benefit/goal?” Additionally, from 1(not at all
within my control) to 7(very much within my control) participants were asked “To what degree
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does achieving the future benefit/goal feel ‘within your control’?” The correlation between these
two items was high; r(238) = .67, p < .001,25 thus, the two items were combined into a composite
measure where higher numbers indicate greater feelings of certainty/controllability over the
specific future goal; Cronbach’s α = .80.
Generalized beliefs about future goal attainability. On a Likert scale anchored at
endpoints 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree), participants were asked to rate their level of
disagreement or agreement on three statements that were designed to capture beliefs about
generalized future goal attainability. These three statements were: “Attaining future goals are
almost always certain to work out,” “Since whatever will be will be, I am uncertain about future
goals working out,” [R] and, “Future goals are certainly attainable - as long as enough sacrifices
are made.” A composite score was created by combining the three items above such that higher
numbers represent generalized beliefs about future goal attainability; Cronbach’s α = .65.
Willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. Willingness to sacrifice the present
for the future was the same measure used in Studies 1 through 3; Cronbach’s α = .80.
Results and Discussion
Central Analyses
Manipulation Failure
The present study was originally designed to pilot an attempt at manipulating future
controllability. The manipulation, however, was not successful. First, an examination of specific
goal certainty/controllability (the manipulation check) showed no differences in felt
control/certainty between the manipulated conditions. Furthermore, when we tested our initial
hypothesis (that manipulated controllability should increase life satisfaction compared to a lack

25

The correlation remained much the same when controlling for condition; r(238) = .66, p < .001.

Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction

69

of control), we found no main effects of condition when we compared all three conditions (β =
.07, p = .27), nor when we compared just the two conditions where we expected the greatest
difference in outcomes: the controllability and lack of control conditions (β = .02, p = .90). These
results remained the same when we also controlled for initial life satisfaction. Finally, we
examined the mood DV as the criterion variable and, similar to life satisfaction, no condition
effects were found (β’s < .27, p’s > .17). To be completely thorough, we examined those initially
low and those initially high in life satisfaction separately, and, once again, found no condition
effects on Diener’s life satisfaction (DV); β’s < .38, p’s > .17.26
Upon reviewing the manipulations used to elicit feelings of future controllability vs. lack
of control, it is possible that we burdened the participants with too many criteria with which to
follow in a single step (i.e., describe a decision to sacrifice the present for a controllable future
goal vs. describe a decision to sacrifice the present for an uncontrollable future goal) which may
have failed to clearly distinguish the controllability aspects of the future from the sacrifice
decision, thereby reducing the strength of the manipulated aspect (controllability) in the
instructions. Thus, we simplified and altered several elements of the manipulation in Study 5 to
test the original hypothesis.
Fortunately, and as described below in greater detail, none of the dependent measures in
the present study differed by condition. As such we are able to proceed with correlational
analyses and present meditational models that capture implicit theories and felt
certainty/controllability of future goals as well as life satisfaction and willingness to sacrifice the
present for the future.

26

Note: Among the regression analyses that we ran to examine the potential main effects of condition, none of the
regressions produced interactions with implicit theories.
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Preliminary Analyses
To check the success of random assignment, we first wanted to make sure that implicit
theories of personality and the LS pre-measure did not differ by manipulated condition.
Therefore, we conducted one-way ANOVAs and found that lay theories of personality did not
differ by condition; omnibus F(2, 230) = .14, p = .87. LSD tests were used to compare the means
between all conditions. No significant differences arose (p’s > .60). Additionally, we determined
that that the pre-measure of life satisfaction also did not differ across conditions; omnibus F(2,
235) = .88, p = .42, and LSD tests found no differences between conditions; p’s > .22. Refer to
Table 21 for all comparisons.
Did any of the dependent variables differ by condition? One-way ANOVAs were
conducted to test if any of the dependent measures in the present study differed by condition. For
the remainder of the analyses, we are concerned mainly with participants’ ratings of specific goal
certainty/controllability and general certainty/controllability of future goals as well as Diener’s
LS measure and willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. No differences arose across
conditions on Diener’s life satisfaction measure; omnibus F(2, 230) = .80, p = .45, and, LSD
tests indicated no differences between any of the conditions (p’s > .21). Additionally, no
differences arose across conditions on specific goal certainty/controllability; omnibus F(2, 236)
= 1.14, p = .32, or between conditions using LSD tests (p’s > .16). Finally, LSD tests for general
future certainty between conditions showed only a marginal difference between the baseline
condition (M = 4.80, SD = 1.06) and the controllable condition (M = 4.52, SD = .86); p = .08;
omnibus F(2, 233) = 1.72, p = .18. Finally, we found no differences across conditions on
willingness to sacrifice the present for the future; omnibus F(2, 232) = .60, p = .55, and, LSD
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tests indicated no differences between any of the conditions (p’s > .33); Refer to Table 21 for all
comparisons.
How do Entity and Incremental Theorists Differ in their Beliefs about Attainment and
Controllability of Future Goals?
Once we determined that our manipulation was not successful and that neither life
satisfaction nor our measures of goal certainty/controllability differed by condition, we sought to
examine the degree to which implicit theories are associated with future goal
certainty/controllability as doing so helps to further characterize the nature of entity and
incremental theorists and can provide additional understanding for why we are seeing that
incremental theorists are more satisfied with life when they sacrifice the present for the future
and entity theorists are more satisfied when they do not sacrifice the present for the future.
To determine the relationship between implicit theories and future
certainty/controllability we ran partial correlations controlling for initially assigned condition.
Overall, implicit theories (where higher numbers indicate the incremental perspective) were
found to be marginally correlated with specific certainty/controllability of future goal attainment;
r(233) = .12, p = .07, and significantly correlated with general certainty of future goals; r(233) =
.27, p < .001. Implicit theories were also found to be related to life satisfaction (DV); r(231) =
.15, p = .02. Refer to Table 23 for all partial correlations. Furthermore, it is important to note that
Diener’s measure of life satisfaction (measured as a dependent variable) was also significantly
related to specific goal certainty/controllability; r(233) = .34, p < .001, and general certainty of
future goals; r(233) = .43, p < .001. In other words, people who felt that future outcomes are
relatively certain/controllable also felt higher in overall life satisfaction.
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Supplemental Analyses
Is the Relationship between Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction Mediated by Felt
Certainty/Controllability of Future Goals?
In the present study, participants were asked to describe a goal in which they were
sacrificing the present for the future and then later rate the degree to which they feel certain
about achieving the specific goal as well as their generalized beliefs about certainty over future
goals. As noted above, we found a correlation between implicit theories and goal certainty (both
specific and generalized). Additionally, there was a correlation between goal certainty (both
specific and generalized) and Diener’s life satisfaction. Thus, we tested these relationships in a
meditational model. We used Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping procedure to test
mediation between implicit theories, goal certainty/controllability and life satisfaction (DV).
Implicit theories was entered as the independent variable and Diener’s life satisfaction was
entered as the dependent variable. Two mediators were tested: specific goal
certainty/controllability and generalized certainty of future goals. Initially assigned condition
was controlled for in both path analyses.
First, we examined specific goal certainty/controllability. Bootstrapping (1000 samples,
95% confidence intervals) revealed a significant indirect effect; 95% CI [.01, .13], p < .05,
suggesting that participants’ feelings of specific goal certainty/controllability partially mediates
the relationship between implicit theories and life satisfaction.27 See Figure 10.
Next, we examined generalized certainty of future goals. The same bootstrapping
procedure was used and, once again, revealed a significant indirect effect; 95% CI [.05, .22], p <

27

We also tested the original mediation for those initially low and high in life satisfaction separately (via median
split). Mediation by specific goal certainty emerged as non-significant for both groups
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.05, suggesting that generalized certainty of future goals also mediates the relationship between
implicit theories and life satisfaction.28 See Figure 11.
Is the Relationship between Implicit Theories and Willingness to Sacrifice the Present for
the Future Mediated by Felt Certainty/Controllability of Future Goals?
In addition to the relationship between implicit theories and felt certainty/controllability,
there was a correlation between implicit theories and willingness to sacrifice the present for the
future; r(232) = .25, p < .001. If felt controllability of future goals is related to higher life
satisfaction, then felt controllability may also explain why incremental theorists are more willing
to sacrifice the present for the future. Thus, we tested these relationships in a meditational model.
Implicit theories was entered as the independent variable and willingness to sacrifice the present
for the future was entered as the dependent variable. As we did with life satisfaction above, two
mediators were tested and condition was controlled for in both path analyses.
First, we examined specific goal certainty/controllability. The same bootstrapping
procedure as above was used and revealed a significant indirect effect; 95% CI [.01, .10], p <
.05, suggesting that specific goal certainty/controllability partially mediates the relationship
between implicit theories and willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. See Figure 12.
The bootstrapping procedure also revealed a significant indirect effect of generalized
certainty of future goal; 95% CI [.05, .19], p < .05, suggesting that generalized certainty of future
goals also partially mediates the relationship between implicit theories and willingness to
sacrifice the present for the future. See Figure 13.

28

We also tested the original mediation for those initially low and high in life satisfaction separately (via median
split). Mediation by general certainty of future goals remained significant for both the low and high LS groups.
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Discussion
As we have surmised, incremental theorists (vs. entity theorists) feel more certain of and
more control over attaining specific goals and feel more certain about future goals in general.
This may be one reason why incremental theorists feel more satisfaction with life when working
toward future goals despite the present sacrifices they must make along the way. In contrast,
because entity theorists feel less control over attaining future goals, this may be one reason why
they feel little satisfaction sacrificing present rewards while working toward future goals if they
feel less certain that future goals will work out. Indeed, we found some evidence for this
reasoning. Not only did we find that the relationship between implicit theories and life
satisfaction was mediated by future goal certainty, but this same process variable mediated the
path between implicit theories and willingness to sacrifice the present for the future; thus
suggesting both affective consequences of long term goal pursuit (i.e., life satisfaction) for
incremental theorists, and possibly the self-regulatory cognitions needed to actually pursue more
long term goals (i.e., willingness to sacrifice)
Study 5
The results of Study 4 suggest that incremental theorists feel more certainty and control
over future outcomes than entity theorists do and that felt certainty/controllability is one likely
explanation for why incremental theorists are more willing to sacrifice the present for the future
and feel higher life satisfaction when doing so. Thus, in Study 5, we sought to, once again,
explicitly manipulate felt controllability with respect to future goals as part of establishing a
causal link between feelings of future goal certainty and life satisfaction as suggested by Spencer
et al. (2005). Additionally, we will test if felt controllability causes more willingness to sacrifice
the present for the future.
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For Study 5, we returned to the goal elicitation methodology used in Study 2 and asked
all participants to generate a decision that they are working on these days where they are
sacrificing some present goal/benefit in order to achieve some future goal/benefit. This
instruction captures the tension involved in prioritizing one goal at the expense of another. As in
Study 4, we once again only include the future goal condition in the present study (sacrificing the
present for the future) and not the converse condition (sacrificing the future for the present).
After participants described the tension situation (sacrificing the present for the future),
participants were directed to a new page where they were then randomly assigned to one of three
manipulated conditions. One third of the participants were asked to think about and write down
the ways that they foresee having control over how the future goal will work out (the controllable
condition). Another third thought about and wrote down the ways they foresee not having control
over how the future goal might work out (the lack of control condition). Finally, another third of
participants (those in the baseline condition) did not elaborate on goal controllability or
uncontrollability. We expect that separating the goal elicitation from the controllability
manipulation will allow the controllability manipulation to become more salient, and thus, a
more powerful manipulation.
As in Study 4, we again focus on the main effects of our controllability manipulation and
hypothesize that when controllability of future outcomes is emphasized (the controllable
condition), participants will indicate higher satisfaction with life and a greater willingness to
sacrifice the present for the future than when uncontrollability of future outcomes is emphasized
(the lack of control condition). Once again, we have no specific hypotheses for the effect of the
baseline condition on participants’ overall life satisfaction.
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In addition, we measured two dependent variables previously shown to be related to life
satisfaction and to beliefs about the future: optimism (Busseri, Choma, & Sadava, 2009) and
pessimism (Chang, Maydeu-Oivares, & D’Zurilla, 1997). Similar to our expected outcomes of
un/controllability on life satisfaction, we expect that participants will indicate higher optimism
and lower pessimism when future goal controllability is emphasized than when future goal
uncontrollability is emphasized.
Method
Participants
Four hundred and eighteen participants were recruited through Mturk. Thirty-nine
participants failed one, both, or all three attention checks and twenty-eight participants spent less
than 30 seconds generating an event in which they expect to sacrifice some present goal/benefit
for some future goal/benefit.29 In total, sixty-seven participants were eliminated from all analyses
leaving 351 participants (Mage = 38.71, SD = 13.62; 199 female, 151 male, and 1 undisclosed).
Procedure
Participants completed the questionnaire package online in one 20 minute session in the
same order as listed below (see also Appendix E).
Measures
Life Satisfaction and mood pre-measures. Life satisfaction and mood were premeasured the same as Studies 2 through 4.
Implicit theories. As in Studies 2 through 4, implicit theories were measured using the
Dweck (1999) implicit theory of personality measure. A composite score where higher numbers

29

To remain consistent with Studies 2, 3 and 4, thirty seconds was deemed the cut-off for generating a future
focused event. There were no participants who spent more than 1000 seconds generating their event.
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indicate a stronger incremental theory was then calculated for participants’ implicit theory of
personality (Cronbach’s α = .96).
Goal elicitation. Similar to Study 2, participants were asked to think of a decision that
they are working on these days where they are sacrificing some present benefit/goal in order to
prioritize a future benefit/goal and briefly describe the decision. Recall that in Study 2, we asked
participants to “think of a decision that they are working on these days – or worked on recently .
. .” whereas in the present study, we eliminated the words “or worked on recently” as we wanted
participants to stay focused on a future mindset wherein they would likely still be on the path to
fulfilling some future goal/desire.
Controllability Manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to think about and
write down the ways they foresee having control over how the future goal will work out
(controllable condition) or the ways they foresee not having control over how the future goal
might work out (lack of control condition). Participants read a preamble designed to encourage
them to think of the future as either certain/controllable or uncertain/uncontrollable. It was
noted: “as you work toward this goal, recall that the future is actually [more controllable/less
controllable] than we sometimes realize, so, we can [often be pretty certain/never be certain] that
the goals we are aiming for will work out, [given/despite] the sacrifices we make in the present.”
Then, participants were asked to “think about how the future benefit/goal is [relatively
certain/uncertain] to work out and write down the ways that you [foresee having control/don’t
have control] over how it will work out.”
Life satisfaction. As in Studies 2 through 4, life satisfaction (LS) was captured by
Diener’s measure of global life satisfaction (Diener et al., 1985). A composite score where
higher numbers indicate higher overall life satisfaction was calculated (Cronbach’s α = .93).
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Goal importance. Following the dependent variable measure of life satisfaction
participants were asked to rate the importance of both the present goal and the future goal (i.e.,
the present vs. future goal pitted against each other during the tension manipulation) generated
during goal elicitation. On a 7-point Likert scale anchored at endpoints 1(not at all important) to
7(extremely important), participants were asked, “Please indicate how important the present
benefit/goal is to you in general.” and “Please indicate how important the future benefit/goal is to
you in general.”
Goal Progress. Participants were asked to indicate how far along they are in attaining the
future goal they wrote about in the goal elicitation procedure. On an 8-point Likert scale from
0(have not started yet), to 1(just beginning) to 7(almost completed), participants were asked to
indicate their response to the following question: “From 'just beginning' to 'almost completed' Approximately how far along are you in trying to attain this future benefit/goal? If you have not
started pursuing this goal yet, indicate ‘have not started yet.’”
Specific certainty/controllability of future goal. Specific goal certainty and goal
controllability were measured the same as in Study 4. These items were highly correlated; r(342)
= .64, p < .001, and were thus combined to create a composite measure; Cronbach’s α = .78.
Generalized beliefs about future goal attainability. Generalized beliefs about future
goal attainability were measured using the same 3 items as in Study 4; Cronbach’s α = .62.
Optimism and Pessimism. We were interested in further characterizing the degree to
which feelings of future goal controllability versus uncontrollability influence feelings of
pessimism and optimism. As one might expect, pessimism is typically found to be strongly and
negatively related to life satisfaction (Chang, et al., 1997) and optimism is found to be strongly
associated with life satisfaction (Busseri, et al., 2009). To measure optimism (a generally
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positive outlook on the future), we used a shortened version of Scheier and Carver’s (1985) Life
Orientation Scale. From 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree), participants completed a 3item measure that included statements such as “In uncertain times, I usually expect the best,” and
“If something can go wrong for me, it will,”[R]; α = .82. To capture pessimism (a generally
negative outlook on the future), we used a shortened version of Hayes et al.’s (2015) measure of
pessimism. From 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree), participants completed a 4-item
measure that included statements such as: “There is no guarantee that working hard will get you
the future rewards that you hope for,” “I feel like society doesn’t have very much to offer me,”
and “I know that if I work hard now I will benefit from it in the future,” [R]; Cronbach’s α = .74.
Willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. Willingness to sacrifice the present
for the future was the same measure used in Studies 1 through 4; Cronbach’s α = .80.
Sacrifice the Present – One vs. many instances? Finally, we were curious about how
participants characterize present sacrifices while working toward future goals/rewards. Whereas
the goal-regulation literature (e.g., Baumeister & Vohs, 2007) often examines the “snapshot”
moment of how people self-regulate in the face of one temptation (e.g., pass up a tempting
doughnut) in pursuit of a long term goal (e.g., a diet/health goal), we were curious if when
people think about the sacrifice involved in pursuit of a future goal/reward, they may bring to
mind multiple sacrifices that must be made over a span of time (e.g., pass up all future tempting
doughnuts). We were interested in characterizing the ways people thought about the present
sacrifice (as one or many) relative to the future goal. . Participants first read a preamble that
stated, “For today's exercise . . . when you thought about giving up a present goal/benefit - would
you say this is a ‘one time’ sacrifice? OR, is it about giving up ‘several’ immediate rewards? -i.e., making many immediate sacrifices over time on the way to the future goal/benefit.” Then on
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a Likert scale from 1(one time sacrifice) to 5(many sacrifices over time) participants answered
the question “On the scale below, to what degree did "sacrificing" the present represent a 'one
time' sacrifice versus 'many sacrifices' over time?” We have no specific hypotheses about this
item. The answers to this question will be examined for descriptive exploration only.
Results and Discussion
Recall that for Study 5, we hypothesized that when controllability of future outcomes is
emphasized (the controllable condition), participants will indicate higher satisfaction with life
and greater willingness to sacrifice the present for the future than when uncontrollability of
future outcomes is emphasized (the lack of control condition). We had no specific predictions for
the baseline condition.
Central Analyses
Preliminary Analyses
As a test of random assignment, we first wanted to make sure that implicit theories of
personality, initial mood and initial life satisfaction did not differ by condition. We ran one-way
ANOVAs with condition (lack of control, baseline and controllable; effect coded -1, 0, 1) as the
fixed factor and treated initial life satisfaction, initial mood and implicit theories as dependent
variables. No differences across conditions arose for either of the variables; omnibus F’s < 1.18,
p’s > .31. LSD tests were used to compare the means between all conditions on each of the
variables. No significant differences arose between conditions for any of the variables (p’s >
.15).30 The means and standard deviations of all measures across the three conditions are
reported in Table 24.

30

We also regressed condition and implicit theories onto initial life satisfaction and also onto initial mood and found
no interactions; β’s < .02, p’s > .72.
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Goal Importance. First, we compared the goal importance ratings for present and future
goals (a within-subjects comparison) by manipulated condition in a repeated measures
multivariate analysis. Recall that participants were asked to describe a decision where they are
sacrificing a present goal in pursuit of a future goal. Not surprisingly, we found that overall,
future goals (M = 6.33, SD = .91) were rated as more important than present goals (M = 5.22, SD
= 1.49); F(1, 340) = 186.49, p < .001, η2 = .35. Additionally, a condition x present/future
comparison interaction emerged significant; omnibus F(1, 340) = 3.77, p = .024, η2 = .02. In
order to test potential differences between conditions, we first created difference scores whereby
we subtracted present importance ratings from future importance ratings and entered this variable
as the dependent variable in a one-way ANOVA. First, descriptive statistics showed that future
goals were rated more important than present goals across all conditions. LSD tests revealed that
there was a significant difference between the baseline condition (M = .873, SD = 1.43) and the
controllable condition (M = 1.41, SD = 1.51); p = .007, suggesting that participants in the
controllable condition rated their future goals as significantly more important than present goals
compared to participants in the baseline condition. There was a marginal difference between the
lack of control condition (M = 1.04, SD = 1.49) and controllable condition; p = .07, also
suggesting that in the controllable condition participants rated future goals as more important
than present goals compared to participants in the lack of control condition. There was no
difference between the lack of control condition and the baseline condition; p =.40. Additionally,
we regressed both implicit theories and all condition comparisons (using two dummy variables
reflecting a comparison of the controllable condition and the lack of control condition to the
baseline condition, and, a comparison of the baseline and the controllable conditions to the lack
of control condition) onto the ‘difference in importance’ variable as the criterion. Results for
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condition mirrored those found in the ANOVA analysis. Furthermore, there was no interaction
with implicit theories (p’s > .23). Overall, participants rated future goals as more important than
present ones when future goal controllability was emphasized (vs. lack of control and baseline)
and these differences did not differ for entity or incremental theorists.
We also examined importance ratings separately with implicit theories as a possible
moderator. Looking only at importance ratings of present goals, we first examined present
importance ratings by condition. An omnibus ANOVA revealed no effect of condition on present
importance ratings, F(2, 340) = 1.40, p = .27. Furthermore, LSD tests revealed no differences
between any of the conditions, p’s >.15. Additionally, we regressed both implicit theories and all
condition comparisons (using the dummy variables) onto present importance as the criterion
variable. Results for condition mirrored those found in the ANOVA analysis. Furthermore, there
was no interaction with implicit theories (p’s > .16).
We also examined future importance ratings by condition. An omnibus ANOVA revealed
an overall marginal effect of condition; F(2, 341) = 2.86, p = .06, η2 = .02. LSD tests revealed
that participants ranked their future goal as more important in the controllable condition (M =
6.45, SD = .70) than in the baseline condition (M = 6.17, SD = 1.09); p = .02 but not more
important than the lack of control condition (M = 6.37, SD = .85); p = .52. The baseline and lack
of control conditions were marginally different; p = .10. We then regressed both implicit theories
and condition (using the dummy variables) onto future importance as the criterion variable.
Results for condition mirrored those found in the ANOVA analysis and there was no interaction
with implicit theories (p’s > .29).
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Finally, we examined participants’ goal progress by condition. An omnibus ANOVA
revealed an overall effect of condition; F(2, 341) = 5.11, p = .006, η2 = .03. LSD31 tests revealed
that in the controllable condition; i.e., when they wrote about the ways in which they have
control over how the goal might work out, participants reported being further along in their goals
(M = 4.87, SD = 2.03) than in the baseline condition (M = 4.28, SD = 2.13); p = .02. Similarly,
when participants wrote about the many ways in which they have no control over how the goal
might work out (i.e., the lack of control condition) they also reported higher goal progress (M =
5.08, SD = 2.28) than in the baseline condition. Because both the controllable and lack of control
conditions were rated as higher in goal progress than baseline, it is possible that simply by asking
participants to elaborate on the steps they could take in pursuing the long term goal this activated
a sense that the goal was also further along regardless of goal controllability. Importantly, goal
progress did not differ between our main conditions of interest in the present study: the
controllable condition and the lack of control condition; p = .55. It is worth keeping in mind that
when people do not elaborate on how they might achieve the goal (as was the case in the baseline
condition) they may be qualitatively different from the two experimental conditions that shared a
more common method.
Manipulation Checks
Specific certainty/controllability of future goal. To determine if the manipulation had
its desired effect, we examined participants’ ratings for specific goal attainability and goalspecific feelings of control over the goal. An omnibus ANOVA revealed a significant effect of

31

Regression analyses revealed the same results for condition. For each regression, implicit theories and the dummy
variables were entered in Step 1 and the interaction term for implicit theories and each dummy was entered in Step
2. Regression analyses confirmed the between condition comparisons as found in the univariate tests noted above
when goal progress was the criterion. Furthermore, there were no interactions between implicit theories and any of
the condition comparisons; p’s > .79.
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condition on specific goal attainability, F(2, 341) = 8.77, p < .001, η2 = .05. LSD32 tests revealed
that as expected, participants felt that their specific goal was more certain/controllable in the
controllable condition (M = 5.87, SD = 1.09) than in the baseline condition (M = 5.51, SD =
1.37); p = .03, and the lack of control condition (M = 5.16, SD = 1.27); p < .001. Furthermore,
participants felt more certain/control of their specific goal in the baseline condition than in the
lack of control condition; p = .04. In sum, our controllability manipulation seems to have had its
desired effects.
Generalized beliefs about future goal attainability. Similar to specific goal
attainability, we were curious if the controllability manipulation affected participants’
generalized certainty of future goals. An omnibus ANOVA revealed a significant effect of
condition on generalized certainty of future goals, F(2, 330) = 7.11, p = .001, η2 = .04. LSD33
tests revealed that participants felt more certain about attaining goals in general in the
controllable condition (M = 4.99, SD = 1.02) than in the baseline condition (M = 4.62, SD =
1.12); p = .012, and the lack of control condition (M = 4.45, SD = 1.03); p < .001. There were no
differences between the baseline and the lack of control conditions; p = .22.
Do Feelings of Control over Future Goals vs. Lack of Control affect Life Satisfaction and
Willingness to Sacrifice the Present for the Future?
Life Satisfaction. For the present study, we sought to explicitly manipulate felt
controllability with respect to future goals as part of establishing a link between feelings of
future goal controllability and life satisfaction. Recall that in Studies 3 and 4 we found a
relationship between implicit theories and felt certainty/controllability of future goals, therefore,

32

Regression analyses revealed the same results for condition. Furthermore, implicit theories did not interact with
any of the condition comparisons; p’s > .15.
33
Similar to the other manipulation checks, regression analyses revealed the same results for condition. Implicit
theories did not interact with any of the condition comparisons; p’s > .65.
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in Study 5 we manipulated feelings of future controllability as one means of providing evidence
of a causal link between felt controllability of future outcomes and overall life satisfaction (e.g.,
Spencer et al., 2005). We hypothesized that when controllability of future outcomes is
emphasized (the controllable condition), participants will indicate higher satisfaction with life
than when uncontrollability of future outcomes is emphasized (the lack of control condition). We
had no specific hypotheses for the baseline condition.
First, we ran a one-way ANOVA to examine life satisfaction ratings (our dependent
measure) by condition (lack of control, baseline, and controllable; effect coded -1, 0 1) to
determine if there were any differences in life satisfaction ratings by condition. An omnibus
ANOVA did not reveal a significant effect of condition on life satisfaction, F(2, 348) = 1.66, p =
.19, η2 = .01. However, LSD34 tests revealed a marginal difference in life satisfaction between
the lack of control and controllable conditions; the conditions that we hypothesized would show
the greatest contrast. Participants expressed higher satisfaction with life when future goal
controllability was made salient (M = 4.55, SD = 1.56) than when lack of control was made
salient (M = 4.15, SD = 1.58); p = .09. Life satisfaction ratings did not differ between the
controllable and the baseline condition (M = 4.25, SD = 1.55); p = .15, nor did the baseline
condition differ from the lack of control condition; p = .76.35 Although marginal, the difference
between the controllable and lack of control condition (the two conditions where we expected to
see most of the action) suggests that our manipulation of control over future goals had somewhat
of an effect on participants’ overall life satisfaction ratings. These findings provide some

34

An omnibus ANOVA with LSD tests (where the difference between present goal importance versus future goal
importance was entered as a control variable) produced the same results.
35
When the mood DV (measured just prior to Diener’s LS) was tested as the dependent variable a significant effect
of condition emerged; omnibus ANOVA F(2, 341) = 3.42, p = .034. LSD tests revealed that participants were
happier in the controllable condition (M = 5.00, SD = 1.57) than in the lack of control condition (M = 4.47, SD =
1.61); p = .02, and the baseline condition (M = 4.55, SD = 1.65); p = .04. There were no differences between the
baseline and lack of control conditions; p = .71.
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preliminary (although weak) evidence in establishing a causal link between feelings of future
control and life satisfaction.
Willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. Similar to the above analyses, we
were interested in determining if the control manipulation had the anticipated effect on
participants’ willingness to sacrifice the present for the future. An omnibus ANOVA revealed no
overall effect of condition, F(2, 329) = 1.99, p = .14, η2 = .01. LSD36 tests however, revealed that
participants were marginally more willing to sacrifice the present for the future in the
controllable condition (M = 5.00, SD = 1.13) than in the lack of control condition (M = 4.72, SD
= 1.07); p = .07, and also in the baseline condition (M = 4.75, SD = 1.27); p = .10. There were no
differences between the lack of control and baseline conditions; p = .80. Similar to the findings
above with life satisfaction, these findings provide preliminary (although weak) evidence in
establishing a causal link between feelings of future control and willingness to sacrifice the
present for the future.
Do Feelings of Control over Future Goals vs. Lack of Control affect Optimism or
Pessimism?
Optimism and pessimism are usually found to be strongly correlated with life satisfaction
(Busseri et al., 2009; Chang et al., 1997). The findings of the present study confirm this:
optimism and life satisfaction (LS) are strongly positively correlated; r(334) = .63, p < .001, and
pessimism is strongly negatively correlated with LS; r(334) = -.50, p < .001. We speculated that
the controllability manipulation would affect optimism and pessimism, both because the
manipulation altered anticipated future outcomes, and because these variables are so connected

36

Regression analyses revealed the same results for condition. Moreover, implicit theories did not interact with
condition; p’s > .11.
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to life satisfaction.Thus, and similar to the main analyses above, we examined optimism and
pessimism as additional dependent variables.
Starting with optimism, an omnibus ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition
(coded -1, 0, 1) on optimism, F(2, 332) = 2.98, p = .05, η2 = .01. LSD37 tests revealed that
participants were significantly more optimistic in the controllable condition (M = 4.70, SD =
1.33) than in the lack of control condition (M = 4.27, SD = 1.41); p = .016, however there was no
difference between the controllable condition and the baseline condition (M = 4.44, SD = 1.41);
p = .12. Furthermore, there was no difference between the baseline and lack of control condition;
p = .37.
Next we examined pessimism. Similar to optimism, an omnibus ANOVA revealed a
significant effect of condition (coded -1, 0, 1) on pessimism, F(2,332) = 4.02, p = .02, η2 = .02.
Also similar to optimism, LSD38 tests revealed that participants were significantly more
pessimistic in the lack of control condition (M = 3.80, SD = 1.20) than in the controllable
condition (M = 3.36, SD = 1.21); p = .007, but not more than in the baseline condition (M = 3.70,
SD = 1.19); p = .46. Additionally, participants were less pessimistic in the baseline condition
than in the controllable condition; p = .04.
Overall, the results for optimism and pessimism informatively complement the outcomes
of our controllability manipulation on life satisfaction and willingness to sacrifice the present for
the future.

37

Regression analyses revealed the same results for condition. Additionally, implicit theories did not interact with
any of the condition comparisons; p’s > .20.
38
Regression analyses revealed the same results for condition. Additionally, implicit theories did not interact with
any of the condition comparisons; p’s > .39.
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Supplemental Analyses
Did Implicit Theories Play a Role in Response to the Control vs. No Control Manipulation?
We sought to alter the psychological experience of future certainty/controllability (which
we found to vary by implicit theories in Studies 3 & 4), thus we may not see an effect of implicit
theories. However, it is still possible that the role of implicit theories would continue to be
visible. If differences are found between how entity and incremental theorists reacted to the
controllability vs. lack of control manipulation, it may help to elucidate why the direct
relationship between manipulated control and life satisfaction was only marginal.
To examine this more directly, we used regression analyses. We entered condition (lack
of control, baseline, controllable; effect coded -1, 0, 1) and implicit theories (mean centered) in
Step 1, and the interaction term in Step 2 predicting Diener’s life satisfaction as the criterion
variable. The main effect of condition emerged as nearing marginal; b = .17, β = .08, p = .11,
95% CI = [-.04, .38], however this is an omnibus effect of condition, rather than a comparison
between conditions.39 Additionally, there was a main effect of implicit theories; b = .17, β = .12,
p = .02, 95% CI = [.03, .31], suggesting that incremental theorists were more satisfied with life
overall than entity theorists (at least in the context of thinking about future goals, which was the
case for all conditions in Study 5). However, there was no interaction between condition and
implicit theories; p = .29. See Table 26 for β and t values for all predictor variables.
We wondered, if, similar to Study 3, the effects of the manipulation might interact with
implicit theories on life satisfaction differentially for those who are initially low versus high in
life satisfaction. As such, we entered initial life satisfaction as an additional moderator in the

39

When condition was broken down into two sets of dummy variables and examined in regressions with implicit
theories, only the comparison between the no control and control condition emerged as nearing marginal, b = .33, β
= .10, p = .12. Implicit theories did not interact with any of the condition comparisons, p’s > .31.
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regression analysis. The omnibus regression did not produce a significant 3-way interaction
between condition, implicit theories and initial life satisfaction; b = -.03, β = -.04, p = .18, 95%
CI = [-.06, .01]. See Table 27 for β and t values for all predictor variables.40
For the sake of due diligence, and to replicate our analysis strategy of Study 3, we opted
to examine separately those initially low and initially high on life satisfaction to see if implicit
theories might have interacted with the effects of our manipulation. Thus, we re-ran the
regression analyses examining condition (lack of control, baseline, controllable; coded -1, 0, 1) x
implicit theories on life satisfaction DV for those low and high in initial life satisfaction. Not
surprisingly, and similar to Study 3, all of the action was found to be within the participants who
were initially low in life satisfaction. Results showed a main effect of condition; b = .28, β = .17,
p = .02, 95% CI = [.04, .51] suggesting that there is a significant difference on life satisfaction
between at least two of the conditions. Additionally, there was a main effect of implicit theories;
b = .24, β = .21, p = .005, 95% CI = [.07, .41], suggesting that, for those initially low in life
satisfaction, incremental theorists reported feeling more satisfied with life than entity theorists.
However, the main effects were qualified by a significant interaction; b = .25, β = .17, p = .025,
95% CI = [.03, .48].41 See Figure 14.
For those initially high in life satisfaction, results of the regression analysis show neither
an effect of condition; p = .33, nor an interaction; p = .37,42 however, similar to those initially
low in life satisfaction a main effect of implicit theories emerged as significant; b = .13, β = .17,

40

When condition was broken down into two sets of dummy variables and examined in regressions with implicit
theories and initial life satisfaction one of the condition contrasts produced a marginal interaction with implicit
theories and initial life satisfaction – the contrast between baseline and the control condition; b = -.06, β = -.07, p =
.09. None of the other 3-way interactions were significant; p’s > .22.
41
The interaction between condition and implicit theories remained significant for those initially low in life
satisfaction when controlling for Mood (DV); b = .19, β = .12, p = .047, 95% CI = [.00, .37].
42
Results for the initially high satisfaction group remained non-significant when controlling for Mood (DV) in the
regression.
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p = .023, 95% CI = [.02, .24], once again suggesting that for those initially high in life
satisfaction, incremental theorists reported feeling more satisfied than entity theorists overall.
See figure 11.
To better examine the effects of our three conditions, we created two sets of dummy
variables that allowed us to determine which of the condition contrasts interacted with implicit
theories predicting life satisfaction. In order to test all of the condition contrasts, two regressions
were run for each group initially low and high in life satisfaction separately. In Step 1 of
regression 1, we entered one pair of condition dummy variables and implicit theories (mean
centered). In Step 2, we entered the interactions of each dummy variable and implicit theories.
For regression 2, we used the second pair of condition dummy variables in the same manner.
The low life satisfaction group. For those initially low in life satisfaction, we found a
significant condition effect between the lack of control and controllable conditions; b = .54, β =
.20, p = .026, 95% CI = [.07, 1.02]. Additionally, there was an interaction between the lack of
control and controllable contrast and implicit theories; b = .50, β = .24, p = .03, 95% CI = [.05,
.94]. There was also an interaction between the baseline and controllable contrast and implicit
theories; b = .40, β = .20, p = .05, 95% CI = [.01, .80]. There were no other condition effects or
interactions; p’s > .17. See Table 28 for β and t values for all predictor variables for both
regressions.
Next, for those initially low in life satisfaction, we examined the interaction pattern in
regression analysis by examining the simple slopes of each condition contrast and the simple
effects of implicit theories at one standard deviation (SD) above and below the mean for the
implicit theories variable. As noted earlier, we anticipated overall, that the controllable
manipulation encouraging participants to write about a number ways in which their future goal
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was under their control (i.e., the controllable condition), that entity theorists would not differ in
ratings of life satisfaction ratings from that of incremental theorists. For those initially low in life
satisfaction, however, this was not the case. In the controllable condition, incremental theorists
reported significantly greater life satisfaction than entity theorists; b = .55, β = .47, p < .001, 95%
CI = [.26, .85], but did not differ from entity theorists in the baseline condition; p = .28, or the
lack of control condition; p = .71. Indeed, entity theorists did not differ in their life satisfaction
ratings across any of the conditions; p’s > 68. Incremental theorists, on the other hand, did have
higher life satisfaction between the controllable and lack of control condition; b = 1.12, β = .44, p
= .002, 95% CI = [.44, 1.80], and between the control and baseline condition; b = .79, β = .29, p
= .02, 95% CI = [.12, 1.45]. Similarly, there was no difference between the baseline and lack of
control condition; p = .32.
The high life satisfaction group. Similar to those initially low in life satisfaction, we
first tested contrasts between all conditions, implicit theories and their interactions in regression
analyses for the group initially high in life satisfaction. No condition effects or interactions
emerged as significant; p’s > .25. See Table 29 for β and t values for all predictor variables for
both regressions.
Simple effects tests revealed that incremental theorists were marginally more satisfied
with life in the baseline condition; b = .18, β = .23, p = .09, 95% CI = [-.03, .38], which mirrors
the effects found in Study 3 (also a focus on the future). Similarly, incremental theorists were
also marginally more satisfied with life than entity theorists in the lack of control condition; b =
.17, β = .23, p = .09, 95% CI = [-.03, .37]. Similar to those low in life satisfaction, there were no
differences between the baseline and lack of control condition for entity or incremental theorists;
p’s > .86.
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In line with our initial predictions about how feelings of future control should increase
life satisfaction for both theory holders, entity and incremental theorists did not differ in life
satisfaction in the controllable condition; b = .05, β = .06, p = .62, 95% CI = [-.14, .23]. Thus,
when encouraged to contemplate a number of ways that future goals are controllable, entity
theorists seemingly were just as satisfied with life as incremental theorists whereas, in Studies 1
and 3 (when feelings of control were not made salient), entity theorists were much less satisfied
when sacrificing the present for the future. Finally for those initially high on LS, entity theorists
did not differ in life satisfaction between the controllable and lack of control contrast; p = .17, or
the controllable and baseline condition; p = 15.
Sacrifice the present – One vs. many instances? Finally, we were curious about how
participants characterized present sacrifices while working toward future goals/rewards. We
wondered if, when people think about sacrificing a present goal/reward in pursuit of a future
goal/reward they may contemplate several sacrifices that must be made. We examine the
answers to this one-item measure with the understanding that the study was in no way structured
around answering this particular question. Indeed, the interest in this item is driven by curiosity,
and by examining it with an eye for descriptive information. Results will, at the very least answer
the basic question: When people in the present study thought about sacrificing the present for the
future, were they imagining just one moment of sacrifice in the present or were they imagining
many moments of having to sacrifice the present?
To examine this question, we first looked at basic descriptive information. Recall that we
asked participants to indicate their response on a scale from 1(one time sacrifice) to 5(many
sacrifices over time). The mean on this item was 3.80 with a SD of 1.34 indicating that when
participants spoke of a future goal that they were sacrificing present rewards for, there was a
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propensity toward believing that many present sacrifices would be had over time in pursuit of
their future goal. Indeed, the mean on this item differed significantly from 1 (one time sacrifice);
t(326) = 37.78, p < .001; See Figure 16 for answer frequency histogram.
Then we examined correlations with the ‘one vs. many instances’ item and found that
there was no relationship with implicit theories r(327) = .03, however there was a small negative
relationship with life satisfaction (DV); r(327) = -.16, and the pre-measure of life satisfaction;
r(327) = -.17, such that more sacrifices was related to lower life satisfaction (See Table 25 for
intercorrelations among all of the variables). Next, we examined this item to see if it differed
between conditions. An omnibus ANOVA revealed no differences among the lack of control,
baseline and controllable conditions, F(2, 324) = .62, p = .54. LSD43 tests revealed that
participants felt they were sacrificing about the same number of present moments in the
controllable condition (M = 3.91, SD = 1.26) as they did in the baseline condition (M = 3.71, SD
= 1.44); p = .27, and the lack of control condition (M = 3.80, SD = 1.31); p = .56. There were
also no differences between baseline and lack of control; p = .60.
Discussion
The present study manipulated felt controllability of future goals as part of establishing a
link between feelings of future goal controllability and life satisfaction as well as willingness to
sacrifice the present for the future as suggested by Spencer et al. (2005). We hypothesized that
when controllability of future outcomes was emphasized, participants would indicate higher life
satisfaction and a greater willingness to sacrifice the present for the future than when
uncontrollability was emphasized.

43

Regression analyses confirmed the between condition comparisons as found in the univariate test noted above.
Furthermore, implicit theories did not interact with any of the condition comparisons; p’s > .14.
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Although condition differences for both life satisfaction and willingness to sacrifice the
present for the future were marginal, the findings provide some preliminary evidence of our
causal hypothesis, suggesting that feelings of future controllability may affect both an affective
component (i.e., feeling satisfied with one’s life) and the self-regulatory cognitions needed to
engage in long-term goal pursuits.
Additionally, we found corroborating evidence with our findings for optimism and
pessimism between the controllable and lack of control conditions; variables that are highly
related to life satisfaction. Optimism increased with the controllability manipulation and
pessimism decreased. Thus, we feel confident in suggesting that some of the differences found in
life satisfaction and a willingness to sacrifice the present for the future between entity and
incremental theorists is due, in part, to feelings of control (for incremental theorists) or the lack
thereof (for entity theorists). Initial mood, future goal importance (and present goal importance),
as well as goal progress did not differ between the lack of control and controllable conditions,
therefore, did not have a direct impact on the results, further supporting our contention that the
results were, in fact, due to the controllability manipulation.
It is worthwhile to note that, for those initially low in life satisfaction, entity theorists
were significantly less satisfied with life (the DV) in the controllable condition than incremental
theorists. In fact, entity theorists did not differ on the dependent measure of LS between any of
the conditions. We wondered if perhaps entity theorists in this group were not convinced by the
controllable manipulation (i.e., that future goals can be controlled). Looking back to our earlier
examination of the manipulation checks, however, where we asked about the degree to which
participants felt that achieving the future goal felt within their control, we found only the
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expected main effects of condition and no interactions with implicit theories.44 It would appear,
then, that entity theorists felt as much control over their future goal (in the controllable
condition) as incremental theorists did. It is possible then, that even though entity theorists felt
control over their future goal, this did not necessarily make them feel satisfied about it. In
contrast, the entity theorists who were initially high in life satisfaction were just as satisfied as
incremental theorists, which is what we predicted our controllable manipulation would do in our
initial hypotheses. We elaborate on these findings more in the general discussion below.
Finally, we also learned in the present study that when participants were asked to
describe future goals/rewards they hope to achieve that required sacrificing in the present that the
present sacrifices were reported to be, on average, more than just a single sacrifice. In other
words, most participants indicated that it was not just one sacrifice or temptation that they must
give up in the present in service of future goals, but several present goals/rewards that they must
sacrifice in this pursuit. This is meaningful because when people find themselves in real world
self-regulatory conflicts they may consider complex tensions between immediate and future
benefits that may involve not only a single instance of sacrifice, but repeated and sustained effort
in pursuit of a future goal that may vary on certainty.
General Discussion
Overview of Findings
We have proposed that incremental theorists, who believe that attributes are malleable
and can change and develop over time, should feel more satisfied with life when prioritizing

44

To be completely thorough, we went back to the regression analysis for the manipulation checks to see if there
were any interactions between any of the condition contrasts and implicit theories for those low in initial life
satisfaction and those high in initial life satisfaction on goal controllability. No interactions emerged as significant;
the lowest of which was the interaction between implicit theories and the baseline/no control comparison; p = .12.
The rest of the interactions had p’s > .28.
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future goals over present ones and entity theorists, who believe that attributes are relatively
stable over time, should feel more satisfied prioritizing immediate goals over future ones. We
demonstrated this pattern correlationally (Study 1) and experimentally (Study 3), noting that the
effects may be especially likely to emerge among those who are lower in initial life satisfaction
(Study 3).
We propose that this pattern may occur, at least in part, because incremental theorists are
more certain they can control, and, thus achieve their future goals – making it more palatable to
sacrifice current pleasure in pursuit of these rather certain future benefits. In Study 4 we showed
that incremental theorists do feel more certain they can achieve future goals relative to entity
theorists. Moreover, future goal certainty (both specific goal certainty and generalized feelings of
future certainty) mediated the relationship between implicit theories and life satisfaction, as well
as the relation between implicit theories and the willingness to sacrifice the present for the future.
Finally, in Study 5 we manipulated this proposed mediator by attempting to make people feel
more (or less) control over future outcomes. We expected that, paralleling incremental and entity
theorists’ natural tendencies, leading people to feel control over future goal outcomes should
cause them to be more satisfied with life - and more willing to sacrifice the present for the future
- relative to those who feel uncertain about future goals. Overall, future goal certainty did have a
small effect: those led to think of how a goal outcome was controllable and more certain reported
(marginally) more satisfaction with life and (marginally) more willingness to sacrifice for the
future than those who thought of the ways the goal outcome was uncontrollable and uncertain.
However, further exploration revealed that the effect was most pronounced for incremental
theorists with lower initial life satisfaction, whereas entity theorists with low life satisfaction
showed no evidence of increased satisfaction when goals were framed as controllable. This may
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mean that entity theorists (especially those lower in current life satisfaction) are less likely to
base life satisfaction on future goals, whether they viewed them as controllable or not. Indeed, it
is possible that our proposed mediator of “controllability” (tested in Studies 4 & 5) may be more
applicable to future (rather than present) goals. Taking this one step further, it is possible that
there is something about the psychology of immediate goals that more strongly influences entity
theorists. If this is the case, there may be an additional unmeasured mediator accounting for
reactions to immediate goals.
Overall, the findings suggest that implicit theories of change and stability importantly
moderate the satisfaction in life that people may feel when deciding whether to live for today or
sacrifice immediate gains to pursue their future and that this relationship is, in part, mediated by
feelings of certainty about and control over future outcomes - but that there may be additional
mechanisms other than perceived control accounting for variations in participants’ responses,
especially in the present goal condition. .
Additionally, we discovered a potential boundary condition for these effects (as was seen
in Studies 3 & 5); namely, that the effects were stronger (or only in evidence) for those initially
low in life satisfaction. It is possible that we encountered ceiling effects for those already high in
life satisfaction at the onset. In other words, people already very satisfied with life might not shift
their life satisfaction easily: They are less likely to increase in LS from an already high starting
point; similarly, they may also be more impervious to temporary declines. It is plausible that
single goal elicitations or temporary controllability manipulations are not enough to perturb an
already highly satisfied state.
Based on our reasoning that people should be less satisfied if they feel less control over
future outcomes, we would anticipate, then, that most of the action (i.e., the least satisfaction)
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would occur in the situation where people feel most uncertain about the outcomes – which is
what we found for entity theorists when we examined the simple effects in studies 1 and 3.
Indeed, we found that entity theorists were less satisfied when sacrificing the present for the
future (than the reverse), and, when in the future focused condition (sacrificing the present),
entity theorists were less satisfied than incremental theorists.
The evidence is less consistent for incremental theorists. In Study 3 incremental theorists
did not feel more life satisfaction in the future focus condition than in the present focus
condition; suggesting that incremental theorists might be o.k. with either temporal focus.
Additionally, incremental theorists did not show evidence of feeling less LS than entity theorists
in the present focused condition in Study 3. Study 3 found some preliminary evidence that
incremental theorists might feel more control (than entity theorists) over both present goals and
future goals, however this measure was assessed prior to goal elicitation (i.e., prior to goal
deliberation). Overall, we are not inclined to see the results for incremental theorists as
problematic for our overall theorizing as we saw the same pattern of results across the first three
studies.
Going back to Study 1, we did find that incremental theorists reported lower life
satisfaction when they reported not sacrificing the present for the future (vs. sacrificing). It is
possible that we did not see strong differences in the life satisfaction outcome measure between
the future focus condition and present focus condition for incremental theorists in Study 3
because we asked them to describe only one instance of sacrificing the future for the present. For
example, in Study 2, one incremental theorist in the present-focus condition wrote that they
recently decided to hang out with a friend for the weekend (present goal) which they knew would
conflict with their work schedule (future sacrifice). Although we cannot say for certain, we can

Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction

99

speculate that, in general, one instance of sacrificing the future for the present might not affect an
incremental theorist’s overall life satisfaction if there are a number of other instances in their life
where they are sacrificing the present for the future. Future manipulations that encourage
participants to describe several decisions of the same ilk (and more likely to have a permanent
impact on future goals) might elicit stronger differences in life satisfaction for incremental
theorists. It is not possible to determine with the present data whether or not incremental theorists
are naturally drawn to pursuing longer-term, future-oriented goals in reality. This will be
important to discern in future research. However, should this be the general case, it is possible
that incremental theorists might not see that a temporary focus on present goals is much of an
obstacle to future goals. We suspect that incremental theorists who regularly sacrifice the future
for present/immediate outcomes are likely to be less satisfied overall than those who regularly
sacrifice the present for the future. Corroborating evidence can be found in Study 1 whereby
incremental theorists are significantly less satisfied when they have a low (vs. high) future focus
time perspective and low (vs. high) promotion orientation, suggesting that incremental theorists
likely do find great satisfaction in striving for the future.
In Study 5, entity theorists showed no evidence of increased satisfaction when goals were
framed as controllable (for those initially low in LS). However, the entity theorists in this group
reported having the same amount of control as incremental theorists did over the specific future
goal (i.e., the manipulation check). It is possible then, that for entity theorists in the low LS
group, feeling control over their future goal did not necessarily make them feel satisfied about it.
It is entirely possible (although speculation at this point) that the initially low LS entity theorists
were disappointed at the thought of sacrificing a present (more certain) reward even when future
goals were made to feel controllable. Perhaps present benefits (and the sacrifice of them) may

Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction

100

mean more (or have different meaning) to entity (vs. incremental) theorists, which may, in turn,
deflate life satisfaction outcomes irrespective of how certain the future goal seems.
Some corroborating evidence can be seen for this speculation in Study 1. For example, in
Study 1, we found that entity theorists were significantly more satisfied than incremental
theorists when they held a strong present hedonic time perspective (e.g., Zimbardo & Boyd,
1999), however, this did not preclude them from enjoying future goals; entity theorists were just
as satisfied with life as incremental theorists when they also had a strong future time perspective
and also when they were high in promotion focus (e.g., Higgins, 1997). Thus, it is possible that
entity theorists can feel satisfied when working toward future goals. However, when present
goals and future goals are pitted against each other, sacrificing a present goal might take all the
pleasure out of the prospect of future goal fulfillment for entity theorists. For example, a
graduate student may sacrifice their relationship with their young child in the short term while
completing a thesis of great importance. Even though the student might see the thesis completion
as completely within their control and important for their future, the sacrifice endured along the
way might make the journey substantially less enjoyable than a journey that did not entail such
present sacrifices. Thus, even a confident belief in the certainty of a future goal might not
eliminate the possible perceived (and real) loss involved in sacrificing too much in the present.
Popular wisdom often highlights the importance of not losing sight of the joys of today
by focusing solely on the journey on tomorrow, (e.g., “I’ll be happy when . . .”). However, as we
speculate above, it is possible that sacrificing present benefits (for future goals) may have
different meaning for entity (vs. incremental) theorists. Future research could examine this
question. It is possible that, for entity theorists, the loss of a short-term benefit cannot be
outweighed by the benefits of long term goals.
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Theoretical and Practical Contributions
Previous research on implicit theories has found that individual differences in beliefs
about change versus stability play an important role in how people approach and interpret the
world (Hong et al., 1999; Plaks et al., 2009). Although implicit theories have been studied
extensively as a cognitive construct for their effects on motivation (Dweck, 1999), learning
(Dweck & Leggett, 1988), and person perception (Plaks et al., 2009), relatively little is known in
the “self” domain and about the connection between implicit theories and life satisfaction. The
present set of studies sheds some light as to one possible means by which these different theory
holders might achieve life satisfaction.
Previous research on implicit theories has also found that incremental theorists feel more
internal control (Dweck, 1995a) whereas entity theorists feel less internal control and are less
optimistic about goal outcomes (Burnette et al, 2013). Our findings suggest that this might be
one reason why entity theorists are less likely to feel satisfied by pursuing future goals over more
certain present goals (and vice versa for incremental theorists). Looking specifically at future
goals, we were able to determine that, indeed, incremental theorists felt more certainty and
control over future outcomes, and finally, that feelings of future control also led to higher life
satisfaction and also a greater willingness to sacrifice the present for the future.
Previous researchers have suggested that the entity system tends to breed uncertainty
(Dweck et al., 1995b) leading to fewer and less successful self-regulation strategies (Burnette et
al., 2013). Our research supports these past findings – it is possible that entity theorists gravitate
toward short term goals because they provide more satisfaction. One outcome might be that
entity theorists then develop fewer long term self-regulation strategies.
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Self-regulation is often defined as a future-oriented endeavor (Baumeister & Vohs,
2007); whereby people delay immediate rewards in preference for larger future rewards. Thus,
one’s willingness to sacrifice the present for the future can be construed as a self-regulation
strategy. The present research suggests that incremental theorists are not only more willing to
sacrifice the present for the future (i.e., self-regulate), but that they also feel greater satisfaction
with life when doing so. Some research has found that people can feel quite fulfilled when
contemplating ‘anticipated joys’ of the future. People often pre-experience the expected hedonic
outcomes of future events and can underestimate potential future misfortune (or pain) in the
process (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). Although speculative, it is possible that incremental theorists
do not construe present-sacrifices as terribly painful or negative. Indeed, it seems entirely
possible that incremental theorists relish their self-regulatory prowess and feel a degree of pride
in working toward hard earned outcomes. To our knowledge, though, how entity and incremental
theorists mentally represent present sacrifices (e.g., the degree of positive or negative valence)
and or construe the process toward future goal fulfillment is not as yet known. These questions
are ripe for investigation in future research.
As we hypothesized at the onset of this program of research, entity theorists are likely to
be more satisfied when pursuing present (over future) goals and incremental theorists are likely
to be more satisfied when pursuing future (over present) goals. This, of course, does not imply
that people only pursue the goals that provide them with the highest positive evaluations of life
all the time. Everyone pursues both present and future goals (Harber et al., 2003) and when these
goals conflict, they may need to sacrifice one over the other for any number of reasons
(Emmons, 1986). An important question that is not addressed in the present research is whether
or not entity theorists tend to pursue present (over future) goals – in day to day living - and
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whether or not incremental theorists tend to pursue future (over present) goals. It is possible that
entity and incremental theorists (who differ on their achievement goals; e.g., performance vs.
mastery) have different life experiences for which types of goals they are used to seeing work out
in their lives when tension exists between present and future desires. For example, if an entity
theorists has successfully achieved performance goals in the past (which may be more presentoriented than future-oriented), then they might see present-oriented goals as more meaningful in
their lives, place greater values on such goals and possibly pursue these types of goals more
naturally. In contrast, if incremental theorists have successfully achieved mastery-oriented goals
in the past (e.g., if you don’t succeed, try try again) these may be more future-oriented than
present-oriented in nature. As a result they might see future-oriented goals as more meaningful
in their lives, place greater value on such goals and pursue these types of goals more naturally.
As noted previously, entity and incremental theorists might find different meaning in present vs.
future goals which might ultimately affect the criterion for which these theory holders use to
determine what “a good life” is – and what makes life satisfying.
Some of this theorizing parallels work by Sheldon and Elliot (1999) who find that when
people select goals that match their underlying values and interests (i.e., self-concordant goals)
they are more likely to feel more satisfied with their life. Sheldon and Elliott found that selfconcordant goals tend to feel more authentic and meaningful and are more likely to be achieved
thus furthering the well-being effect. In the case of implicit theories, there is a great deal of
evidence showing that incremental theorists typically pursue learning and mastery-oriented goals
(even though these goals require extra effort) which enables them to develop self-efficacy and
strengthens their self-regulation abilities (Burnette et al., 2013). Thus, it is reasonable to assume
that pursuing future goals at the expense of present ones might be a good “fit” for an incremental
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theorist and deeply satisfying. In contrast, evidence shows that entity theorists tend to pursue
performance goals that show off their enduring qualities and allow them to validate themselves
(Dweck, 1999) however, to maintain this stature, entity theorists need to repeatedly seek
reflections of their abilities in their performance. Thus, it is reasonable to surmise that pursuing
immediate goals at the expense of future goals might be a good “fit” for an entity theorist.
Although researchers have begun to examine the role of individual differences and personal
goals and their effect on happiness and life satisfaction for individuals (see Myers & Diener,
1995 for a review), relatively little emphasis has been placed on considering how people with
different underlying beliefs might fare better in different contexts.
So, what is the best way to achieve life satisfaction? Is it better to live for today or focus
on the future? The findings of the present research might suggest that there may be two routes to
life satisfaction depending on whether or not one holds entity or incremental beliefs. However, it
is important to note that there are pitfalls with both types of goal pursuits (present and future). As
noted earlier in this thesis, focusing on future goals is not only culturally valued (Spears et al.,
2001) but has many concrete positive consequences for individuals in Western society such as
higher socioeconomic status and superior academic achievement (Teahan, 1958; Zimbardo &
Boyd, 1999); both of which are related to higher life satisfaction. Furthermore, people can enjoy
engaging in the process of striving toward a future goal (Diener, 1984; Schmuck & Sheldon,
2001). However, if someone is always focused on the future, they may sacrifice really beneficial
goals along the way, such as building relationships with family and friends.
Focusing on the present has many positive consequences as well. People who engage in
hedonic activities often experience positive emotions (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Sobol-Kwapinska,
2013) which can often lead to feelings of higher life satisfaction in general (Lyubomirsky &
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Layous, 2013). Furthermore, people with a present focus tend to nurture and enjoy their personal
relationships (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). However, with a focus on the present, people may end
up sacrificing important long-term objectives such as their career and may engage in risky
behaviours that lead to negative outcomes (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999).
Perhaps there is a middle ground – a way to strive toward future goals while not
sacrificing the present – where future goals are always on the radar and in sight, but present goals
are also valued. Some might say this type of balanced goal pursuit is a way of “enjoying the
journey.” A quote that sums up this thought nicely is one found in a recent blog-post. The author
states, “you need to have fun if you hope to reach the top of the mountain,” (Linge, 2011).
This concept is somewhat related to what Csikszentmihalyi (1990) might call “flow;”
being immensely engaged in a present-moment activity, where this activity might also benefit
some longer-term future goal. For example, a painter who is deeply engaged in perfecting the
smallest details of a painting knowing that the entire collection of works are to be shown at some
point in the future. It is possible that optimal experience – or optimal life satisfaction is possible
when present and future goals are not considered an ‘either/or’, but rather parts of each other
along the journey.
Limitations and Future Directions
There are a few limitations within present studies that should be pointed out. First, we
discovered late in the process that Study 2 had a failure of random assignment. Without the
corroborating evidence of Study 2, it is important to qualify the strength of the conclusions
considerably until further research is conducted. Although correlational in nature, Study 1 does
show that these relationships exist naturally. Broadly speaking though, replication research will
be an important next step in the research process.
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In some of the studies our sample sizes were somewhat low. For example, in Study 3, we
did not initially plan for a 3-way interaction to examine those low and high in initial life
satisfaction. With two hundred and thirty-nice participants in the study, the final analysis had
approximately 30 participants in each of the eight cells. Similar to what is noted above, future
studies that replicate the results with higher power is an important goal for future studies.
It is also important to note that in the present set of studies we did not test the causal role
of implicit theories. It is possible that temporary shifts in implicit theories (i.e., via manipulation)
might affect one’s feelings of control over the future, one’s willingness to sacrifice the present
for the future or possibly even one’s evaluation of life satisfaction. Furthermore, it is hard to rule
out potential third variables or individual differences that may vary naturally with implicit
theories when implicit theories are simply measured. Thus, we expect to manipulate implicit
theories in future research studies in order to determine the causal role of these belief systems.
Finally, we do not address what goals entity and incremental theorists tend to pursue. It is
quite plausible that the affective reactions (i.e., the life satisfaction evaluations) we document
would be linked to a tendency to pursue goals that produce greater satisfaction (e.g.,
entity/present and increment/future). However, it is also possible that people may sometimes
pursue goals that leave them feeling dissatisfied, at least in the moment. Future research can
extend the focus on life satisfaction responses to a focus on goal decisions and typical patterns of
goal pursuit among entity and incremental theorists, as well as the degree to which these
evaluative responses might contribute to ultimate goal success.
Conclusions
We found that incremental theorists, who believe that attributes are malleable and can
change and develop over time, feel more satisfied with life when prioritizing future goals over

Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction

107

present ones and entity theorists, who believe that attributes are relatively stable over time, feel
more satisfied prioritizing immediate goals over future ones. The present set of studies suggests
that implicit theories of change and stability importantly moderate the effects of temporal focus
on life satisfaction.
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Appendix A: Study 1 Questionnaire
Demographics
Age _________
Gender





Female
Male
Other
Do not wish to answer

Income
Average 'annual' household Income
 Less than 20,000
 20,000 - 30,000
 30,000 - 40,000
 40,000 – 50,000
 50,000 - 60,000
 60,000 - 70,000
 70,000 - 80,000
 80,000 - 100,000
 100,000 – 120,000
 120,000 – 140,000
 More than 140,000

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 1-item measure of Life
Satisfaction
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?
0
Extremely
dissatisfied

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Extremely
satisfied
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Implicit Theories:
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below.
People can’t change the kind of person they are; No matter what they do, their fundamental
attributes stay the same. (R)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
disagree

Strongly
agree

A person’s basic characteristics and traits can’t be changed very much, no matter how hard they
try. (R)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
disagree

Strongly
agree

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for the Future
Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
disagree

Strongly
agree

1. It is more important for me to enjoy life now than plan for the future. (R)
2. I am willing to sacrifice pleasure in the present because I know that it will bring me more
rewards in the future.
3. I am afraid that if I sacrifice pleasure now, I will never experience many of the great things
that life has to offer. (R)
4. I want to have a good time now, even if my future might suffer as a result. (R)

Regulatory Focus
This set of questions asks you HOW FREQUENTLY specific events actually occur or have
occurred in your life.
1
Never or
seldom

2

3

4

5
Very often
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1. Compared to most people, are you typically unable to get what you want out of life? (R)
2. Growing up, would you ever “cross the line”? (R)
3. How often have you accomplished things that got you psyched to work even harder?
4. Did you get on your parents’ nerves often when you were growing up? (R)
5. How often did you obey rules and regulations that were established by your parents?
6. Growing up, did you ever act in ways that your parents thought were objectionable? (R)
7. Do you often do well at different things that you try?
8. Not being careful enough has gotten me into trouble at times. (R)
9. When it comes to achieving things that are important to me, I find that I don’t perform as
well as I ideally would like to do. (R)
10. I feel like I have made progress toward being successful in my life.
11. I have found very few hobbies or activities in my life that capture my interest or motivate
me to put effort into them. (R)

Promotion Orientation, Items: 1, 3, 7, 9, 10, 11
Prevention Orientation, Items: 2, 4, 5, 6, 8

Time Perspective
Below are a number of statements. Read each one and rate: “HOW characteristic the statement
is of you”
1
Very
uncharacteristic
of me

2

3

4

5
Very
characteristic
of me

1. I believe that getting together with one's friends to party is one of life's important pleasures.
2. Familiar childhood sights, sounds, smells often bring back a flood of wonderful memories.
3. Fate determines much in my life.
4. I often think of what I should have done differently in my life.
5. My decisions are mostly influenced by people and things around me.
6. I believe that a person's day should be planned ahead each morning.
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7. It gives me pleasure to think about my past.
8. I do things impulsively.
9. If things don't get done on time, I don't worry about it. (R)
10. When I want to achieve something, I set goals and consider specific means for reaching those
goals.
11. On balance, there is much more good to recall than bad in my past.
12. When listening to my favorite music, I often lose all track of time.
13. Meeting tomorrow's deadlines and doing other necessary work comes before tonight's play.
14. Since whatever will be will be, it doesn't really matter what I do.
15.1 enjoy stories about how things used to be in the "good old times."
16. Painful past experiences keep being replayed in my mind.
17. I try to live my life as fully as possible, one day at a time.
18. It upsets me to be late for appointments.
19. Ideally, I would live each day as if it were my last.
20. Happy memories of good times spring readily to mind.
21. I meet my obligations to friends and authorities on time.
22. I've taken my share of abuse and rejection in the past.
23. I make decisions on the spur of the moment.
24. I take each day as it is rather than try to plan it out. (R)
25. The past has too many unpleasant memories that I prefer not to think about. (R)
26. It is important to put excitement in my life.
27. I've made mistakes in the past that I wish I could undo.
28. I feel that it's more important to enjoy what you're doing than to get work done on time.
29. I get nostalgic about my childhood.
30. Before making a decision, I weigh the costs against the benefits.
31. Taking risks keeps my life from becoming boring.
32. It is more important for me to enjoy life's journey than to focus only on the destination.
33. Things rarely work out as I expected.
34. It's hard for me to forget unpleasant images of my youth.
35. It takes joy out of the process and flow of my activities, if I have to think about goals,
outcomes, and products.
36. Even when I am enjoying the present, I am drawn back to comparisons with similar past
experiences.
37. You can't really plan for the future because things change so much.
38. My life path is controlled by forces I cannot influence.
39. It doesn't make sense to worry about the future, since there is nothing that I can do about it
anyway.
40. I complete projects on time by making steady progress.
41. I find myself tuning out when family members talk about the way things used to be. (R)
42. I take risks to put excitement in my life.
43. I make lists of things to do.
44. I often follow my heart more than my head.
45. I am able to resist temptations when I know that there is work to be done.
46. I find myself getting swept up in the excitement of the moment.
47. Life today is too complicated; I would prefer the simpler life of the past.
48. I prefer friends who are spontaneous rather than predictable.

Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction

49. I like family rituals and traditions that are regularly repeated.
50. I think about the bad things that have happened to me in the past.
51.1 keep working at difficult, uninteresting tasks if they will help me get ahead.
52. Spending what I earn on pleasures today is better than saving for tomorrow's security.
53. Often luck pays off better than hard work.
54. I think about the good things that I have missed out on in my life.
55. I like my close relationships to be passionate.
56. There will always be time to catch up on my work. (R)
Past Negative: 4, 5, 16, 22, 27, 33, 34, 36, 50, 54
Present Hedonistic: 1, 8, 12, 17, 19, 23, 26, 28, 31, 32, 42, 44, 46, 48, 55
Future: 6, 9R, 10, 13, 18, 21, 24R, 30, 40, 43, 45, 51, 56R
Past Positive:2, 7, 11, 15, 20, 25R, 29, 41R, 49
Present Fatalistic: 3, 14, 35, 37, 38, 39, 47, 52, 53
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Appendix B: Study 2 Questionnaire
Demographics
Age _________
Gender





Female
Male
Other
Do not wish to answer

Income
Average 'annual' household Income
 Less than 20,000
 20,000 - 30,000
 30,000 - 40,000
 40,000 – 50,000
 50,000 - 60,000
 60,000 - 70,000
 70,000 - 80,000
 80,000 - 100,000
 100,000 – 120,000
 120,000 – 140,000
 More than 140,000

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 1-item pre-measure of
Life Satisfaction
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
dissatisfied

Right now, I don’t feel very happy. (R)
1

8

9

10
Extremely
satisfied

Mood: pre-measure

Strongly
disagree

7

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction

115

Implicit Theories
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below, as they
apply to yourself.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6
Strongly
agree

1. My personality is a part of who I am and I can’t change it very much. (R)
2. I can always change my personality.
3. The kind of person I am is something very basic about me and it can’t be changed very
much. (R)
4. I can do things differently, but the important parts of who I am can’t really be changed.
(R)
5. I can significantly change my basic characteristics, no matter who I am.
6. As much as I hate to admit it, you can’t teach an old dog new tricks. I can’t really change
my deepest attributes. (R)
7. I can always substantially change the kind of person I am.
8. I am a certain kind of person, and there is not much that can be done to really change
that. (R)
9. No matter what kind of person I am, I can always change very much.
10. I can change even my most basic qualities.

Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction

Approach/Avoidance
Please indicate how much you disagree or agree with each of the following statements.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

1. By nature, I am a very nervous person.
2. Thinking about the things I want really energizes me.
3. It doesn’t take much to make me worry.
4. When I see an opportunity for something I like, I immediately get excited.
5. It doesn’t take a lot to get me excited and motivated.
6. I feel anxiety and fear very deeply.
7. I react very strongly to bad experiences.
8. I’m always on the lookout for positive opportunities and experiences.
9. When it looks like something bad could happen, I have a strong urge to escape.
10. When good things happen to me, it affects me very strongly.
11. When I want something, I feel a strong desire to go after it.
12. It is easy for me to imagine bad things that might happen to me.
Approach – items: 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11
Avoidance – items: 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 12
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Manipulation and Goal Elicitation (Present versus Future focus)
(participants were randomly assigned to one of the following conditions)

Present Focus (i.e., sacrifice future for present)
Read the following carefully.
Sometimes in life, there is a tension between our happiness now (in the present) and what we
hope to achieve in the future. Sometimes we might feel that it is important to sacrifice or set
aside a future goal in order to satisfy an immediate (or present) goal or desire - for example,
we may choose to enjoy a night out with friends now even though it may hinder our work on a
project that might benefit our future career. Or, perhaps the benefits of an enjoyable vacation
now may be prioritized over our desire to save money for the future.
Think of a decision that you are working on these days - or worked on recently - where you are
sacrificing some future benefit in order to prioritize a present benefit. Briefly describe
WHAT that decision was. (We will ask more about this decision later - for now, please just
describe WHAT that decision was).

Future Focus (i.e., sacrifice present for future)
Read the following carefully.
Sometimes in life, there is a tension between our happiness now (in the present) and what we
hope to achieve in the future. Sometimes we might feel that it is important to sacrifice or set
aside an immediate (or present) goal or desire in order to work toward a long-term goal for example, we may choose to sacrifice enjoying a night out with friends now in order to work
on a project that might benefit our future career. Or, perhaps our desire to save money for the
future may be prioritized over the benefits of an enjoyable vacation now.
Think of a decision that you are working on these days - or worked on recently - where you are
sacrificing some present benefit in order to prioritize a future benefit. Briefly describe
WHAT that decision was. (We will ask more about this decision later - for now, please just
describe WHAT that decision was).
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DV: Mood – Happiness Right Now
Please answer the following questions based on how you feel right now. Note the scale before
providing your answers.

Right now, I don't feel very happy. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

7
Strongly
agree

I am not a very happy person. (R)
1

2

3

4

5

6

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

7
Strongly
agree

All things considered, I am quite happy.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

7
Strongly
agree

I feel very happy.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4
Neither
agree
nor
disagree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree
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DV: Life Satisfaction
Please answer the questions below based on how you feel right now.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

1. In most ways my life is close to my ideal.
2. The conditions of my life are excellent.
3. I am satisfied with my life
4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.
5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.

Goal Importance
Earlier in the survey you wrote about a recent decision you have been making (or made) to
prioritize a (present/future) benefit over a (future/present) benefit.
Present focus condition
How unimportant or important was the present goal at the time?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not at all
important

Very
unimportant

Somewhat
unimportant

Neither
important
nor
unimportant

Somewhat
important

Very
important

Extremely
important

How unimportant or important was the future goal at the time?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not at all
important

Very
unimportant

Somewhat
unimportant

Neither
important
nor
unimportant

Somewhat
important

Very
important

Extremely
important

Future focus condition
How unimportant or important was the future goal at the time?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not at all
important

Very
unimportant

Somewhat
unimportant

Neither
important
nor
unimportant

Somewhat
important

Very
important

Extremely
important
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How unimportant or important was the present goal at the time?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not at all
important

Very
unimportant

Somewhat
unimportant

Neither
important
nor
unimportant

Somewhat
important

Very
important

Extremely
important

Consideration of Future Consequences
For each statement below, indicate whether the statement is like you or not like you.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not at all
like me

Not like
me

Not much
like me

Neutral

Somewhat
like me

Like me

Just like
me

1. I consider how things might be in the future, and try to influence those things with my
day to day behavior.
2. Often I engage in a particular behavior in order to achieve outcomes that may not result
for many years.
3. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring the future will take care of itself.
4. My behavior is only influenced by the immediate (i.e., a matter of days or weeks)
outcomes of my actions.
5. My convenience is a big factor in the decisions I make or the actions I take.
6. I am willing to sacrifice my immediate happiness or well-being in order to achieve future
outcomes.
7. I think it is important to take warnings about negative outcomes seriously even if the
negative outcome will not occur for many years.
8. I think it is more important to perform a behavior with important distant consequences
than a behavior with less-important immediate consequences.

9. I generally ignore warnings about possible future problems because I think the problems
will be resolved before they reach crisis level.
10. I think that sacrificing now is usually unnecessary since future outcomes can be dealt
with at a later time.
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11. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring that I will take care of future problems
that may occur at a later date.
12. Since my day to day work has specific outcomes, it is more important to me than
behavior that has distant outcomes.

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for the Future
Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

1. It is more important for me to enjoy life now than plan for the future. (R)
2. I am willing to sacrifice pleasure in the present because I know that it will bring me more
rewards in the future.
3. I am afraid that if I sacrifice pleasure now, I will never experience many of the great things
that life has to offer. (R)
4. I want to have a good time now, even if my future might suffer as a result. (R)
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Appendix C: Study 3 Questionnaire
Demographics
Age _________
Gender





Female
Male
Other
Do not wish to answer

Income
Average 'annual' household Income
 Less than 20,000
 20,000 - 30,000
 30,000 - 40,000
 40,000 – 50,000
 50,000 - 60,000
 60,000 - 70,000
 70,000 - 80,000
 80,000 - 100,000
 100,000 – 120,000
 120,000 – 140,000
 More than 140,000

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 1-item pre-measure of
Life Satisfaction
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
dissatisfied

Right now, I don’t feel very happy. (R)
1

8

9

10
Extremely
satisfied

Mood: pre-measure

Strongly
disagree

7

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree
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Implicit Theories
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below, as they
apply to yourself.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6
Strongly
agree

1. My personality is a part of who I am and I can’t change it very much. (R)
2. I can always change my personality.
3. The kind of person I am is something very basic about me and it can’t be changed very
much. (R)
4. I can do things differently, but the important parts of who I am can’t really be changed.
(R)
5. I can significantly change my basic characteristics, no matter who I am.
6. As much as I hate to admit it, you can’t teach an old dog new tricks. I can’t really change
my deepest attributes. (R)
7. I can always substantially change the kind of person I am.
8. I am a certain kind of person, and there is not much that can be done to really change
that. (R)
9. No matter what kind of person I am, I can always change very much.
10. I can change even my most basic qualities.
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Goal Elicitation
Preamble
For the next sections we will ask you to generate two distinct kinds of financial goals that matter
to you these days. One goal should be a present goal - a goal to spend money now for an
immediate outcome. Another goal should be a future goal - a goal to save money in favor of a
longer-term future outcome (i.e., save now to spend later).

Goal Elicitation
Present Goal - spend money now for an immediate outcome
We all make many financial decisions in life about how and when to spend or save our money.
Sometimes we choose to spend money on things that will bring us enjoyment now and in
the short-term future. Think about a decision you could make now, or very soon in the
future to spend money on something that you will enjoy immediately (without regard to any
longer-term future desires). Briefly describe this short-term spending decision you could make.
(Note: do not describe it in detail - just indicate what the specific short-term spending decision
would be).

Present goal importance
Regarding the spending decision you just listed:
How personally important is it to you to act on the decision to spend now for the short-term?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all
important

7
Extremely
important

Present goal achievement certainty
How certain are you that if you acted on this short-term goal, you would ultimately achieve the
desired outcome?
1
Not certain
at all

2

3

4

5

6

7
Extremely
certain
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Future goal - save money in favor of a longer-term future outcome
We all make many financial decisions in life about how and when to spend or save our money.
Sometimes we choose to save money now in order to achieve some longer-term goal or
make a more distant future purchase. Think about a decision you could make now, or very
soon in the future to save money now in order to work toward a future purchase or other goal
you will enjoy at a future time (without regard to any present or short-term desires). Briefly
describe this long-term future saving decision you could make. (Note: do not describe it in
detail - just indicate what the specific long-term saving decision would be).

Future goal importance
Regarding the saving decision you just listed:
How personally important is it to you to act on the decision to save now for a long-term future
goal?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all
important

7
Extremely
important

Present goal achievement certainty
How certain are you that if you acted on this long-term future goal, you would ultimately
achieve the desired outcome?
1
Not certain
at all

2

3

4

5

6

7
Extremely
certain
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Manipulation – (Present versus Future focus)
(participants were randomly assigned to one condition)
Present focus
There is often a direct tension between our desires now (in the present) and what we hope to
achieve in the future. Sometimes we might feel that it is important to sacrifice, or set aside, a
future goal in order to satisfy an immediate (or present) goal or desire. Think about your
financial goals in this context, and the tension that exists between spending money on things we
want to have or do now and on things we hope to have or do in the long-term future.
On the previous pages, you listed a current desire (spend now) and a future desire (save for the
future). Imagine that only one of these goals can be fulfilled - in this case, focus on fulfilling
only the current desire (spend now) - at the expense of the longer-term desire.
Explain what will happen when you sacrifice the long-term future desire (save for later) and act
on the current desire (spend now). Please imagine carrying out this decision and describe your
thoughts and reactions in detail.

Future focus
There is often a direct tension between our desires now (in the present) and what we hope to
achieve in the future.Sometimes we might feel that it is important to sacrifice, or set aside, an
immediate (or present) goal in order to work toward a long-term goal or desire. Think about
your financial goals in this context, and the tension that exists between spending money on
things we want to have or do now and on things we hope to have or do in the long-term future.
On the previous pages, you listed a current desire (spend now) and a future desire (save for the
future). Imagine that only one of these goals can be fulfilled - in this case, focus on
fulfilling only the future desire (save for the future) - at the expense of the short-term desire.
Explain what will happen when you sacrifice the short-term desire (spend now) and act on the
long-term future desire (save for later). Please imagine carrying out this decision and describe
your thoughts and reactions in detail.
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DV: Mood – Happiness Right Now
Please answer the following questions based on how you feel right now. Note the scale before
providing your answers.

Right now, I don't feel very happy. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

7
Strongly
agree

I am not a very happy person. (R)
1

2

3

4

5

6

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

7
Strongly
agree

All things considered, I am quite happy.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

7
Strongly
agree

I feel very happy.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4
Neither
agree
nor
disagree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree
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DV: Life Satisfaction
Please answer the questions below based on how you feel right now.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

1. In most ways my life is close to my ideal.
2. The conditions of my life are excellent.
3. I am satisfied with my life
4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.
5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for the Future
Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

1. It is more important for me to enjoy life now than plan for the future. (R)
2. I am willing to sacrifice pleasure in the present because I know that it will bring me more
rewards in the future.
3. I am afraid that if I sacrifice pleasure now, I will never experience many of the great things
that life has to offer. (R)
4. I want to have a good time now, even if my future might suffer as a result. (R)
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Appendix D: Study 4 Questionnaire
Demographics
Age _________
Gender





Female
Male
Other
Do not wish to answer

Income
Average 'annual' household Income
 Less than 20,000
 20,000 - 30,000
 30,000 - 40,000
 40,000 – 50,000
 50,000 - 60,000
 60,000 - 70,000
 70,000 - 80,000
 80,000 - 100,000
 100,000 – 120,000
 120,000 – 140,000
 More than 140,000

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 1-item pre-measure of
Life Satisfaction
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
dissatisfied

Right now, I don’t feel very happy. (R)
1

8

9

10
Extremely
satisfied

Mood: pre-measure

Strongly
disagree

7

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree
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Implicit Theories
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below, as they
apply to yourself.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6
Strongly
agree

1. My personality is a part of who I am and I can’t change it very much. (R)
2. I can always change my personality.
3. The kind of person I am is something very basic about me and it can’t be changed very
much. (R)
4. I can do things differently, but the important parts of who I am can’t really be changed.
(R)
5. I can significantly change my basic characteristics, no matter who I am.
6. As much as I hate to admit it, you can’t teach an old dog new tricks. I can’t really change
my deepest attributes. (R)
7. I can always substantially change the kind of person I am.
8. I am a certain kind of person, and there is not much that can be done to really change
that. (R)
9. No matter what kind of person I am, I can always change very much.
10. I can change even my most basic qualities.
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Manipulation Preamble – All participants
Sometimes in life there is a direct tension between our happiness now (in the present) and what
we hope to achieve in the future.
Sometimes we might feel that it is important to sacrifice, or set aside, an immediate (or present)
goal or desire in order to work toward a long-term goal - for example, we may choose to
sacrifice enjoying a night out with friends now in order to work on a project that might benefit
our future career. Or, perhaps our desire to save money for the future may be prioritized over the
benefits of an enjoyable vacation now.
Manipulation (Goal Elicitation) – 3 Conditions, randomly assigned: Control over the
Future, No Control over the Future, Baseline
Control over the Future
Think of a decision that you are working on these days - where you are sacrificing some present
benefit/goal in order to prioritize a future benefit/goal.
This future goal should be one that you are (1) still working on, (2) have decided to pursue
despite the sacrifices that you must make in the present, and (3) achieving the future goal feels
within your "control" and you are "certain" it will work out.
Briefly describe WHAT this decision is. (We will ask you more about this decision later - for
now, please just describe WHAT this decision is).
No Control over the Future
Think of a decision that you are working on these days - where you are sacrificing some present
benefit/goal in order to prioritize a future benefit/goal.
This future goal should be one that you are (1) still working on, (2) have decided to pursue
despite the sacrifices that you must make in the present, and (3) achieving the future goal
feels outside of your "personal control" and you are "uncertain" if it will work out.
Briefly describe WHAT this decision is. (We will ask you more about this decision later - for
now, please just describe WHAT this decision is).
Baseline
Think of a decision that you are working on these days - where you are sacrificing some present
benefit/goal in order to prioritize a future benefit/goal.
This future goal should be one that you are (1) still working on, and (2) have decided to pursue
despite the sacrifices that you must make in the present.
Briefly describe WHAT this decision is. (We will ask you more about this decision later - for
now, please just describe WHAT this decision is).
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DV: Mood – Happiness Right Now
Please answer the following questions based on how you feel right now. Note the scale before
providing your answers.

Right now, I don't feel very happy. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

7
Strongly
agree

I am not a very happy person. (R)
1

2

3

4

5

6

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

7
Strongly
agree

All things considered, I am quite happy.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

7
Strongly
agree

I feel very happy.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4
Neither
agree
nor
disagree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree
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DV: Life Satisfaction
Please answer the questions below based on how you feel right now.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

1. In most ways my life is close to my ideal.
2. The conditions of my life are excellent.
3. I am satisfied with my life
4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.
5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.

Goal Importance
On a previous page, you indicated a decision where you are sacrificing some present
benefit/goal in order to achieve some future benefit/goal.
Please indicate how important the present benefit/goal is to you in general.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all
important

7
Extremely
important

Please indicate how important the future benefit/goal is to you in general.
1
Not at all
important

2

3

4

5

6

7
Extremely
important
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Specific goal certainty/controllability
From "very uncertain" to "very certain" - How "certain" are you that you will be able to attain
this future benefit/goal?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very
uncertain
that I will
attain future
goal/benefit

7
Very certain
that I will
attain future
goal/benefit

To what degree does achieving the future benefit/goal feel "within your control"?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much
within my
control

Not at all
within my
control

General goal certainty/attainability
Please rate your level of disagreement or agreement with the following statements.
Attaining future goals are almost always certain to work out.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

Since whatever will be will be, I am uncertain about future goals working out.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

Future goals are certainly attainable - as long as enough sacrifices are made.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree
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Willingness to Sacrifice Present for the Future
Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

1. It is more important for me to enjoy life now than plan for the future. (R)
2. I am willing to sacrifice pleasure in the present because I know that it will bring me more
rewards in the future.
3. I am afraid that if I sacrifice pleasure now, I will never experience many of the great things
that life has to offer. (R)
4. I want to have a good time now, even if my future might suffer as a result. (R)
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Appendix E: Study 5 Questionnaire
Demographics
Age _________
Gender





Female
Male
Other
Do not wish to answer

Income
Average 'annual' household Income
 Less than 20,000
 20,000 - 30,000
 30,000 - 40,000
 40,000 – 50,000
 50,000 - 60,000
 60,000 - 70,000
 70,000 - 80,000
 80,000 - 100,000
 100,000 – 120,000
 120,000 – 140,000
 More than 140,000

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 1-item pre-measure of
Life Satisfaction
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Extremely
dissatisfied

Right now, I don’t feel very happy. (R)
1

8

9

10
Extremely
satisfied

Mood: pre-measure

Strongly
disagree

7

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree
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Implicit Theories
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below, as they
apply to yourself.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6
Strongly
agree

1. My personality is a part of who I am and I can’t change it very much. (R)
2. I can always change my personality.
3. The kind of person I am is something very basic about me and it can’t be changed very
much. (R)
4. I can do things differently, but the important parts of who I am can’t really be changed.
(R)
5. I can significantly change my basic characteristics, no matter who I am.
6. As much as I hate to admit it, you can’t teach an old dog new tricks. I can’t really change
my deepest attributes. (R)
7. I can always substantially change the kind of person I am.
8. I am a certain kind of person, and there is not much that can be done to really change
that. (R)
9. No matter what kind of person I am, I can always change very much.
10. I can change even my most basic qualities.
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Goal Elicitation – All Participants
Sometimes in life there is a tension between our happiness now (in the present) and what we
hope to achieve in the future.
Sometimes we might feel that it is important to sacrifice, or set aside, an immediate (or present)
goal or desire in order to work toward a long-term goal - for example, we may choose to
sacrifice enjoying a night out with friends now in order to work on a project that might benefit
our future career. Or, perhaps our desire to save money for the future may be prioritized over the
benefits of an enjoyable vacation now.
Think of a decision that you are working on these days - where you are sacrificing some
present benefit/goal in order to prioritize a future benefit/goal.
Briefly describe WHAT this decision is. (We will ask you more about this decision later - for
now, please just describe WHAT this decision is).
Manipulation – Non-Controllable, Controllable, and Baseline

Non-Controllable Future Condition
Think of the future benefit/goal that you just identified. You may work toward this goal, BUT,
the future is less controllable than we sometimes realize, so, we can never be certain that the
goals we are aiming for will work out, despite the sacrifices we make in the present.
Think about how the future benefit/goal you identified is uncertain to work out and write down
the ways that you don't have control over how it might work out.

Controllable Future Condition
Think of the future benefit/goal that you just identified. As you work toward this goal, recall that
the future is actually more controllable than we sometimes realize, so, we can often be pretty
certain that the goals we are aiming for will work out, given the sacrifices we make in the
present.
Think about how the future benefit/goal you identified is relatively certain to work out and write
down the ways that you foresee having control over how it will work out.

Baseline Condition
No task is asked of participants.
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DV: Mood – Happiness Right Now
Please answer the following questions based on how you feel right now. Note the scale before
providing your answers.

Right now, I don't feel very happy. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

7
Strongly
agree

I am not a very happy person. (R)
1

2

3

4

5

6

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

7
Strongly
agree

All things considered, I am quite happy.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Strongly
disagree

7
Strongly
agree

I feel very happy.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4
Neither
agree
nor
disagree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree
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DV: Life Satisfaction
Please answer the questions below based on how you feel right now.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

1. In most ways my life is close to my ideal.
2. The conditions of my life are excellent.
3. I am satisfied with my life
4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.
5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.

Goal Importance
On a previous page, you indicated a decision where you are sacrificing some present
benefit/goal in order to achieve some future benefit/goal.
Please indicate how important the present benefit/goal is to you in general.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all
important

7
Extremely
important

Please indicate how important the future benefit/goal is to you in general.
1
Not at all
important

2

3

4

5

6

7
Extremely
important
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Goal Progress
From 'just beginning' to 'almost completed' - Approximately how far along are you in trying to
attain this future benefit/goal? If you have not started pursuing this goal yet, indicate "have not
started yet."
0

1

2

Have not
started yet

Just
beginning

3

4

5

6

7
Almost
completed

Specific goal certainty/controllability
From "very uncertain" to "very certain" - How "certain" are you that you will be able to attain
this future benefit/goal?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very
uncertain
that I will
attain future
goal/benefit

7
Very certain
that I will
attain future
goal/benefit

To what degree does achieving the future benefit/goal feel "within your control"?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very much
within my
control

Not at all
within my
control

General goal certainty/attainability
Please rate your level of disagreement or agreement with the following statements.
Attaining future goals are almost always certain to work out.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

Since whatever will be will be, I am uncertain about future goals working out.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree
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Future goals are certainly attainable - as long as enough sacrifices are made.
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

3

4

5

6

7

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

Pessimism
1
Strongly
disagree

1.
2.
3.
4.

2
Disagree

There is no guarantee that working hard will get you the future rewards you hope for.
I feel like society doesn't have very much to offer me.
I don't think I'm ever going to make a lot of money.
I know that if I work hard now I will benefit from it in the future. (R)

Optimism
1
Strongly
disagree

2
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7

Somewhat
disagree

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.
2. If something can go wrong for me, it will. (R)
3. I'm always optimistic about my future.
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Willingness to Sacrifice Present for the Future
Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
disagree

Strongly
agree

1. It is more important for me to enjoy life now than plan for the future. (R)
2. I am willing to sacrifice pleasure in the present because I know that it will bring me more
rewards in the future.
3. I am afraid that if I sacrifice pleasure now, I will never experience many of the great things
that life has to offer. (R)
4. I want to have a good time now, even if my future might suffer as a result. (R)

Sacrifice the Present: One vs. Many Instances
For today's exercise . . . when you thought about giving up a present goal/benefit - would you say
this is a "one time" sacrifice? OR, is it about giving up "several" immediate rewards? -- i.e.,
making many immediate sacrifices over time on the way to the future goal/benefit.
On the scale below . . To what degree did "sacrificing" the present represent a 'one time' sacrifice
versus 'many sacrifices' over time?
1
One time
sacrifice

2

3

4

5

6

7
Many
sacrifices
over time
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Tables and Figures

Table 1
Study 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Measures

Means (SD)
Life Satisfaction

7.12 (2.31)

Implicit Theories of Personalityi

4.59 (1.54)

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future

4.61 (1.27)

Promotion Orientation

3.57 (0.66)

Prevention Orientation

3.36 (1.06)

Time Perspective
Past Negative

3.01 (0.75)

Past Positive

3.39 (0.82)

Future

3.59 (0.63)

Present Hedonic

3.04 (0.71)

Present Fatalistic

2.45 (0.68)

Note. i Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
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Table 2
Study 1: Intercorrelations among all Independent and Dependent variables (overall)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1. Life Satisfaction

-

2. Implicit Theoriesi

-.03

-

3. Willingness to Sacrifice

-.01

.22**

-

4. Promotion Orientation

.54**

.18**

.10

-

5. Prevention Orientation

.07

-.16*

.12†

.05

-

6. Past Negative

-.49**

-.09

-.12†

-.50**

-.22**

-

7. Past Positive

.39**

-.01

.03

.28**

.16*

-.28**

-

8. Future

.22**

.11

.44**

.30**

.30**

-.12†

.16*

-

9. Present Hedonic

.21*

.01

-.36**

.18**

-.45**

.07

.21**

-.35**

-

10. Present Fatalistic

-.19*

-.32**

-.45**

-.31**

-.08

.33**

.04

-.39**

.30**

Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p = .07.
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.

10

-
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Table 3
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Implicit Theory of Personality and Willingness to Sacrifice the
Present for the Future
β

t

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.029

-.406

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future

-.007

-0.10

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.012

-.164

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future

-.024

-.332

Implicit Theory X Willingness to Sacrifice

.201

2.876*

Predictor
Step 1

Step 2

Note. Standardized coefficients.
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
* p = .004
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Table 4
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Promotion Orientation and Willingness to Sacrifice the Present
for the Future
β

t

Promotion Orientation

.548

9.186**

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future

-.069

-1.161

Promotion Orientation

.548

9.107**

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future

-.069

-1.156

Promotion Orientation X Willingness to Sacrifice

.007

.112

Predictor
Step 1

Step 2

Note. Standardized coefficients.
* p < .001
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Table 5
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Prevention Orientation and Willingness to Sacrifice the
Present for the Future
β

t

Prevention Orientation

.074

1.036

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future

-.023

-.318

Prevention Orientation

.075

1.052

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future

-.009

-.124

Prevention Orientation X Willingness to Sacrifice

.083

1.157

Predictor
Step 1

Step 2

Note. Standardized coefficients.
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Table 6
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Implicit Theory of Personality and Promotion Orientation
β

t

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.134

-2.245*

Promotion Orientation

.565

9.454**

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.138

-2.316*

Promotion Orientation

.570

9.590**

Implicit Theory X Promotion Orientation

.108

1.843†

Predictor
Step 1

Step 2

Note. Standardized coefficients.
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
** p < .001, * p < .05, †p = .067
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Table 7
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Implicit Theory of Personality and Prevention Orientation
β

t

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.020

-.286

Prevention Orientation

.068

.948

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.016

-.222

Prevention Orientation

.064

.890

Implicit Theory X Prevention Orientation

.054

.760

Predictor
Step 1

Step 2

Note. Standardized coefficients.
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
* p = .004
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Table 8
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Implicit Theory of Personality and Promotion Orientation
β

t

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.12

-1.91†

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future

-.05

-.81

Promotion Orientation

.57

9.40**

Prevention Orientation

.03

.51

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.11

-1.81†

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future

-.06

-1.07

Promotion Orientation

.57

9.84**

Prevention Orientation

.04

.59

Implicit Theory X Willingness to Sacrifice

.24

4.00**

Promotion X Willingness to Sacrifice

-.10

-1.50

Implicit Theory X Promotion

.10

1.52

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.10

-1.68†

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future

-.06

-.95

Promotion Orientation

.59

9.50**

Prevention Orientation

.04

.63

Implicit Theory X Willingness to Sacrifice

.24

4.03**

Promotion X Willingness to Sacrifice

-.11

-1.67†

Implicit Theory X Promotion

.08

1.26

ImpTheory X WilltoSac X Promotion

-.06

-.82

Predictor
Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Note. Standardized coefficients.
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
** p < .01, * p < .05, †p < .10
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Table 9
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Implicit Theory of Personality and Present Hedonic Time
Perspective
β

t

Future

.12

1.95*

Present Fatalistic

-.02

-.24

Past Negative

-.39

-6.00**

Past Positive

.26

4.12**

Future

.23

3.52**

Present Fatalistic

-.10

-1.52

Past Negative

-.41

-6.63**

Past Positive

.17

2.83**

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.13

-2.18*

Present Hedonic

.32

5.02**

Future

.22

3.42**

Present Fatalistic

-.12

-1.73†

Past Negative

-.39

-6.34**

Past Positive

.17

2.85**

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.12

-2.12*

Present Hedonic

.31

5.03**

Implicit Theory X Present Hedonic

-.12

-2.21*

Predictor
Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Note. Standardized coefficients.
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
** p < .01, * p < .05, †p < .10
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Table 10
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Implicit Theory of Personality and Future Time Perspective
β

t

Present Hedonic

.23

3.76**

Present Fatalistic

-.14

-2.14*

Past Negative

-.39

-6.13**

Past Positive

.24

3.85**

Present Hedonic

.32

5.02**

Present Fatalistic

-.10

-1.52

Past Negative

-.41

-6.63**

Past Positive

.17

2.83**

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.13

-2.18*

Future

.23

3.52**

Present Hedonic

.32

5.02**

Present Fatalistic

-.10

-1.46

Past Negative

-.41

-6.62**

Past Positive

.17

2.68**

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.13

-2.21*

Future

.22

3.43**

Implicit Theory X Future

.05

0.92ns

Predictor
Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Note. Standardized coefficients.
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
** p < .01, * p < .05
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Table 11
Study 1: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Implicit Theory of Personality and Present Fatalistic Time
Perspective
β

t

Present Hedonic

.29

4.67**

Future

.24

3.99**

Past Negative

-.43

-7.35**

Past Positive

.17

2.75**

Present Hedonic

.32

5.02**

Future

.23

3.52**

Past Negative

-.41

-6.63**

Past Positive

.17

2.83**

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.13

-2.18*

Present Fatalistic

-.10

-1.52**

Present Hedonic

.29

4.76**

Future

.20

3.11**

Past Negative

-.38

-6.18**

Past Positive

.18

2.95**

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.12

-2.09*

Present Fatalistic

-.11

-1.69†

Implicit Theory X Present Fatalistic

-.18

3.17**

Predictor
Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Note. Standardized coefficients.
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
** p < .01, * p < .05, †p < .10
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Table 12
Study 2: Intercorrelations among all Independent and Dependent variables (overall)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1. Life Satisfaction - DV

-

2. Mood (positive) - DV

.80**

-

3. Life Satisfaction premeasure
4. Mood pre-measure (i.e., not

.87**

.78**

-

-.63**

-.66**

-.61**

-

-.02

.09

-.04

-.02

-

6. Approach Orientation

.27**

.37**

.25**

-.17*

.15*

-

7. Avoidance Orientation

-.46**

-.52**

-.43**

.40**

.01

.02

-

8. Consid of Future Consequ.

.19*

.22**

.17*

-.16*

.13†

.14*

-.28**

-

9. Willingness to Sacrifice

.00

.04

.00

-.07

.12†

-.06

-.10

.64**

-

10. Importance of Present Goal

.01

-.07

.02

.06

.08

.05

.05

.03

-.11

-

11. Importance of Future Goal

-.03

.03

-.04

-.02

.13†

.21**

.05

.10

.18*

-.01

happy right now)

5. Implicit Theories i

Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p ≤ .10.
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
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Table 13
Study 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Measures by Condition
Present Focus
Condition

Future Focus
Condition

Means (SD)

Means (SD)

Life Satisfaction (DV)

4.51a (1.65)

4.33a (1.63)

Mood (positive) - DV

5.07a (1.64)

4.97a (1.56)

Life Satisfaction pre-measure

7.71a (2.55)

7.40a (2.57)

Mood pre-measure (i.e., Not happy right now)

3.04a (1.99)

3.17a (1.82)

Implicit Theories of Personalityi

3.25a (1.20)

3.18a (1.14)

Approach Orientation

5.33a (.91)

5.29a (.83)

Avoidance Orientation

3.93a (1.61)

3.97a (1.48)

Consideration of Future Consequences

4.89a (.96)

4.85a (.99)

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future

4.52a (1.08)

5.00b (1.14)

Importance of Present Goal

5.94a (1.01)

5.05b (1.60)

Importance of Future Goal

5.57a (1.38)

6.14b (.73)

Measures

Note. Different subscripts within a row indicate a significant difference (p ≤ .01).
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
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Table 14
Study 2: Regressing Life Satisfaction (DV) onto Condition (present focus vs. future focus) and Implicit
Theory of Personality
β

t

Condition (present vs. future)

-.06

-.80

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.02

-0.33

Condition (present vs. future)

-.06

-.78

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.01

-.13

Condition X Implicit Theory

.14

1.91†

Predictor
Step 1

Step 2

Note. Standardized coefficients.
Effect coding for condition: Present = -1
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
†
p = .057
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Table 15
Study 2: Regressing Life Satisfaction (DV) onto Condition (present focus vs. future focus), Implicit
Theory of Personality while controlling for initial life satisfaction.
β

t

1.42

75.56**

Life Satisfaction pre-measure

1.42

23.87**

Condition (present vs. future)

-.03

-.41

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.02

.41

Life Satisfaction pre-measure

1.42

23.53**

Condition (present vs. future)

-.02

-.41

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.02

.46

Condition X Implicit Theory

.03

.55

Predictor
Step 1
Life Satisfaction pre-measure
Step 2

Step 3

Note. Standardized coefficients.
Effect coding for condition: Present = -1
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
** p < .01
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Table 16
Study 2: Regressing Initial Life Satisfaction (i.e., LS pre-measure) onto Condition (present focus vs.
future focus) and Implicit Theory of Personality.
β

t

Condition (present vs. future)

-.15

-.82

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.09

-0.54

Condition (present vs. future)

-.15

-.79

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.06

-.36

Condition X Implicit Theory

.30

1.83†

Predictor
Step 1

Step 2

Note. Standardized coefficients.
Effect coding for condition: Present = -1
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
†
p =.068
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Table 17
Study 3: Intercorrelations among all Independent and Dependent variables (overall)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1. Life Satisfaction - DV

-

2. Mood (positive) - DV

.68**

-

3. Life Satisfaction pre-measure

.81**

.63**

-

4. Mood pre-measure (i.e., not
happy right now)

-.68**

-.77**

-.73**

-

5. Income

.17*

.01

.17*

-.04

-

6. Implicit Theories i

.05

.23**

.08

-.19**

-.09

-

7. Willingness to Sacrifice

-.04

-.01

.01

-.02

-.03

.10

-

8. Importance of Present Goal

.09

.11†

.07

-.14*

-.10

.11

-.20**

-

9. Achieve Present Goal Certainty

.13*

.14*

.10

-.15*

-.06

.16*

.07

.33**

-

10. Importance of Future Goal

.05

.11†

.06

-.05

-.11†

-.06

.19**

.21**

.27**

-

11. Achieve Future Goal Certainty

.29**

.34**

.27**

-.23**

-.05

.15*

.16*

.11†

.37**

.33**

Note. ** p< .01, * p< .05, †p ≤ .10.
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
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Table 18
Study 3: Means and Standard Deviations of Measures by Condition
Present Focus
Condition

Future Focus
Condition

Means (SD)

Means (SD)

Life Satisfaction (DV)

4.11a (1.50)

4.35a (1.42)

Mood (positive) - DV

4.48a (1.68)

4.78a (1.63)

Life Satisfaction pre-measure

7.04a (2.27)

7.55b (2.07)

Mood pre-measure (i.e., Not happy right now)

3.23a (1.87)

2.90a (1.76)

Income

$55.63K a ($35K)

$53.78K a ($32K)

Implicit Theories of Personalityi

3.59a (1.19)

3.67a (1.22)

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for Future

4.32a (1.19)

4.36a (1.24)

Importance of Present Goal

4.45a (1.62)

4.41a(1.65)

Achieve Present Goal Certainty

5.73a (1.30)

5.84a (1.34)

Importance of Future Goal

5.79a (1.34)

5.95a (1.32)

Achieve Future Goal Certainty

5.29a (1.50)

5.43a (1.48)

Measures

Note. Different subscripts within a row indicate a marginal difference (p = .055).
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
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Table 19
Study 3: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Condition (present focus vs. future focus), Implicit Theory of
Personality and OECD Life Satisfaction pre-measure.
β

t

Condition (present vs. future)

-.01

-.37

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.01

.79

OECD Life Satisfaction (LS) pre-measure

.82

21.37**

Condition (present vs. future)

-.02

-.45

Implicit Theory of Personality i

-.01

-.25

OECD Life Satisfaction pre-measure

.82

21.32**

Condition X Implicit Theory

.05

1.24

Implicit Theory X OECD LS

-.05

-1.28

Condition X OECD LS

.00

.09

Condition (present vs. future)

-.01

-.32

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.01

.12

OECD Life Satisfaction pre-measure

.82

21.54**

Condition X Implicit Theory

.05

1.41

Implicit Theory X OECD LS

-.06

-1.57

Condition X OECD LS

.01

.31

Implicit Theory X Condition X OECD LS

-.08

-2.18*

Predictor
Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Note. Standardized coefficients.
Effect coding for condition: Present = -1
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
** p < .01, * p < .05
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Table 20
Study 3: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Condition (present focus vs. future focus) and Implicit Theory
of Personality for the group initially low in Life Satisfaction
β

t

Condition (present vs. future)

-.01

-.06

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.10

.96

Condition (present vs. future)

-.02

-.17

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.13

1.26

Condition X Implicit Theory

.22

2.18*

Predictor
Step 1

Step 2

Note. Low in initial life satisfaction.
Standardized coefficients.
Effect coding for condition: Present = -1
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
*p = .03
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Table 21
Study 4: Means and Standard Deviations of Measures by Original Condition
Future Lack
of Control
Condition

Future
Baseline
Condition

Future
Controllable
Condition

Means (SD)

Means (SD)

Means (SD)

Life Satisfaction (DV)

3.94a (1.43)

4.04a (1.40)

4.23a (1.29)

Mood (positive) – DV

4.23a (1.52)

4.86b (1.36)

4.57ab (1.45)

Life Satisfaction pre-measure

7.00a (2.34)

7.35a (2.08)

7.42a (1.95)

Mood pre-measure (i.e., Not happy
right now)

3.36a (1.69)

2.95a (1.63)

3.23a (1.69)

Implicit Theories of Personalityi

3.50a (1.20)

3.54a (1.07)

3.59a (1.08)

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for
Future

4.62a (1.09)

4.79a (1.08)

4.63a (1.12)

Importance of Present Goal

5.47a (1.49)

5.26ab (1.48)

5.03b (1.47)

Importance of Future Goal

6.00a (1.21)

6.11a (1.11)

5.94 a (1.11)

Specific goal certainty/controllability

5.20a (1.39)

5.18a (1.58)

5.43a (1.03)

General future goal certainty
composite

4.58ab (1.13)

4.80a (1.06)

4.52b† (.86)

Measures

Note. Different subscripts within a row indicate a significant difference (p < .05). Subscripts with a †
notation indicate a marginal difference (p ≤ .10).
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
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Table 22
Study 4: Intercorrelations among all Independent and Dependent Variables (overall)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1. Life Satisfaction - DV

-

2. Mood (positive) - DV

.68**

-

3. Life Satisfaction premeasure
4. Mood pre-measure (i.e., not

.77**

.68**

-

-.62**

-.80**

-.64**

-

5. Implicit Theories i

.15*

.14*

.13*

-.09

-

6. Willingness to Sacrifice

.20**

.23**

.20**

-.23**

.25**

-

7. Importance of Present Goal

.08

.09

.03

-.02

.18**

.14*

-

8. Importance of Future Goal

.05

.12†

.08

-.10

.15*

.42**

.36**

-

.34**

.36**

.37**

-.30**

.13*

.33**

.17**

.30**

-

.43**

.37**

.39**

-.29**

.24*

.37**

.17**

.24**

.49**

happy right now)

9. Specific goal
certainty/controllability
10. General future goal
certainty composite

Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p = .07.
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
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Table 23
Study 4: Intercorrelations among Highlighted Variables (controlling for initial condition)
1

2

3

4

5

1. Life Satisfaction - DV

-

2. Mood (positive) - DV

.69**

3. Implicit Theories i

.15*

.13*

-

4. Willingness to Sacrifice

.20**

.23**

.25**

-

5. Specific goal
certainty/controllability
6. General future goal
certainty composite

.34**

.35**

.12†

.33**

-

.43**

.37**

.27**

.42**

.54**

Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p = .06
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
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Table 24
Study 5: Means and Standard Deviations of Measures by Condition
Future Lack
of Control
Condition

Future
Baseline
Condition

Future
Controllable
Condition

Means (SD)

Means (SD)

Means (SD)

Life Satisfaction (DV)

4.15a (1.58)

4.25ab (1.55)

4.55b† (1.56)

Mood (positive) - DV

4.47a (1.61)

4.55ab (1.65)

5.00c (1.57)

Life Satisfaction pre-measure

7.11a (2.52)

7.14a (2.44)

7.42a (2.43)

Mood pre-measure (i.e., Not happy right
now)

3.05a (1.90)

3.08 a (1.74)

2.73a (1.57)

Implicit Theories of Personalityi

3.47a (1.09)

3.56a (1.13)

3.58a (1.21)

Importance of Present Goal

5.36a (1.46)

5.35a (1.41)

5.03a (1.51)

Importance of Future Goal

6.37ab (.85)

6.25a (.97)

6.44b† (.71)

Goal Progress

5.08a (2.28)

4.28b (2.13)

4.87ac (2.03)

Specific goal certainty/controllability

5.16a (1.27)

5.51b (1.37)

5.87c (1.09)

General future goal certainty composite

4.45ac (1.03)

4.62a (1.12)

4.99b (1.02)

Pessimism

3.80ac (1.20)

3.70a (1.19)

3.36b (1.21)

Optimism

4.27a (1.41)

4.44ab (1.41)

4.70b (1.33)

Willingness to Sacrifice Present for
Future

4.72a (1.07)

4.75a (1.27)

5.00b† (1.13)

One vs. many sacrifices k

3.81a (1.31)

3.71a (1.44)

3.91a (1.26)

Measures

Note. Different subscripts within a row indicate a significant difference (p < .05). Subscripts with a †
notation indicate a marginal difference (p ≤ .10).
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
k
Higher scores indicate many sacrifices.

Cindy Ward – Temporal Focus, Implicit Theories and Life Satisfaction

174

Table 25
Study 5: Intercorrelations among all Independent and Dependent Variables (overall)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1. Life Satisfaction - DV

-

2. Mood (positive) - DV

.73**

-

3. Life Satisfaction premeasure

.83**

.74**

-

4. Mood pre-measure

-.73**

-.83**

-.80**

-

.13*

.13*

.09†

-.10†

-

.10

.07

.07

-.11*

-.02

-

.03

.05

.03

-.10†

-.07

.29**

-

.01

-.04

-.03

.07

-.07

-.05

.07

-

9. Specific goal certainty/
controllability

.37**

.38**

.36**

-.35**

.04

.04

.22**

.11*

-

10. General future goal
certainty composite

.40**

.43**

.37**

-.42**

.14**

.04

.16*

-.03

.53**

-

11. Pessimism

-.50**

-.53**

-.51**

.53**

-.18**

-.12*

-.18**

.07

-.48**

-.64**

-

12. Optimism

.63**

.63**

.61**

-.61 **

.23**

.11*

.10†

.02

.47**

.57**

-.70**

-

.06

.11*

.07**

-.11*

.08

.05

.23**

-.06

.22**

.31**

-.35**

.15**

-

-.06

-.17**

.11*

.03

-.07

.15**

-.07

-.12*

-.11*

.14*

-.14*

.07

(i.e., not happy right now)

5. Implicit Theoriesi
6. Importance of Present
Goal
7. Importance of Future
Goal
8. Goal progress

13. Willingness to Sacrifice

14. One vs. Many
-.16**
Sacrifices
Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p ≤ .10
i
k

Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
Higher scores indicate many sacrifices.
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Table 26
Study 5: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Condition (no control, baseline, control) and Implicit
Theory of Personality.
β

t

Condition (lack of control, baseline, controllable)

.08

1.57

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.13

2.39*

Condition (lack of control, baseline, controllable)

.08

1.58

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.12

2.32*

Condition X Implicit Theories

.06

1.06

Predictor
Step 1

Step 2

Note. Standardized coefficients.
Effect coding for condition: Lack of control = -1, baseline = 0
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
* p = .02
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Table 27
Study 5: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Condition (lack of control, baseline, controllable), Implicit
Theory of Personality and OECD Life-Satisfaction pre-measure.
β

t

Condition (lack of control, baseline, controllable)

.05

1.51

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.06

1.87

OECD Life Satisfaction (LS) pre-measure

.83

27.73**

Condition (lack of control, baseline, controllable)

.05

1.53

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.05

1.80

OECD Life Satisfaction pre-measure

.83

27.65**

Condition X Implicit Theory

.05

1.56

Implicit Theory X OECD LS

.02

51

Condition X OECD LS

-.03

-1.12

Condition (lack of control, baseline, controllable)

.05

1.66†

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.06

1.83†

OECD Life Satisfaction pre-measure

.82

27.56**

Condition X Implicit Theory

.05

1.61

Implicit Theory X OECD LS

.02

.71

Condition X OECD LS

-.04

-1.31

Implicit Theory X Condition X OECD LS

-.04

-1.36

Predictor
Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Note. Standardized coefficients.
Effect coding for condition: Lack of control = -1, baseline = 0
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
** p < .01, * p < .05, †p < .10
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Table 28
Study 5: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Condition (dummy coded) and Implicit Theory of
Personality for the group initially low in Life Satisfaction
β

t

Dummy1.Base.Controllable

.12

1.47

Dummy2.Base.LackControl

-.08

-.91

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.22

2.94**

Dummy1.Base.Controllable

.12

1.39

Dummy2.Base.LackControl

-.08

-.97

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.13

1.14

Implicit Theory X Dummy1.B.C

.20

2.00*

Implicit Theory X Dummy2.Base.LC

-.04

-.43

Dummy3.LackControl.Controllable

.20

2.25*

Dummy4.LackControl.Base

.08

.91

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.221

2.94**

Dummy3.LackControl.Controllable

.20

2.25*

Dummy4.LackControl.Base

.09

.97

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.05

.36

Implicit Theory X Dummy3.LC.C

.24

2.20*

Implicit Theory X Dummy4.LC.B

.05

.43

Predictor
Regression 1
Step 1

Step 2

Regression 2
Step 1

Step 2

Note. Low in initial life satisfaction
Standardized coefficients.
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
** p < .01, * p < .05

178

Table 29
Study 5: Regressing Life Satisfaction onto Condition (dummy coded) and Implicit Theory of
Personality for the group initially high in Life Satisfaction
β

t

Dummy1.Base.Controllable

.10

1.17

Dummy2.Base.LackControl

.01

.14

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.17

2.25*

Dummy1.Base.Controllable

.10

1.23

Dummy2.Base.LackControl

.02

.19

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.23

1.78†

Implicit Theory X Dummy1.B.C

-.11

-.97

Implicit Theory X Dummy2.Base.LC

-.01

-.05

Dummy3.LackControl.Control

.09

1.00

Dummy4.LackControl.Base

-.01

-.14

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.17

2.48*

Dummy3.LackControl.Control

.09

1.01

Dummy4.LackControl.Base

-.02

-.19

Implicit Theory of Personality i

.22

1.69†

Implicit Theory X Dummy3.LC.C

-.10

-.91

Implicit Theory X Dummy4.LC.B

.01

.05

Predictor
Regression 1
Step 1

Step 2

Regression 2
Step 1

Step 2

Note. High in initial life satisfaction
Standardized coefficients.
i
Higher scores indicate a greater endorsement of incremental theory.
** p < .01, * p < .05
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Figure 1. Study 1: Life Satisfaction Ratings as a function of Implicit Theories and
Willingness to Sacrifice Present for the future
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Figure 2. Study 1: Life Satisfaction Ratings as a function of Implicit Theories and Regulatory
Focus.
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Figure 3. Study 1: Life Satisfaction Ratings as a function of Implicit Theories and Present
Hedonic Time Perspective.
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Figure 4. Study 1: Life Satisfaction Ratings as a function of Implicit Theories and Future
Focus Time Perspective.

183

9
OECD Life Satisfaction

8.5

8
7.5

7

Lo Pres Fatalistic

6.5

Hi Pres Fatalistic

6
5.5
5
4.5
Entity

Incremental

Figure 5. Study 1: Life Satisfaction Ratings as a function of Implicit Theories and Present
Fatalistic Time Perspective.
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Figure 6. Study 2: Life Satisfaction Ratings (DV) as a function of Implicit Theories and
Present versus Future Focus Manipulated Condition.
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Figure 7. Study 2: Initial Life Satisfaction Ratings as a function of Implicit Theories and
Present versus Future Focus Manipulated Condition.
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Figure 8. Study 3: For those initially high in Life Satisfaction – Life Satisfaction Ratings
(DV) as a function of Implicit Theories and Present versus Future Focus Manipulated
Condition.
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Figure 9. Study 3: For those initially low in Life Satisfaction - Life Satisfaction Ratings (DV)
as a function of Implicit Theories and Present versus Future Focus Manipulated Condition.
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Specific Goal
Certainty/
Controllability

b = .15
(p =
.05)

Implicit Theories

c path b = .18, (p =
.03)
c’ path b = .13, (p =
.10)

b = .33
(p <
.001)

Life
Satisfaction

Figure 10. Study 4. Path analysis demonstrating that specific goal certainty/controllability
mediates the relationship between implicit theories and life satisfaction (DV); 95% CI [.01,
.13], p < .05.
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Figure 11. Study 4. Path analysis demonstrating that general goal certainty mediates the
relationship between implicit theories and life satisfaction (DV); 95% CI [.05, .22], p < .05.
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Figure 12. Study 4. Path analysis demonstrating that specific goal certainty/controllability
mediates the relationship between implicit theories and willingness to sacrifice the present for
the future; 95% CI [.01, .10], p < .05.
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Figure 13. Study 4. Path analysis demonstrating that general goal certainty mediates the
relationship between implicit theories and willingness to sacrifice the present for the future;
95% CI [.05, .19], p < .05.
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Figure 14. Study 5: For those initially low in Life Satisfaction - Life Satisfaction Ratings
(DV) as a function of Implicit Theories and Manipulated Condition.
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Figure 15. Study 5: For those initially high in Life Satisfaction - Life Satisfaction Ratings
(DV) as a function of Implicit Theories and Manipulated Condition.

194

160
140

Frequency

120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1 - One
time
sacrifice

2

3

4

5 - Many
sacrifices
over time

Figure 16. Study 5: Histogram – the degree to which "sacrificing" the present represented
a 'one time' sacrifice versus 'many sacrifices' over time.

